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ABSTRACT 
Whilst a substantial amount of research has investigated the role of affective distress 
and features of personality in memory complaints made by older adults, little effort 
has been directed towards understanding their distinct contributions to complaints. 
Given considerable overlap between affective distress and features of personality, 
such evidence is necessary to inform theoretical frameworks pertaining to memory 
complaints and clarify results from other empirical studies examining these concepts. 
Consequently, the current study examined symptoms of depression and anxiety as 
predictors of memory complaints within the context of features of personality and 
other relevant contextual variables (i.e., age, gender, education, premorbid 
intellectual functioning and memory performance) utilizing a correlational design. 
Study participants included 177 (115 females, 62 males) community-dwelling older 
adults between 65 and 90 years of age. The results of the study unanimously 
suggested that affective distress (i.e., depressive and anxiety symptomatology) was 
not associated with memory complaints beyond pertinent features of personality and 
other relevant contextual variables. This finding was consistent regardless of how 
memory complaints were assessed (i.e., General Frequency of Forgetting scores or 
via a global, dichotomous measure) or how affective distress was conceptualized 
(i.e., overall or specific features of depression and anxiety). The results suggest 
changes to several theoretical frameworks in the memory complaint literature are 
necessary, if the results can be replicated with different variable measures. From a 
clinical perspective, the results of the current study suggest older adults complaining 
of memory difficulties may exhibit an ongoing risk of symptoms of depression and 
anxiety. In addition, the results also help to clarify why cognitively-healthy older 
adults who complain of memory problems exhibit an increased risk of subsequent 
dementia. 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter One 
 Many older adults report problems with their memory, despite such reports 
typically showing only weak relationships with objective memory performance. 
 Memory complaints appear to be more robustly associated with affective distress 
and aspects of personality. 
 Despite a clear association between affective distress and features of personality, 
little effort has been invested in disentangling this association in the context of 
memory complaints in older adults. 
 This thesis attempts to clarify the unique contribution of affective distress to 
memory complaints beyond the role of personality. 
 The results of the research have theoretical and clinical implications and will 
assist with the interpretation of studies previously examining predictors of 
memory complaints. 
 To achieve its aims, the research described in this thesis incorporates two 
patterns of affective distress (symptoms of depression and anxiety) and five 
features of personality (those comprising the Five Factor Model of Personality). 
 The thesis has two sections: section one reviews relevant empirical and 
theoretical literature; section two details the current study and ensuing 
discussion. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Whilst research investigating the epidemiology of memory dysfunction in 
older adults is currently making considerable headway, memory-related problems 
still present a key concern of older adults to the extent that they exceed concerns 
associated with death and dying (Dark-Freudeman, West, & Viverito, 2006). Recent 
estimates suggest that approximately two-thirds of community-dwelling older adults 
between 70 and 90 years of age report difficulties with their memory as well as a 
decline in function over the previous 10 years (Slavin et al., 2010). However, such 
self-reports of memory difficulties are inconsistently associated with concurrent 
memory performance (Hertzog & Pearman, 2014; Reid & MacLullich, 2006) and 
discerning their primary source(s) has proven challenging. In fact the complexity that 
underlies memory complaints in older adulthood, coupled with the potential value of 
understanding them, has given rise to 25 years of persistent research efforts with few 
significant breakthroughs. 
Considerable research effort has been expended on examining whether 
memory complaints are predictive of memory performance or other associated 
factors, including general cognitive functioning, age, medical conditions (e.g., 
stroke), dementia diagnoses and a range of other variables (for a review, see Reid & 
MacLullich, 2006). Despite such efforts, few factors have been found to be 
consistently related to memory complaints. For example, some studies have reported 
weak associations between memory complaints and memory performance on 
psychometrically-validated tests of cognitive function (Jonker, Launer, Hooijer, & 
Lindeboom, 1996; Lam, Lui, Tam, & Chiu, 2005), whilst others have reported no 
such association (Jungwirth et al., 2004; O’Connor, Pollitt, Roth, Brook, & Reiss, 
1990; Pearman & Hertzog, in press). Similarly, other studies have found memory 
complaints to be predictive of subsequent cognitive decline (Dik et al., 2001; Jorm, 
Christensen, Korten, Jacomb, & Henderson, 2001) and dementia (Schmand, Jonker, 
Hooijer, & Lindeboom, 1996; Wang et al., 2004), whilst others have not (Jorm et al., 
1997; Smith, Petersen, Ivnik, Malec, & Tangalos, 1996; Taylor, Miller, & 
Tinklenberg, 1992). 
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In contrast, more recent literature suggests memory complaints are most 
robustly associated with aspects of affective distress, particularly depression or 
symptoms of it. Several studies have reported this link (e.g., Dux et al., 2008; 
Pearman & Hertzog, in press; Potter, Hartman, & Ward, 2009; Slavin et al., 2010) 
and whilst the strength of the relationship differs according to the measures of 
depression and complaints used, few (if any) published studies have reported the 
absence of a significant zero-order relationship between them (although publication 
bias may play a role here). Likewise, a number of studies have also reported 
associations between memory complaints and anxiety (Jungwirth et al., 2004; 
Lautenschlager, Flicker, Vasikaran, Leedman, & Almeida, 2005; Potter & Hartman, 
2006), suggesting memory complaints may be more closely tied to forms of affective 
distress than the presence of any objective memory or cognitive impairment. 
Alternatively, a handful of studies have also highlighted associations between 
memory complaints and more stable, enduring aspects of personality (Kliegel, 
Zimprich, & Eschen, 2005; Pearman & Hertzog, in press; Pearman & Storandt, 
2004, 2005). For example, studies by Pearman and Storandt (2004) and Kliegel et al. 
both found memory complaints to be significantly associated with neuroticism, a 
fundamental personality trait of the Five-Factor Model of Personality (McCrae & 
Costa, 1987; McCrae & Oliver, 1992). Pearman and Storandt (2005) then extended 
this in a later study, suggesting memory complaints were most closely associated 
with a single facet of conscientiousness (self-discipline) and two facets of 
neuroticism (self-consciousness and anxiety). Consequently, Pearman and Storandt 
(2005) concluded that assistance for older adults with memory complaints should 
focus on enhancing self-discipline and self-concept. 
Despite such studies into personality characteristics and features of affective 
distress as predictors of memory complaints, little consideration has been given to 
the overlap between them. It has been widely observed that characteristics of 
personality are associated with both depression (Bagby, Quilty, & Ryder, 2008; 
Klein, Kotov, & Bufferd, 2011) and anxiety (Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 
2010; Kotov, Watson, Robles, & Schmidt, 2007; Middeldorp et al., 2006). For 
example, a recent review by Klein et al. suggests depression is related to several 
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aspects of personality, including neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness. 
Likewise, an earlier review by Middeldorp et al. found anxiety to be consistently 
associated with neuroticism and extraversion. Whilst there is still considerable 
debate about whether or not the relationship between personality characteristics and 
affective distress is a causal one (see Andersen & Bienvenu, 2011; Klein et al., 
2011), there is undeniably a range of strong associations between them (discussed 
further in Chapter 3). 
It is this overlap between personality and features of affective distress and its 
impact on the predictability of memory complaints in older adults that forms the 
basis of this thesis. Perhaps the most notable limitation of literature evaluating the 
association between affective distress and memory complaints is the extent to which 
this relationship exists beyond more stable, long-term aspects of personality. There is 
currently little or no literature available that has examined whether affective distress 
is predictive of memory complaints beyond what can already be explained by 
characteristics of personality (although see Appendix A). 
Addressing this gap in the literature is important for several reasons. Firstly, 
it has been widely observed that memory complaints are one of the key indicators of 
depression in older adult populations (indeed, it has been incorporated into the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM-5] criteria for Major 
Depressive Disorder, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, without 
research considering the concurrent role of personality, it remains unclear whether or 
not the relationship reported in the literature is of a direct nature. One only needs to 
examine the relationship between ice cream sales and drowning rates (both of which 
can be attributed to seasonal weather patterns) to understand that correlated variables 
are not necessarily directly connected in any meaningful way. Secondly, such 
research would have implications for theory attempting to address predictors of 
memory complaints, given personality factors have been largely overlooked to this 
point. Thirdly, and arguably most importantly, the results would have clinical 
implications for mental health screening and for better understanding the nature of 
memory complaints in older adulthood. 
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Consequently, the aim of the current study and of this thesis is to address the 
relationship between features of affective distress and personality in the prediction of 
memory complaints in older adults by observing whether symptoms of depression 
and anxiety (which research suggests are associated with memory complaints) 
remain useful predictors beyond characteristics of personality. This includes both 
general measures of affective distress (i.e., overall measures of depression and 
anxiety as predictors of memory complaints) as well as specific self-reported 
elements of depression (e.g., feelings of hopelessness) and anxiety (e.g., 
physiological arousal). In the study reported in the latter section of this thesis, these 
relationships were observed within the context of personality characteristics defined 
by the Five-Factor Model of Personality (McCrae & Costa, 1987; McCrae & Oliver, 
1992) and a range of other pertinent factors, including performance on 
psychometrically-validated tests of memory, age, gender, education and premorbid 
intellectual functioning. 
To achieve the aim of this study, the thesis brings together select bodies of 
literature primarily from the fields of clinical psychology, neuropsychology and 
personality psychology. Structurally, the thesis is divided into two sections, 
consisting of three and four chapters, respectively. Section one provides the relevant 
background literature to the study reported in section two. It begins by examining 
literature investigating the associations between memory complaints, memory 
performance and affective distress (Chapter 2). This is followed by a discussion of 
literature examining the role of personality via its associations with memory 
complaints and affective distress (Chapter 3). The final chapter of section one 
provides a concise summary of four theories that address memory complaints that 
have made specific mention of affective distress and/or characteristics of personality 
(Chapter 4). At the conclusion of section one, a summary is provided that revisits the 
key points. 
Section two then addresses the current study and begins with a discussion of 
the objectives and their rationale, and provides the questions to be answered in the 
research (Chapter 5). This is followed by a methodology section (Chapter 6), which 
details the sample utilized in the study (including how participants were selected), 
10 
 
the apparatus used to collect the data and the research procedures. A section detailing 
the analyses and results is then presented (Chapter 7). This section begins by 
presenting the specific analyses utilized in the study and addresses the relevant 
assumptions of these analyses. This is followed by two sets of preliminary analyses 
that address the selection of relevant personality characteristics and the formation of 
memory performance variables that are incorporated into the main analyses. 
The main analyses then follow, which first address depression as a predictor 
of memory complaints beyond personality and a range of other variables (both for 
overall depression and specific symptoms, such as inertia). Separate regression 
models are produced for both applied and globally-measured memory complaints.  
This is followed by analyses examining anxiety as a predictor of memory complaints 
beyond personality (again, both for overall anxiety and specific symptoms, such as 
physiological arousal). The Discussion section is presented last (Chapter 8) and 
begins with a detailed synopsis of the results within the context of the research 
questions and previous literature. The theoretical and clinical implications of the 
results are then discussed, followed by the limitations of the current study. The thesis 
concludes with a discussion of new avenues for research and an overall summary. 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter Two 
 Until recently, associations with memory performance and affective distress have 
dominated research into subjective memory complaints. 
 Chapter 2 discusses empirical literature and relevant reviews investigating the 
extent to which each of these three factors are associated with one another. 
 In the majority of published studies utilizing established measures of memory 
complaints, complaints typically show only a weak association with objective 
memory performance. 
 As with research utilizing established measures of memory complaints, studies 
using short, global assessments of memory complaints typically show a weak 
association with objective memory performance. 
 Reviews and meta-analyses have demonstrated that depression is associated with 
poorer performance on a range of memory tasks. 
 Reviews and meta-analyses have demonstrated that anxiety is associated with 
poorer memory performance; however, these deficits appear to be limited to 
specific information, such as verbal and episodic information, rather than 
representing a universal cognitive impairment. 
 Research has demonstrated that memory complaints are associated with 
depression (or symptoms of it), regardless of whether established questionnaires 
or simple global questions of memory complaints are utilized. 
 Likewise, research has also demonstrated that memory complaints are associated 
with anxiety (or symptoms of it), regardless of whether established 
questionnaires or simple global questions of memory complaints are utilized. 
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CHAPTER 2: Complaints, Performance and Affective Distress 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, considerable effort has been expended 
over the past 25 years on attempts to understand memory complaints and delineate 
the important predictors of them. A number of studies have examined the 
relationship between memory complaints and memory performance, motivated 
predominantly by the potential value of such complaints as an indicator of actual 
memory problems. Research stemming from the fields of clinical psychology and 
neuropsychology has also provided several studies on memory performance within 
the context of affective distress, which presents itself as a key factor in the context of 
memory complaint research. Over the past two decades, however, the memory 
complaint literature has shifted considerably, focussing extensively on aspects of 
affective distress that co-occur with complaints of memory problems. Such studies 
have not only changed the interpretation of memory complaints but have important 
implications for mental health screening in older adults with memory concerns (see 
Harwood, Barker, Ownby, Mullan, & Duara, 2004). 
A range of other factors that may be associated with memory complaints 
have also been examined, including brain structure (Jorm et al., 2004; Minett, Dean, 
Firbank, English, & O'Brien, 2005), education (Levy-Cushraan & Abeles, 1998) and 
recall strategies (Seelye et al., 2007). In addition, research has also examined 
memory complaints within specific clinical sub-groups, such as stroke patients 
(Aben et al., 2011) and individuals who are HIV-positive (Au et al., 2008; Chan et 
al., 2007). However, the bulk of the literature has targeted the relationships between 
memory complaints, memory performance and affective distress (primarily 
depression and anxiety). Given the prominence of these relationships in the literature 
and their relevance to this thesis, this chapter focuses on research that has examined 
these relationships. 
Literature that has examined the relationship between memory complaints 
and memory performance is reviewed initially. A detailed synthesis and summary of 
relevant studies is provided for this section because few or no relevant reviews 
(narrative or meta-analytic) are currently available on this topic. Following this, the 
chapter shifts focus to the relationship between memory performance and two forms 
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of affective distress (i.e., depression and anxiety). A more established literature base 
exists for the relationship between memory performance and these two forms of 
affective distress, which includes several narrative and meta-analytic reviews on this 
topic. Consequently, for the purpose of maintaining a comprehensive yet concise 
synthesis of the literature, the section detailing these relationships provides a concise 
review of the more pertinent reviews rather than providing detailed summaries of 
individual studies available on this topic. In the final section of this chapter, a review 
is provided for the relationship between memory complaints and both forms of 
affective distress (i.e., depression and anxiety). As with the relationship between 
memory complaints and memory performance, few reviews that focus exclusively on 
the relationship between memory complaints and affective distress are available 
(although they are discussed as part of much broader reviews, see Hertzog & 
Pearman, 2014; Reid & MacLullich, 2006). Consequently, a detailed synthesis and 
summary of relevant studies is also provided for this section. 
Memory Complaints and Memory Performance 
Whilst research into memory complaints is young in the context of many 
other fields of psychology, literature examining the relationship between memory 
complaints and memory performance has developed exceptionally quickly in a short 
period of time. In order to limit the review of literature to studies relevant to this 
thesis, a number of inclusion criteria were utilized for studies in the following 
section (see Table 1). First, studies needed to include one or more measures of 
memory complaint and one or more measures of memory performance (e.g., studies 
incorporating only measures of more general cognitive performance were not 
included). Second, given the purpose of this chapter is partly to examine whether 
memory complaints and memory performance are related, only studies that provide 
zero-order relationships between these factors were included (e.g., studies providing 
only semi-partial correlations or group differences corrected for other variables were 
not included). Third, given this thesis focusses on concurrent relationships between 
memory complaints, memory performance, affective distress and personality, only 
studies reporting on cross-sectional (i.e., not longitudinal) relationships are reviewed 
here. Fourth, because the research reported in this thesis focuses on a community 
sample, only studies reporting on community samples were included here. That is, 
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studies focusing exclusively on cognitively-impaired individuals (e.g., dementia or 
mild cognitive impairment) or other specific sub-groups (e.g., only individuals with 
clinically-diagnosed depression) were not included. Finally, because this thesis 
focuses on older adults, only studies incorporating older adult samples were 
examined (e.g., studies only including samples younger than 50 years were not 
included). 
Table 1 
Criteria for Studies that Reviewed Memory Complaints and Memory Performance 
1. One or more measures of both memory complaints and memory performance 
2. Zero-order relationship(s) between complaint and performance measures 
3. Cross-sectional (i.e., not longitudinal) relationships 
4. Community samples, not solely clinical populations 
5. Includes a large proportion of older adults (e.g., adults over 50 years of age) 
 
A total of 18 studies examining memory complaints that met the above 
criteria were identified. Ten of these studies utilized applied memory complaint 
questionnaires (i.e., those examining complaints in an applied context, such as 
recalling phone numbers). The remaining eight studies utilized more global measures 
of memory complaints. In all studies but one, global measures of complaints were 
assessed via four or fewer questions. Given such measures may give rise to stronger 
or weaker relationships with memory performance and that this issue has not been 
adequately addressed in the literature, the following section examines these studies 
separately. 
Questionnaire Assessments of Memory Complaints 
The median size of the 13 samples included in the 10 studies examining the 
relationship between memory performance and applied memory complaint 
questionnaires was 117, ranging from 25 up to 364 participants. Six studies used 
more than one measure of memory performance and two studies used more than one 
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memory complaint questionnaire. Of the 10 studies, seven identified at least one 
significant association between memory performance and memory complaints in the 
expected direction. Listed in Table 2 are the 10 studies with sample size and age 
range (or mean age), measures of memory performance and memory complaints 
used and whether the study identified a link between them in the expected direction 
(i.e., more severe complaints with poorer performance). 
Table 2 
Questionnaire Studies Examining Memory Complaints and Memory Performance 
Study N/n (age) 
Memory 
Measure 
Complaint 
Measure 
Association 
(Yes / No) 
Derouesne et al. (1999) 183 (50+) Multiple SMS Yes 
Devolder & Pressley (1991) 
48 (M = 70.9) 
48 (M = 68.6) 
Multiple MQ 
No 
No 
Dux et al. (2008) 130 (65+) RAVLT GFF Yes 
Hertzog et al. (2000)  121 (35-84) Multiple MFQ Yes 
Levy-Cushraan et al. (1998) 130 (47-90) RBMT MAC-S Yes 
Mendes et al. (2008) 292 (18-87) CVLT MCS No 
Minett et al. (2005) 60 (64-84) Multiple MCQ Yes 
Schmidt et al. (2001) 
117 (46-89) 
111 (45-85) 
Multiple GMFQ 
Yes 
No 
Scogin (1985) 
59 (60-82) 
25 (60-75) 
Multiple MQ 
Yes 
No 
Zeintl et al. (2006) 364 (65-80) Red Pencil CSMAQ Yes 
Note: CSMAQ = Capacity Scale of the Metamemory in Adulthood Questionnaire, CVLT = California 
Verbal Learning Test, GFF = General Frequency of Forgetting Scale, GMFQ = Groningen Memory 
Failures Questionnaire, MAC-S = Memory Assessment Clinics Self-Rating Scale, MCQ = Memory 
Complaint Questionnaire, MCS = Memory Complaints Scale, MFQ = Memory Functioning 
Questionnaire, MQ = Metamemory Questionnaire, RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Task, 
RBMT = Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test, SMS = Subjective Memory Scale. 
Early small-scale studies suggested that if memory performance was 
associated with responses on memory complaint questionnaires, the relationship was 
relatively weak (Devolder & Pressley, 1991; Scogin, 1985). Initially, a study by 
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Scogin indicated that memory complaints (assessed via the Metamemory 
Questionnaire, Zelinski, Gilewski, & Thompson, 1980) may be vaguely indicative of 
poorer memory performance. In samples of high (n = 59) and low (n = 25) memory 
complainers between 60 and 82 years of age, Scogin reported no significant 
differences between the groups on the Benton Visual Retention Test (Benton, 1974), 
Digit Span (Wechsler, 1981) or on immediate or delayed measures of recalling 20 
nouns, 15 grocery items or the names of 15 people associated with photographs. 
Within each of the groups, canonical correlations between all memory measures and 
all questions on the Metamemory Questionnaire did not reach significance for either 
group (although one could assume that, given the size of the samples and the 
strength of the relationship, low statistical power played a role in this result). 
However, several measures of memory correlated weakly (r = -.26 to -.36)
1
 but 
significantly with specific questions on the Metamemory Questionnaire in the high 
memory complaints group. 
Despite these relationships, another early small-scale study by Devolder and 
Pressley (1991) demonstrated no association between memory complaints and 
memory performance. In two groups of older adults, no evidence was found for a 
link between memory complaints measured via a subset of items from the 
Metamemory Questionnaire (Zelinski et al., 1980) and memory performance on 
noun recall and recognition tasks, a face-name learning task, and an appointment-
keeping task. For sample one (n = 48, Mage = 70.9 years), no differences in 
performance on the noun recall or recognition tasks were found between those with 
low, moderate and high levels of memory complaints. In sample two (n = 48, Mage = 
68.6 years), no difference was found for face-name learning or on an appointment-
keeping task either. 
More recent small-scale studies have suggested equally-weak relationships 
between memory complaints and memory performance. Minett, Dean, Firbank, 
English and O’Brien (2005), for example, examined correlations between scores on 
the Memory Complaint Questionnaire (Crook, Feher, & Larrabee, 1992) and 
                                                          
1
 Given differences in how variables are measured and scored, effect sizes reported throughout this 
thesis differ in direction. However, unless specified otherwise, effect sizes were in the expected 
direction. 
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performance on category fluency (animals), a digit span task, the Logical Memory 
(LM) subtest from the Wechsler Memory Scale-Third Edition (WMS-III, Wechsler, 
1997), and the Visual Reproduction (VR) Test (Williams, 1991). In a sample of 60 
older adults between 64 and 84 years of age, Minett et al. (2005) reported that higher 
scores (i.e., more complaints) on the Memory Complaint Questionnaire was 
significantly associated with poorer category fluency (animals) performance (r = -
.28, p = .031). Scores on the digit-span, LM and VR tasks were all in the expected 
direction but failed to reach significance. Thus, the study suggests memory 
complaints may exhibit a relationship with memory performance on some tasks, 
albeit very weak. 
In terms of statistical significance, larger studies provide a much more 
consistent relationship between memory complaints and memory performance. Of 
five studies on memory complaints comprising samples between 100 and 200 
participants (Derouesne et al., 1999; Dux et al., 2008; Hertzog et al., 2000; Levy-
Cushraan & Abeles, 1998; Schmidt et al., 2001), four have identified a significant 
relationship between complaints and performance. Dux et al., for example, examined 
whether responses on the Frequency of Forgetting Scale from the Memory 
Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ, Gilewski, Zelinski, & Schaie, 1990) were 
associated with immediate and delayed recall performance on the Rey Auditory 
Verbal Learning Task (Rey, 1964). In a sample of 130 individuals over the age of 65 
years, Dux et al. reported significant relationships with both immediate (r = .30, p < 
.001) and delayed (r = .24, p < .001) recall performance. 
Likewise, Levy-Cushraan and Abeles (1998) also obtained significant 
relationships between measures of memory complaints and memory performance. In 
a sample of 130 individuals aged between 47 and 90 years, the study examined 
correlations between scores on the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test (Wilson, 
Cockburn, Baddeley, & Hiorns, 1989) and scores on the Memory Assessment 
Clinic’s Self-Rating Scale (MAC-S, Winterling, Crook, Salama, & Gobert, 1986), 
which incorporates two subscales pertaining to (1) memory abilities and (2) how 
frequently memory problems are encountered. Levy-Cushraan and Abeles reported 
significant relationships of memory performance with overall MAC-S scores (r = 
.19, p < .05) as well as with scores on the abilities (r = .22, p < .01) and frequency (r 
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= .18, p < .05) subscales. The results reported by Levy-Cushraan and Abeles as well 
as Dux et al. (2008) indicate that memory complaints and memory performance may 
indeed exhibit a relationship between them, though this relationship may be too 
weak to pick up with smaller sample sizes due to a lack of statistical power. 
Derouesne et al. (1999) found further support for a weak relationship 
between memory complaints and memory performance in older adults over 50 years 
of age. The study examined memory complaints in the context of performance on the 
Visual Retention Test (Benton, 1974), the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Rey, 
1964) and an adapted version of the LM Test (Wechsler, 1945). The study found that 
memory performance was not significantly correlated with overall memory 
complaints on the Subjective Memory Scale (Derouesne et al., 1989) for any of the 
measures, though older adults who reported ‘major’ concerns about their memory 
performed more poorly on the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test than older adults 
who reported only ‘minor’ concerns. Furthermore, older adults who scored below a 
given threshold on all three tasks rated their memory as significantly poorer than 
older adults who scored above the threshold on all three tasks (at p < .001). Thus, 
whilst memory complaints may only weakly correlate with memory performance 
across community samples, they may be of some use in discriminating between 
consistently high and low memory performance on well-validated memory 
assessments. 
Hertzog et al. (2000) found relatively consistent relationships between 
memory complaints derived from various subsets of items from the MFQ (Gilewski 
et al., 1990)  and several measures of memory. Hertzog et al. assessed memory 
complaints in 121 adults between 35 and 84 years of age via the general rating of 
memory scale, the mnemonics scale and through three frequency of forgetting 
subscales (pertaining to complaints about prospective, retrospective and working 
memory) formed by combining various individual items from the Frequency of 
Forgetting Scale. Amongst a wide range of memory tasks, immediate and delayed 
performance on a 50-item free recall task showed consistent associations with 
complaints on the prospective memory (r = .29 and .33, respectively), retrospective 
memory (r = .33 and .31, respectively) and working memory (r = .32 and .23, 
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respectively) complaint subscales. The general rating of memory scale also 
correlated with immediate and delayed free recall performance, though to a lesser 
extent (r = .20 and .13, respectively). Mnemonics usage was weakly and negatively 
correlated with delayed free recall (r = -.17) but not with immediate free recall (r = -
.02). Thus, memory performance may also be correlated with specific types of 
memory complaints but less so to more general ratings of memory and the use of 
mnemonics. 
Further evidence for weak correlations between memory complaints and 
memory performance was provided by Schmidt et al. (2001) in a study of adults 
aged 45-89 years. In one sample (n = 117), correlations between 12 measures of 
memory performance and subjective reports of current memory failures (assessed via 
the Groningen Memory Failures Questionnaire, Schmidt, Zwart, Berg, & Deelman, 
1999) ranged from .09 to -.26 (mean r = -.15). Whilst none of the correlations 
reached significance, 10 out of 12 were in the expected direction (i.e., negative). 
Subjective reports of changes in memory failures were more consistently associated 
with performance and whilst only two of 12 correlations reached significance, all 
were in the expected direction (mean r = -.22, range = -.11 to -.36). In a second 
sample (n = 111), however, Schmidt et al. found that subjective reports of memory 
failures showed little or no relationship with various laboratory or ecological 
memory tests. Again, correlations were generally in the expected direction, though 
too weak in this case to provide evidence of any consistent relationship between 
memory complaints and memory performance (mean r = -.06, range = .00 to -.13). 
Two further studies with samples of 292 adults (Mendes et al., 2008) and 364 
older adults (Zeintl et al., 2006) have also examined the link between memory 
complaints and memory performance. Most recently, Mendes et al. found no link 
between memory complaints (assessed via the Subjective Memory Complaints scale, 
Schmand et al., 1996) and performance on the 20-minute delay free recall 
component of the California Verbal Learning Test (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 
1987). Despite the larger sample size, Mendes et al. found no significant relationship 
between these two measures (r = .01, p = .865). Furthermore, the association 
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between complaints and performance did not reach significance for any age groups 
when examined within participants grouped by decade (e.g., 20-30 years). 
However, consistent with previous work by Hertzog et al. (2000), Zeintl et al. 
(2006) also reported a significant relationship between memory complaints and 
prospective memory performance. In a study of 364 older adults between 65 and 80 
years of age, Zeintl et al. examined correlations between prospective memory 
complaints (assessed via the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire, 
Smith, Del Sala, Logie, & Maylor, 2000) and performance on the Red Pencil task 
(Dobbs & Rule, 1987; Salthouse, Berish, & Siedlecki, 2004); a simple measure of 
prospective memory whereby the participant is given instructions at the beginning of 
the testing session to repeat the words “Red Pencil” whenever spoken by the 
researcher conducting the session. No significant difference was reported between 
high (n = 197) and low (n = 167) memory complainers (determined via the median 
score on the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire), although a weak 
but significant relationship (r = .21, p < .01) was observed between performance and 
complaints in the low complainers group. Based on these results, Zeintl et al. 
concluded that prospective memory complaints may be a useful indicator of 
prospective memory performance in older adults with relatively few symptoms of 
depression (since low complainers exhibited fewer symptoms of depression). 
Global Assessments of Memory Complaints 
Another eight studies have been conducted examining the association 
between memory complaints and memory performance using less detailed, global 
assessments of complaint. Table 3 lists the studies, sample size and age range, 
measures of memory performance used, number of questions used to assess memory 
complaints and whether or not the study identified a link between complaints and 
performance. Samples in these eight studies tended to be considerably larger, with 
several exceeding 500 participants as well as two very large scale studies 
incorporating samples of 2546 (Jorm et al., 2004) and 16964 (Amariglio, Townsend, 
Grodstein, Sperling, & Rentz, 2011) participants. The median sample size was 476, 
ranging from 114 up to 16964. Four of the seven studies used multiple measures of 
memory performance and the number of questions used to assess memory 
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complaints ranged from one to seven. Of the eight studies, seven identified at least 
one significant association between memory complaints and memory performance in 
the expected direction. 
Table 3 
Global Assessment Studies Examining Memory Complaints and Performance 
Study N/n (age-years) 
Memory 
Measure 
Complaint 
Questions 
Association 
(Yes / No) 
Amariglio et al. (2011) 16964* (70-81) TISC 7 Yes 
Bassett & Folstein (1993) 810 (18-92) MMSE 1 Yes 
Jorm et al. (2004) 2546 (60-64) CVLT 3 Yes 
Jungwirth et al. (2004) 302 (75) FOME 4 No 
Minett et al. (2008) 114 (50+) Multiple 2 Yes 
Riedel-Heller et al. (1999) 349 (75+) SIDAM 2 Yes 
Snitz et al. (2008) 276 (65+) Multiple 1 Yes 
Zandi (2004) 603 (47-93) CAMCOG 4 Yes 
*All participants were female 
Note: CAMCOG = Cambridge Assessment of Mental Disorders in the Elderly, CVLT = 
California Verbal Learning Test, FOME = Fuld Object Memory Evaluation, MMSE = Mini-
Mental State Examination, SIDAM = Structured Interview for the Diagnosis of Dementia of 
Alzheimer Type, Multi-Infarct Dementia and Dementias of Other Etiology, TISC = 
Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status. 
A relatively recent study by Minett, Da Silva, Ortiz and Bertolucci (2008) 
examined memory complaints in 114 older adults over 50 years of age. Participants 
were grouped into complainers and non-complainers on the basis of their responses 
to two questions: “Do you currently have any problems with your memory?”, and if 
so, “Are these problems interfering with your normal life?” Participants were 
deemed ‘complainers’ if they responded with yes to both of these questions. Minett 
et al. then compared these two groups on a number of performance measures, 
including the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Rey, 1958), the VR Test 
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(Williams, 1991), an adapted version of the LM subtest (Wechsler, 1997), the Free 
and Cued Selective Reminding Test (Buschke, 1984) and two category fluency tests 
(animals and fruits). Mean scores for non-complainers were higher than for 
complainers on all measures except for the LM subtest, though a statistically 
significant difference between the groups was observed only on the category 
fluency-animals task. Thus, even when individuals judge that memory problems are 
interfering with day-to-day life, they likely offer little predictive value for identifying 
differences in memory performance on well-validated neuropsychological 
assessments of memory. 
Medium-size studies examining global memory complaints have provided 
mixed results regarding the relationship between memory complaints and memory 
performance, with two studies finding an association (Riedel-Heller et al., 1999; 
Snitz et al., 2008) and a third study finding no association (Jungwirth et al., 2004). 
Riedel-Heller et al. initially reported in a sample of 349 older adults over 75 years of 
age that measures relating to memory from the SIDAM (Structured Interview for the 
Diagnosis of Dementia of Alzheimer Type, Multi-Infarct Dementia and Dementias 
of Other Etiology, Zaudig et al., 1991) were associated with the severity of memory 
complaints to some degree. Participants were allocated to one of four memory 
complaint groups according to responses to two questions that assessed whether 
participants had any problems with their memory (yes or no), and if so, whether 
these problems occurred seldom, often, or always. The results indicated that long-
term memory performance was not significantly related to complaints (p = .645) but 
was worse in participants in the ‘always’ complaints group. Immediate recall was not 
significantly related to complaints (p = .052) but small, gradual decreases in 
performance were observed across increasing severity of complaints. Furthermore, 
short-term recall was significantly related to complaints (p = .004). Thus, memory 
performance appeared to be related to complaints but was much more evident in 
some measures of memory performance than others. 
More recently, however, Jungwirth et al. (2004) reported no relationship 
between memory complaints and memory performance in a similarly-sized study 
using a different measure of memory. Memory performance was assessed via a 
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slightly modified version of the Fuld Object Memory Evaluation (Fuld, 1981). Those 
scoring more than 1.5 standard deviations below the mean of the sample were 
categorised as having an objective memory impairment. Participants were also coded 
as ‘complainers’ or ‘non-complainers’ on the basis of their responses to four 
questions, which assessed complaints about changes in everyday memory over the 
past 2.5 years (e.g., “Are you worse at remembering where belongings are kept?”). 
Jungwirth et al. reported that only one of 32 complainers (3.1%) exhibited impaired 
memory performance, compared with 15 of 270 non-complainers (5.6%) who 
exhibited impaired memory performance. Jungwirth et al. therefore suggested that 
objective memory performance is not associated with retrospective complaints of 
worsening everyday memory. 
More recently again, Snitz et al. (2008) reported weak but very consistent 
associations between memory performance and memory complaints. In a study of 
265 older adults over 65 years of age, Snitz et al. categorized participants into one of 
three groups based on their response to the question, “In general, how do you feel 
your memory is for a person your age?” (‘Excellent’, ‘Good’ or ‘Fair/Poor’). 
Memory performance was assessed via three instruments that each provided a 
measure of immediate and delayed recall: the Word List Learning Test (Morris et al., 
1989), the LM subtest (Wechsler, 1987) and the Rey-Osterrieth Figure Test (Becker, 
Boller, Saxton, & McGonigle-Gibson, 1987). Snitz et al. observed significant 
differences in memory performance across memory complaint groups on all six 
measures. The results show progressive declines in memory performance with 
increases in complaint severity, apart from delayed recall on the Rey-Osterrieth 
Figure Test, for which the ‘Good’ group slightly outperformed the ‘Excellent’ group 
(both of which outperformed the ‘Fair/Poor’ group). 
Two larger studies by Bassett and Folstein (1993) and Zandi (2004) both 
reported associations between memory complaints and memory performance. In 
Bassett and Folstein’s study, a community sample of 810 adults aged 18 to 92 years 
were each asked, “Do you find that you have trouble with your memory?”, to which 
participants either responded with ‘yes’ (22.1%) or ‘no’ (77.9%). As a simple 
measure of memory performance, the study utilized responses from the 3-item 
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delayed recall question from the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, 
& McHugh, 1975). Participants who recalled two or three of the items were deemed 
to have good recall, whilst those who recalled zero or one of the items were deemed 
as having poor recall. Across the entire sample, 68% of participants accurately 
reported their memory performance (i.e., exhibited poor recall and reported trouble 
with their memory or exhibited good recall and reported no trouble with their 
memory). A point-biserial correlation indicated a significant but modest relationship 
between the two variables (r = .21, p < .05). 
The more recent study by Zandi (2004) examined memory complaints in 603 
adults aged between 47 and 93 years. Participants were asked four questions about 
their memory: (1) “Do you have any difficulty with your memory?”, (2) “Do you 
forget where you have left things more than you used to?”, (3) “Do you forget the 
names of close friends and relatives?”, and “Have you been in your town and 
neighbourhood and forgotten your way?” Memory complaints were scored as the 
total number of “yes” responses to the set of questions (0-4). These scores were then 
examined against total scores across three measures of memory (‘recent’, ‘remote’ 
and ‘learning’ memory) on the CAMCOG component of the CAMDEX (Cambridge 
Assessment of Mental Disorders in the Elderly, Roth et al., 1986). A significant 
correlation of comparable size to that reported by Bassett and Folstein (1993) was 
reported (r = .134, p <.01). 
Finally, two very large scale studies also provide evidence of a weak 
association between memory complaints and memory performance (Amariglio et al., 
2011; Jorm et al., 2004). Jorm et al. conducted a comprehensive study of 2546 older 
adults aged from 60 to 64 years. As part of a vast psychological and 
neuropsychological battery, participants completed the immediate and delayed recall 
components of the California Verbal Learning Test (Delis et al., 1987). Memory 
complaints were assessed via responses to global memory complaint questions; for 
example, “Do you feel you remember things as well as you used to? That is, is your 
memory the same as it was earlier in life?” Jorm et al. reported a significant 
difference between those who did and did not complain of memory problems on both 
the immediate and delayed memory performance measures (both p < .001). This 
result is perhaps not surprising, however, given the size of the sample and power of 
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the analysis. Cohen’s d values indicated a relatively small difference between the 
groups on both the immediate (d = 0.32) and delayed measures (d = 0.33) of memory 
performance. 
Some of the strongest evidence for a relationship between memory 
complaints and memory performance comes from a very large scale study conducted 
recently by Amariglio et al. (2011). In a study of almost 17,000 women aged 
between 70 and 81 years, Amariglio et al. examined memory complaints in seven 
different contexts, including whether or not their memory abilities had changed, 
whether or not they experienced more difficulty remembering short lists of items and 
whether or not they experienced difficulty navigating familiar streets. Amongst a 
range of other measures, memory performance was assessed using the delayed recall 
component of the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status (Brandt & Folstein, 
2003). Amariglio et al. found that women complaining of one or more memory 
problems performed significantly worse than women who reported no problems with 
their memory. Furthermore, obvious decreases in delayed recall performance were 
observed with each additional memory complaint reported (p < .001). Despite these 
consistent decreases in performance with increasing memory complaints, however, 
the odds ratios reported by Amariglio et al. are still relatively small (mean OR = 1.22 
across each additional complaint made). 
In summary, despite some inconsistency with regard to significance testing 
for associations between memory complaints and memory performance, almost all 
studies report a weak association in the expected direction between them. Whilst 
significant relationships are reported slightly more frequently in studies using global 
assessments of memory complaints, this is likely attributable to differences in 
sample size, as effect sizes for the relationship between complaints and performance 
vary little according to whether questionnaires or global assessments are utilized. 
Some measures of memory performance may have stronger associations with some 
measures of complaint; though there is currently insufficient evidence to confidently 
argue this given the same measures of performance and complaints are rarely used 
across studies. 
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Memory Performance and Affective Distress 
In addition to the relationship between memory complaints and memory 
performance, considerable effort has been expended on investigating the association 
between memory performance and affective distress. Whilst not a key focus of this 
thesis, the relationship between memory performance and affective distress is 
important here given it forms an important part of the complex interaction of 
variables associated with memory complaints. For this reason, the following section 
provides a brief summary of the more pertinent reviews examining the association 
between memory performance and two measures of affective distress that have been 
investigated extensively within the memory complaint literature; depression and 
anxiety. Unlike the association between memory complaints and memory 
performance, the relationship between memory performance and affective distress 
exhibits a more consistent relationship (particularly for depression). The literature on 
depression is reviewed first, followed by anxiety. Whilst one body of literature has 
examined the effect of anxiety on memory for specific material, such as threatening 
information (e.g., Mitte, 2008), here the focus is on how anxiety is associated with 
memory for neutral stimuli, given this is the paradigm used in the research reported 
in the latter section of this thesis. 
Depression 
Depression is one dimension of affective distress that appears to be related to 
memory performance. Reviews and meta-analyses examining the relationship 
between memory performance and depression provide considerable support for a 
relationship between them (Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Herrmann, Goodwin, 
& Ebmeier, 2007; McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009; Steffens & Potter, 2008). Herrmann 
et al., for example, reviewed studies observing neuropsychological test performance 
in depressed (late and early onset) and healthy older adults. Across six studies 
examining 13 measures of verbal and non-verbal memory, a mean Cohen’s d value 
of .44 (ranging from .24 to .64) was obtained for comparisons between late-onset 
depression (i.e., depression diagnosed after 50 years of age) and healthy controls, 
whereby depression was associated with poorer performance. For comparisons of 
early onset depression and healthy controls, three studies reported a mean effect size 
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of .40 (ranging from .22 – .77). Performance differences between those with and 
without depression were also observed on measures of semantic memory (e.g., 
semantic fluency), though slightly smaller mean Cohen’s d values were observed in 
these cases (.38 and .27 for late onset and early onset depression group differences 
from healthy controls, respectively). 
In an earlier meta-analysis examining the association between depression and 
memory impairment, Burt et al. (1995) reported results outlining clear differences 
between depressed and non-depressed participants on various measures of memory. 
For 28 studies examining the association between depression status and recall, for 
example, Burt et al. reported a mean Cohen’s d of .56, suggesting a robust effect of 
depression on memory performance in recall tasks. As part of the meta-analysis, Burt 
et al. also reported fail-safe statistics, which provide an indication of the relative 
stability of an effect by denoting the number of additional results with no effect 
required in order for the meta-analytic effect size to be small enough to fall above a 
specified alpha level. Such was the size of the effect of depression on recall 
performance for the studies reviewed that for it to decrease to a point where the 
alpha level exceeded .05, an additional 1103 studies with no effect of depression on 
recall would need to have been reported at that time (relative to just 28 that were 
included in the meta-analysis). 
Evidently, there is a consistent relationship between depression and poor 
memory performance. Indeed, research over the past decade has shifted its focus 
from whether or not this relationship exists to understanding why it exists. Whilst a 
discussion of these explanations is beyond the scope of this chapter, research 
indicates a number of factors may play a role in the association, including the 
presence of distracting, mood-based cognitions (Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2003; 
Jones, Siegle, Muelly, Haggerty, & Ghinassi, 2010; Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 
2009), impaired motivation (Scheurich et al., 2008) and neurological conditions such 
as dementia that may mediate the relationship between them (Steffens & Potter, 
2008). 
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Anxiety 
Anxiety is implicated in a number of mental health disorders, including 
Social Phobia, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder and Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); the hallmark of 
which is the subjective experience of fear or worry causing above-normal levels of 
distress leading to impairment in functioning. The impact of this fear and worry on 
neuropsychological test performance has been the focus of much study (e.g., 
Airaksinen, Larsson, & Forsell, 2005; Castaneda, Tuulio-Henriksson, Marttunen, 
Suvisaari, & Lonnqvist, 2008; MacLeod & Matthews, 2004). Whilst many studies 
have examined this relationship in clinical samples, studies have also examined sub-
clinical anxiety as a predictor and outcome of memory performance (e.g., MacLeod 
& Donnellan, 1993; Sorg & Whitney, 1992). 
Whilst not as robust as with depression, a number of reviews suggest anxiety 
can also be associated with poorer memory test performance (e.g., Beaudreau & 
O'Hara, 2008; Muller & Roberts, 2005; O'Toole & Pedersen, 2011). Based on a 
recent review of 30 papers and 698 adults with Social Anxiety Disorder, O’Toole 
and Pedersen concluded that social anxiety is not associated with universal cognitive 
impairment but that performance on some memory tasks tends to be poorer. For 
verbal memory, two studies (Airaksinen et al., 2005; Asmundson, Stein, Larsen, & 
Walker, 1994-1995) revealed significant decreases in performance in anxious 
participants relative to non-anxious participants, whilst a third study (Sachs, 
Anderer, Doby, Saletu, & Dantendorfer, 2003) found no difference. It should be 
noted, however, that small samples (n = 25) were used by Sachs et al. and that 
statistical power may have been an issue given the size of the effect reported in the 
two previous studies was relatively small. Despite some evidence for an association 
between anxiety and verbal memory, O’Toole and Pederson’s review reported few 
other associations between memory performance and social anxiety. 
An earlier review by Beaudreau and O’Hara (2008) examined the 
relationship between anxiety (both clinical and sub-clinical levels) and performance 
on a range of memory types, including memory for episodic information. For cross-
sectional studies on episodic memory, Beaudreau and O’Hara reported that three 
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studies (Bierman, Comjis, Jonker, & Beekman, 2005; Booth, Schinka, Brown, 
Mortimer, & Borenstein, 2006; Mantella et al., 2007) found observable differences 
in memory performance according to levels of anxiety, whilst a fourth study 
(Derouesne, Rapin, & Lacomblez, 2004) did not. Mantella et al., for example, found 
impaired performance in participants who met diagnostic criteria for Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) relative to healthy age- 
and education-matched controls across both the California Verbal Learning Test 
(CVLT; Delis et al., 1987) and memory component of the Dementia Rating Scale 
(Hughes, Berg, Danziger, Coben, & Martin, 1982). On the CVLT, anxious 
participants recalled fewer words for immediate recall, delayed recall and overall 
recall performance (Mantella et al., 2007). Again, statistical power may have played 
a role in the non-significant result reported by Derouesne et al., given the small 
number of anxious participants included in the study (n = 18). 
In summary, there is evidence to suggest anxiety may be weakly associated 
with some measures of memory performance, both at clinical and sub-clinical levels. 
Reviews tend to suggest small deficits in memory for verbal and episodic 
information, though these deficits tend to be isolated to specific tasks rather than 
representing any universal cognitive impairment. As with depression, various 
explanations have been put forward to account for why anxiety appears to give rise 
to impaired memory performance (for reviews, see Beaudreau & O'Hara, 2008; 
Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001). Whilst a discussion of these explanations is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, reasons for the association between anxiety and memory 
performance include a reduced capacity to attend to relevant information (Bogels & 
Mansell, 2004) as well as reduced working memory storage and processing capacity 
(Eysenck & Calvao, 1992). 
Memory Complaints and Affective Distress 
Whilst the association between memory complaints and objective memory 
performance is still being debated, consistently robust correlations between memory 
complaints and affective distress have lead researchers to suggest that older adults 
complaining of memory problems should perhaps be screened for underlying mental 
health issues as well (Comijs, Deeg, Dik, Twisk, & Jonker, 2002; Harwood et al., 
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2004). A considerable number of studies have examined the relationship between 
memory complaints and affective distress. To ensure the review is relevant to this 
thesis, a similar set of inclusion criteria to those used earlier were utilized for 
literature in the following section (see Table 4). Akin to the section examining 
memory complaints and memory performance, studies examining the link between 
memory complaints and depression or anxiety needed to: (1) incorporate one or more 
measures of both memory complaints (not just cognitive complaints) and depression 
or anxiety, (2) report zero-order relationships between the complaint and depression 
and/or anxiety measures, (3) be cross-sectional and (4) incorporate a large proportion 
of older adults over 50 years of age. In order to maintain a focus on community-
dwelling older adults but also obtain memory complaint data along the full spectrum 
of depression and anxiety severity, (5) studies with clinically depressed or anxious 
participants were included when they also incorporated a healthy older adult sample. 
Table 4 
Criteria for Studies Examining Memory Complaints and Affective Distress 
1. One or more measures of both memory complaints and depression / anxiety 
2. Zero-order relationship(s) for complaints and depression / anxiety measures 
3. Cross-sectional (i.e., not longitudinal) relationships 
4. Include a large proportion of older adults (e.g., adults over 50 years of age) 
5. At least partly a community sample, not entirely clinical 
 
Depression 
A total of 18 studies examining the relationship between memory complaints 
and depression that met the criteria outlined in Table 4 were identified. Ten of these 
studies used questionnaire assessments of memory complaints, whilst eight utilized 
five or fewer questions to assess memory complaints more globally. As with 
memory complaints and memory performance, the following section reviews studies 
examining the link between memory complaints and depression separately for 
questionnaire assessments and global memory complaints. 
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 Questionnaire assessments of memory complaints. The median sample 
size for the 10 studies examining the link between depression and memory 
complaints assessed via a questionnaire was 130, ranging from 50 up to 1204 
participants. One of the 10 studies included more than one measure of depression 
and all studies included one questionnaire to assess memory complaints, with the 
exception of Derouesne et al. (1999), who included a global measure of memory 
complaint as well. The sample size and age range (or mean age), memory complaint 
measure, depression measure and whether or not an association was found for each 
of the 10 studies is provided in Table 5. All studies identified a significant 
association between memory complaints and depression. 
Table 5 
Questionnaire Studies on the Link between Memory Complaints and Depression 
Study N (age-years) 
Complaint 
Measure 
Depression 
Measure 
Association 
(Yes / No) 
Derouesne et al. (1999) 183 (50+) SMS + 1 ZD Yes 
Dux et al. (2008) 130 (M = 76.7) GFF GDS Yes 
Kim et al. (2003) 1204 (65+) GMS GMS Yes 
Levy-Cushraan & 
Abeles (1998) 
130 (47-90) MAC-S BDI / GDS Yes 
Minett et al. (2005) 60 (64-84) MAC-Q GDS Yes 
Potter & Hartman (2006) 99* (60-89) GFF GDS Yes 
Potter et al. (2009) 54* (62-89) GFF GDS Yes 
Slavin et al. (2010) 827 (70-90) MAC-Q GDS Yes 
Williams et al. (1987) 50 (40+) MPQ Diagnosis Yes 
Zeintl et al. (2006) 364 (65-80) PRMQ GDS Yes 
*All participants were female 
Note: BDI = Deck Depression Inventory, DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, GDS = 
Geriatric Depression Scale, GFF = General Frequency of Forgetting Scale, GMS = Geriatric 
Mental State Schedule, MAC-Q = Memory Complaint Questionnaire, MAC-S = Memory 
Assessment Self-Rating Scale, MCS = Memory Complaints Scale, MPQ = Memory Problem 
Questionnaire, PRMQ = Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire, SMS = 
Subjective Memory Scale, ZD = Zung’s Depression Self-Rating Scale. 
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The literature using questionnaires to evaluate memory complaints suggests 
that regardless of the measures used to assess memory complaints and depression, a 
significant association between the two has been found on each occasion. Seven 
studies utilized the Geriatric Depression Scale  (Yesavage et al., 1982) as a measure 
of depression. Of these studies, all seven have reported that more severe depressive 
symptomatology is associated with more severe complaints of memory problems on 
the General Frequency of Forgetting (GFF) scale (Dux et al., 2008; Potter & 
Hartman, 2006; Potter et al., 2009), the Memory Assessment Self-Rating Scale 
(Levy-Cushraan & Abeles, 1998), the Memory Complaint Questionnaire (Minett et 
al., 2005; Slavin et al., 2010) and the Prospective and Retrospective Memory 
Questionnaire (Zeintl et al., 2006). 
Potter and Hartman (2006), for example, reported a significant association 
between memory complaints and depression in 99 community-dwelling women over 
the age of 60 years. Using the GFF scale (Gilewski et al., 1990) and the Geriatric 
Depression Scale (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986), Potter and Hartman reported a 
correlation of -.47 (p < .01), suggesting greater complaint severity was clearly 
associated with reports of higher levels of depression. A more recently published 
study by Potter, Hartman, and Ward (2009) reported the same strength relationship (r 
= -.47) between memory complaints and depression using the same measures in 54 
community-dwelling women over the age of 60 years, though it is unclear whether or 
not this is a sub-sample of Potter and Hartman’s earlier study. 
A slightly larger study (N = 130) by Dux et al. (2008) also reported a 
significant, though slightly weaker, association between the Geriatric Depression 
Scale and the GFF scale in older adult males and females (r = -.35, p < .001). Given 
this result and those reported by Potter and colleagues (Potter & Hartman, 2006; 
Potter et al., 2009), a fairly consistent, medium- to large-sized association appears to 
exist between memory complaints and depression severity (when assessed via the 
Geriatric Depression Scale). However, these values may slightly over-estimate the 
relationship between memory complaints and depression given the Geriatric 
Depression Scale incorporates a question pertaining to memory problems. 
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An earlier study also examined the relationship between memory complaints 
and depression with the Geriatric Depression Scale (Levy-Cushraan & Abeles, 
1998), though using the Memory Assessment Self-Rating Scale (Winterling et al., 
1986) to measure complaints instead. Levy-Cushraan and Abeles reported a 
significant correlation between the two measures of -.39 (p < .001), again suggesting 
memory complaints were higher in those with greater depression symptomatology. 
Levy-Cushraan and Abeles also took a second measure of depression, the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, 1987), for which they found an almost identical 
association with memory complaints on the Memory Assessment Self-Rating Scale 
(r = -.38, p < .001). Notably, the Beck Depression Inventory is one of the most 
widely-accepted measures of depression symptomatology and does not include 
questions pertaining to memory problems. 
Two other more recent studies (Minett et al., 2005; Slavin et al., 2010) also 
examined the relationship between the Geriatric Depression Scale (Sheikh & 
Yesavage, 1986) and the Memory Complaint Questionnaire (Crook et al., 1992). In a 
small-scale study of 60 older adults between 64 and 84 years of age, Minett et al. 
reported a strong relationship between the measures (ρ = .59, p < .001). Indeed, of 14 
measures compared with memory complaints in the study (including demographics, 
white matter lesions, Alzheimer’s and mental state assessments, and various 
measures of memory), depression exhibited the strongest Spearman correlation 
coefficient by a considerable margin. 
A more recent study by Slavin et al. (2010) found that participants exhibiting 
higher depressive symptomatology on the Geriatric Depression Scale also reported 
significantly more frequent and/or severe complaints of memory on the Memory 
Complaint Questionnaire (Crook et al., 1992). For 784 older adults between the ages 
of 70 and 90 years, Slavin et al. found a Pearson correlation of .30 between memory 
complaints and depression on these measures. In part, this relationship led Slavin et 
al. to argue that clinicians should keep in mind that memory complaints in older 
adults tend to correlate strongly with psychological factors (including depression) 
and therefore do not necessarily indicate the presence of any memory or cognitive 
impairment. 
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Another study by Zeintl et al. (2006) examining the association between 
memory complaints and scores on the Geriatric Depression Scale utilized the 
Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (2000) as a measure of 
complaint. For 364 older adults aged between 65 and 80 years, Zeintl et al. reported 
a significantly higher number of depressive symptoms in the ‘high complainers’ 
group relative to the ‘low complainers’ group (which were differentiated on the basis 
of the median complaint score). The means and standard deviations reported in the 
article reflect a medium-sized effect (Cohen’s d = 0.58). 
Derousne et al. (1999) examined the relationship between memory 
complaints and depression using the Subjective Memory Scale (Derouesne et al., 
1989) and Zung’s Depression Self-Rating Scale (Zung, 1965). Using a sample of 
183 older adults over the age of 50 years with clinically-diagnosed depression or 
cognitive impairment, Derousne et al. (1999) reported a significant difference in 
depression scale scores between participants with major and minor complaints 
(participants rated themselves as belonging to one of these two groups). As with, 
Zeintl et al. (2006), differences in memory complaint scores between the groups 
reflected a medium to large effect (Cohen’s d = 0.72). The results presented by 
Derousne et al. (1999) are noteworthy, given they suggest the association between 
memory complaints and depression does not simply reflect differences in healthy 
older adults and those with clinical levels of depression. Rather memory complaints 
differ in healthy older adults with varying degrees of pre-clinical depressive 
symptoms as well. 
In a larger and more comprehensive study, Kim et al. (2003) also reported an 
association between memory complaints and depression. In a study incorporating 
1204 older adults over the age of 65 years, both memory complaints and depression 
were assessed using questions from the Geriatric Mental State Schedule (Copeland, 
Dewey, & Griffith-Jones, 1986). Amongst a range of other variables, including 
demographics, physical illnesses, mental state and Apolipoprotein E status, 
depression was found to be the variable most strongly associated with memory 
complaints. Of the 1204 participants, 13% (n = 152) were classified as meeting 
criteria for depression. Of these 152 older adults, 41.4% were classified as memory 
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complainers compared to just 19.4% of participants not classified as meeting criteria 
for depression. Thus, participants who met criteria for depression were found to be 
more than twice as likely to complain of memory problems as those who did not 
meet criteria for depression. 
One final study by Williams, Little, Scate and Blockman (1987) examining 
participants with (n = 25) and without (n = 25) depression found consistent 
differences between the groups across a range of memory complaint measures 
included in the Metamemory Questionnaire (Zelinski et al., 1980). Of 21 complaint 
measures (including memory for ‘things people tell you’, ‘items whilst shopping’ 
and ‘public speaking content’), 13 were found to differ significantly despite 
relatively low statistical power associated with the use of small samples. Cohen’s d 
effect sizes based on the means and standard deviations reported for the groups 
indicate that of the 21 comparisons, three reflect a small effect size, nine reflect a 
medium effect size and six reflect a large effect size. 
Global assessments of memory complaints. The median sample size for the 
eight studies examining the link between depression and memory complaints 
measured via a global assessment of memory was 462.5, ranging from 114 up to 
2546 participants. The number of questions used to gauge global complaints of 
memory ranged from one to five. A wide variety of depression measures were 
utilized. Three studies used the Geriatric Depression Scale, though Jungwirth et al. 
(2004) also used the Hamilton Depression Scale (Hamilton, 1960). The remaining 
measures of depression included Goldberg et al.’s (1988) depression scale, the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, 1987), Cambridge Mental Disorders in the Elderly 
Examination (Roth et al., 1986) and the Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977). Tsai et al. (2006) did not use an established 
measure of depression but rather asked participants whether there had been a time in 
their past when they were unable to perform social and occupational functions as a 
result of depression. Regardless of how memory complaints and depression were 
assessed, all eight studies reported a significant association between them (Table 6). 
Jungwirth et al. (2004), Jessen et al. (2007) and Minett et al. (2008) all 
reported significant associations between memory complaints and depression 
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measured via the Geriatric Depression Scale. Using a sample of 302 older adults 
aged 75 years, Jungwirth et al. assessed memory complaints using four questions 
about changes in functioning over the past two and a half years relating to past 
events, locating belongings, recalling conversations and remembering appointments 
and social events. Each question was scored as 0, 1 or 2 (indicating the degree of 
decline in memory functioning), providing a total score from 0 to 8. These scores 
were then correlated with scores on the Geriatric Depression Scale (Sheikh & 
Yesavage, 1986) and Hamilton Depression Scale (Hamilton, 1960). Jungwirth et al. 
reported significant associations in the expected direction with both depression 
measures, although Spearman correlations were relatively weak, ranging from .14 to 
.29. 
Table 6 
Global Assessment Studies Examining Memory Complaints and Depression 
Study N/n (age-years) 
Complaint 
Questions 
Depression 
Measure 
Association 
Jungwirth et al. (2004) 302 (75) 4 HAMD & GDS Yes 
Jorm et al. (2004) 2546 (60-64) 3 Goldberg Scale Yes 
Jessen et al. (2007) 2389 (75-89) 5 GDS Yes 
Lautenschlager et al. (2005) 227* (70+) 1 BDI Yes 
Minett et al. (2008) 114 (50+) 2 GDS Yes 
Riedel-Heller et al. (1999) 322 (75+) 2 CES-D Yes 
Tsai et al. (2006) 1499 (M = 68.51) 1 Self-Assessed Yes 
Zandi (2004) 603 (47-93) 4 CAMDEX Yes 
*All participants were female 
Note: HAMD = Hamilton Depression Scale, GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale, BDI = Beck 
Depression Inventory, CAMDEX = Cambridge Mental Disorders in the Elderly Examination,    
CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale. 
In a much larger study, Jessen et al. (2007) assessed 2389 older adults 
between the age of 75 and 89 years. Participants were grouped into three clusters on 
the basis of their pattern of memory complaints. The three clusters corresponded to 
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those with few general or specific complaints about memory problems (cluster 1), 
those with general complaints about memory functioning but few specific complaints 
(cluster 2) and those with general and specific complaints about memory functioning 
(cluster 3). Jessen et al. reported mean Geriatric Depression Scale scores of 1.73, 
2.16 and 3.31 for each of these three clusters, respectively. These Geriatric 
Depression Scale scores were found to discriminate between the three clusters better 
than gender, age, apolipoprotein E4 status and scores of cognitive function assessed 
via verbal fluency and delayed recall. 
In a smaller study, Minett et al. (2008) found depression severity assessed via 
the Geriatric Depression Scale to be a significant predictor of memory complaints. 
Subjective memory complaints were assessed via a yes or no response to the 
question, “Do you currently have any problems with your memory?” Of the 19 
predictor variables included in the study (which included a number of 
neuropsychological assessments), Geriatric Depression Scale scores were one of 
only two predictors found to be significantly associated with the presence of 
complaints. An odds-ratio of 1.23 was reported for Geriatric Depression Scale 
scores, suggesting a relatively weak association despite the significant relationship. 
Using Goldberg et al.’s (1988) rating scale for depression, Jorm et al. (2004) 
also reported an association with memory complaints assessed via three yes or no 
questions. A total of 2546 participants aged 60 to 64 years were asked, “Do you 
remember things as well as you used to?” Participants who responded affirmatively 
were then also asked whether their memory problem interfered with their day-to-day 
life and whether or not they had seen a doctor about it. Jorm et al. reported that 
scores on the depression measure indicated significantly greater depression severity 
in those who reported having memory problems versus those who did not (OR = 
2.16, p < .01). Additionally, greater depression severity was also reported for 
participants with memory complaints who had seen a doctor versus those with 
memory complaints who had not (OR = 1.91, p < .01). 
In another study of 227 women over the age of 70 years, Lautenschlager et al. 
(2005) examined the relationship between depression and memory complaints via 
the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1987) and by asking participants whether they 
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“had any difficulty with their memory”. In addition, participants with an objective 
memory deficit were excluded by only including participants who could recall at 
least two of the three items on the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975) delayed recall 
question. Consistent with the previous studies discussed, Lautenschlager et al. 
reported significantly greater depression severity in participants complaining of 
memory problems than participants who reported no problems with memory. 
A further three relatively large-scale studies have also reported significant 
associations between memory complaints and symptoms of depression (Riedel-
Heller et al., 1999; Tsai et al., 2006; Zandi, 2004). In the largest of these three 
studies, Tsai et al. asked 1490 older adults whether they “had trouble remembering 
things from one second to the next”. These responses were then compared with the 
participants’ perspectives on whether or not depression had interfered with their 
social and occupational functioning at any point in the past. Tsai et al. reported that 
28 of the 134 (20.9%) participants who reported memory problems also reported a 
past history of depression; a much larger proportion than the 97 of 1356 (7.1%) 
participants who reported a past history of depression but no problems with their 
memory. 
The remaining two studies (Riedel-Heller et al., 1999; Zandi, 2004) were 
smaller but used a more established, and arguably more valid, measure of 
depression. Riedel-Heller et al. assessed depression via the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977) and memory complaints 
via two questions that resulted in four possible outcomes: (0) no problems, or 
problems occurring (1) seldomly, (2) often or (3) always. Data from 322 adults over 
the age of 75 years indicated a significant association between depression and 
memory complaints, whereby more complaints were associated with greater 
depression severity. Likewise, Zandi et al. also reported a significant association 
between complaints and depression. The Cambridge Mental Disorders in the Elderly 
Examination (CAMDEX, Roth et al., 1986) was used to assess depression and 
memory complaints were scored on a scale of one to four via four questions 
pertaining to general memory difficulties, losing objects, forgetting names and 
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getting lost. Regardless of objective memory performance, participants who reported 
more memory problems exhibited greater depression severity on the CAMDEX. 
In summary, the relationship between memory complaints and depressive 
symptomatology is extremely consistent. All 18 studies that met criteria for inclusion 
in the previous section reported a significant association between complaints and 
depression. These results occurred regardless of how memory complaints and 
depression were assessed and with samples as small as 50 participants. Medium-
sized effects for group comparisons (depression vs. no depression, whether clinical 
or sub-clinical) and correlations were typically reported, though small and large 
effect sizes were also occasionally found. 
Anxiety 
Anxiety is another psychological concept that has been investigated as a 
possible predictor of memory complaints. A total of nine studies meeting criteria 
outlined in Table 4 that have examined the relationship between memory complaints 
and anxiety were found. Five of these studies utilized established questionnaires as a 
measure of memory complaints, whilst the remaining four studies used four or fewer 
questions. A range of established psychometrically-validated anxiety measures were 
utilized across the studies. The following section reviews each of these nine studies 
and appraises the association between memory complaints and anxiety. As with the 
research on depression, the studies utilizing established questionnaires and global 
measures of memory complaints are reviewed separately. 
Questionnaire assessments of memory complaints. The median sample 
size of the five studies utilizing questionnaires to assess memory complaints was 
130, ranging from 54 up to 822 participants. For each of the studies, memory 
complaints were assessed via a single questionnaire with the exception of Derousne 
et al. (1999), who also utilized a global measure of complaint. Each of the studies 
also utilized a single established measure of anxiety. Details pertaining to each of the 
studies, as well as whether or not an association was found between memory 
complaints and anxiety, is reported in Table 7. Two of the five studies assessed 
anxiety via the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988); the 
remaining three studies utilized Zung’s Anxiety Self-Rating Scale (Zung, 1971), the 
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Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986) and Goldberg 
et al.’s anxiety scale (Goldberg et al., 1988). Consistent with literature examining the 
link between memory complaints and depression, anxiety was found to be 
significantly related to memory complaints in each of the studies also, regardless of 
the measures used. 
Both studies examining the association between the GFF scale (Gilewski et 
al., 1990) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et al., 1988) reported significantly 
higher levels of memory complaints in participants experiencing higher levels of 
anxiety (Potter & Hartman, 2006; Potter et al., 2009). In the earlier study, Potter and 
Hartman reported a zero-order Pearson correlation of -.32 (p < .01) between 
complaints and anxiety in 99 female older adults; an effect size approaching that 
reported for complaints and depression (r = -.47). In a more recently published 
study, Potter et al. reported a similar zero-order Pearson correlation of -.29 between 
the GFF scale and the Beck Anxiety Inventory. However, data for this study was 
drawn from the same data set used in the initial study. 
Table 7 
Questionnaire Studies Examining Memory Complaints and Anxiety 
Study N (age-years) 
Complaint 
Measure 
Anxiety 
Measure 
Association 
(Yes / No) 
Derouesne et al. (1999) 183 (50+) SMS + 1 ZA Yes 
Dux et al. (2008) 130 (M = 76.7) GFF ASI Yes 
Potter & Hartman (2006) 99* (60-89) GFF BAI Yes 
Potter et al. (2009) 54* (62-89) GFF BAI Yes 
Slavin et al. (2010) 827 (70-90) MAC-Q GAS Yes 
*All participants were female 
Note: ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index, BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory, GAS = Goldberg 
Anxiety Scale, GFF = General Frequency of Forgetting Scale, MAC-Q = Memory 
Complaint Questionnaire, SMS = Subjective Memory Scale, ZA = Zung’s Anxiety Self-
Rating Scale. 
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A slightly larger and more recent study again reported a significant 
relationship between memory complaints and anxiety (Dux et al., 2008). In a study 
of 130 older adults, Dux et al. examined zero-order Pearson correlations between 
scores on the GFF scale and the Anxiety Sensitivity Index. Contrary to Potter and 
Hartman (2006), Dux et al. reported stronger associations with memory complaints 
for anxiety (r = -.44, p < .001) than for depression (r = -.35, p < .001). The stronger 
relationship between anxiety and memory complaints reported by Dux et al. relative 
to those values reported in the studies by Potter and colleagues (Potter & Hartman, 
2006; Potter et al., 2009) may be attributable, at least in part, to skewed data on the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (e.g., see Potter & Hartman, 2006, Table 1) or to gender, 
given Dux et al. also included males in their sample. 
A slightly larger study undertaken by Derousne et al. (1999) also reported 
significant associations between memory complaints and anxiety. In 183 adults over 
the age of 50 years, Derousne et al. reported a moderate Pearson correlation of .333 
(p < .001) between scores on the Subjective Memory Scale and on Zung’s Anxiety 
Self-Rating Scale. Furthermore, the study reported significant differences in anxiety 
between participants who complained of ‘major’ problems with memory and those 
who complained of only ‘minor’ problems with their memory (p < .001). The 
correlation reported between memory complaints and anxiety by Derousne et al. was 
comparable to that reported for memory complaints and depression in the same study 
(r = .327, p < .001). 
The largest and most recent study examining the relationship between anxiety 
and memory complaints assessed via a questionnaire, undertaken by Slavin et al. 
(2010), also reported a significant association between the two. In a study involving 
827 older adults aged between 70 and 90 years, Slavin et al. reported a significant 
but weak zero-order Pearson correlation (r = .185, p < .001) between complaints 
assessed via the Memory Complaint Questionnaire and anxiety assessed via the 
Goldberg Anxiety Scale. In addition, participants with high levels of anxiety (> 4 on 
the Goldberg Anxiety Scale) reported more frequent and severe problems on the 
Memory Complaint Questionnaire than participants with low levels of anxiety (  4 
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on the Goldberg Anxiety Scale). However, calculating an effect size for these groups 
suggests a relatively small difference between them (Cohen’s d = 0.39, p < .05). 
Global assessments of memory complaints. The median sample size of the 
four studies assessing memory complaints and anxiety without an established 
measure of anxiety was 264.5, ranging between 135 and 2546 participants. The 
number of questions used to assess memory complaints ranged from one to four, 
although one study (Clarnette, Almeida, Forstl, Paton, & Martins, 2001) confirmed 
memory complaints simply via presentation at a memory clinic. To assess anxiety, 
established measures of anxiety were utilized, including the Cambridge Mental 
Disorders in the Elderly Examination (Roth et al., 1986), Goldberg et al.’s anxiety 
scale (Goldberg et al., 1988), the State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and Beck’s Anxiety Inventory (Beck et 
al., 1988). Consistent with studies examining the link between memory complaints 
and depression using global measures of memory complaints, all four studies 
examining the association between complaints and anxiety reported a significant 
association between them (see Table 8). 
Table 8 
Global Assessment Studies Examining Memory Complaints and Anxiety 
Study N/n (age-years) 
Complaint 
Questions 
Anxiety    
Measure 
Association 
Clarnette et al. (2001) 135 (M = 62.5) - CAMDEX Yes 
Jorm et al. (2004) 2546 (60-64) 1 GAS Yes 
Jungwirth et al. (2004) 302 (75) 4 STAI Yes 
Lautenschlager et al. (2005) 227* (70+) 1 BAI Yes 
*All participants were female 
Note: BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory, CAMDEX = Cambridge Mental Disorders in the 
Elderly Examination, GAS = Goldberg Anxiety Scale, STAI = State-Trait-Anxiety-
Inventory. 
Clarnette et al. (2001) reported significant differences between those 
complaining of memory complaints and healthy controls with regard to anxiety 
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measured via the Cambridge Mental Disorders in the Elderly Examination (Roth et 
al., 1986). Clarnette et al. interviewed 135 older adults, including 97 individuals who 
presented at a memory clinic with complaints of memory problems and 38 spouses 
used as healthy controls. Of those presenting with memory complaints, 66.0% 
reported symptoms of anxiety in contrast to just 44.7% of healthy controls. Despite 
the relatively small sample size, this difference was found to be significant (p < .05). 
Similarly, Lautenschlager et al. (2005) also reported differences between 
those who did and did not complain of memory problems with regard to subjective 
experiences of anxiety. Of 227 female older adults over the age of 70 years, 121 
participants responded affirmatively to, “Do you have any difficulty with your 
memory?” The remaining 106 participants were utilized as a healthy control group 
for comparison. Consistent with the results reported by Clarnette et al. (2001), 
Lautenschlager et al. reported considerable differences between the groups (z = 4.17, 
p < .001) for mean scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory. Again, these results were 
comparable with the discrepancy between the groups for symptoms of depression. 
Jungwirth et al. (2004) also reported significant associations between 
memory complaints and anxiety in a correlational design involving 302 adults aged 
75 years. Participants were asked four questions regarding their possible memory 
problems pertaining to recent events, locating belongings, conversations and 
appointments. Each question was scored as 0, 1 or 2 on the basis of whether the 
participant felt he or she was similar (0), worse (1) or a lot worse (2) in these areas 
than 2.5 years ago (giving a total score ranging from 0 to 8). Spearman correlations 
were then reported for these scores with both state and trait measures of anxiety on 
the State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory. Modest, yet significant correlations of .24 (p < 
.01) for trait anxiety and .23 (p < .01) for state anxiety were reported. In addition, 
Jungwirth et al. also utilized another global measure of complaint, “Do you have 
complaints about your memory in the last 2.5 years?” Comparable Spearman 
correlations of .19 (p < .01) and .19 (p < .05) were obtained for state and trait 
anxiety, respectively. 
The largest of the four studies utilizing a global measure of complaint that 
has examined the relationship between memory complaints and anxiety (Jorm et al., 
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2004) also found a significant difference in anxiety severity between the groups who 
did and did not complain of memory problems. In a study involving 2546 older 
adults aged between 60 and 64 years, Jorm et al. asked participants whether their 
memory functioned as well as it used to. Scores on the Goldberg Anxiety Scale were 
then contrasted for those who did and did not report a decline in memory function. A 
large effect size was reported for the difference between the groups (d = 0.79, p < 
.001), suggesting memory complaints are greater in those experiencing more 
frequent or severe symptoms of anxiety. 
In summary, the literature also suggests the presence of a relationship 
between memory complaints and anxiety, albeit slightly more varied than that 
observed between memory complaints and depression. Each of the nine studies 
examining the relationship between memory complaints and anxiety reported a 
significant association between them, with effect sizes ranging from small through to 
large. These differences in reported effect sizes are possibly attributable to different 
measures of anxiety and memory complaints being used as well as sample 
differences (e.g., gender, recruitment method) and non-normal data distributions 
used in some studies. 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter Three 
 Whilst earlier research has targeted affect (particularly aspects of depression and 
anxiety) as a predictor of memory complaints, studies have more recently begun 
to incorporate personality characteristics as possible predictors of complaints. 
 Whilst theory makes clear predictions about how personality and affective 
distress interact when predicting memory complaints, little or no empirical 
research has targeted this issue. 
 A number of studies report the presence of a relationship between aspects of 
personality and memory complaints; high levels of neuroticism and low levels of 
conscientiousness, for example, have been found to be consistently associated 
with more common or severe complaints of memory problems. 
 Strong associations also exist between specific features of personality 
(particularly neuroticism) and both depression and anxiety. 
 Whilst causal mechanisms for the relationship between personality and both 
depression and anxiety are still largely unknown, the literature provides several 
possible explanations via a number of different models and hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Role of Personality 
Prior to the last 10 years, research into memory complaints had focussed 
predominantly on examining neuropsychological test performance and affective 
distress as predictors. However, studies have more recently begun to demonstrate the 
importance of personality. Levels of neuroticism and conscientiousness, for example, 
have been found to be related to memory complaints (e.g., Pearman & Storandt, 
2004, 2005). Whilst a number of studies have now identified the importance of 
various features of personality in memory complaints, the long-established 
relationship between personality characteristics and affective distress (reviewed later 
in this chapter) raises questions about the nature in which memory complaints and 
affective distress are related. 
Theoretical accounts of memory complaints (reviewed in Chapter 4) outline a 
number of possible relationships amongst relevant predictor variables (e.g., 
Niederehe, 1998), though empirical studies into memory complaints have not yet 
adequately addressed these associations. The overlap between personality 
characteristics and affective distress, for example, has been largely overlooked in 
literature examining these variables as predictors of memory complaints. This is 
somewhat surprising given the importance of such relationships in understanding the 
direct and indirect associations with memory complaints. As justification for 
examining these relationships further, this chapter discusses empirical and theoretical 
literature examining the relationships that personality holds with both memory 
complaints and aspects of affective distress that are typically incorporated into 
memory complaint research (i.e., depression and anxiety). 
Personality and Memory Complaints 
To ensure the research is relevant to the study reported in the next section of 
this thesis, a set of criteria were utilized to select studies to be reviewed in this 
section. The criteria are listed in Table 9 and are similar to those used to select 
studies in the previous chapters. Firstly, studies needed to include at least one 
measure of memory complaints and one or more features of personality. Second, 
only studies providing a zero-order relationship between these variables were 
included (studies only providing adjusted or partial relationships were excluded). 
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Third, studies were only included when they examined concurrent relationships 
between these measures, given longitudinal relationships introduce a range of other 
possible influences (such as aging and fluctuations in mental health). Finally, given 
the current thesis focusses on community-dwelling older adults, only studies that 
incorporated a considerable proportion of older adults in their sample were included. 
That is, samples that included only clinical populations (e.g., those with a personality 
disorder diagnosis) were excluded. 
Table 9 
Criteria for Studies that Examine Personality and Memory Complaints 
1. One or more measures of both personality and memory complaints 
2. Zero-order relationship(s) for personality and complaint measures 
3. Cross-sectional (i.e., not longitudinal) relationships 
4. Include a large proportion of older adults (e.g., adults over 50 years of age) 
5. At least partly a community sample, not entirely clinical 
 
A total of seven studies examining the relationship between personality and 
memory complaints that met the criteria presented in Table 9 were found. The 
studies ranged in size from 57 through to 2546 participants, with a median sample 
size of 423 participants. Few studies used the same measures to assess personality 
characteristics or memory complaints; though six of the seven studies identified a 
significant relationship between at least one feature of personality and memory 
complaints. Measures used in the studies to assess characteristics of personality 
included the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Butcher, Dahlstrom, 
Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989), the Revised Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991), the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-
FFI, Scandell, 2000) and the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
Two studies used multiple measures to assess personality. To assess memory 
complaints, established measures included the Memory Assessment Clinic’s Self-
Rating Scale (Winterling et al., 1986), and the Memory Complaint Questionnaire 
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(Crook et al., 1992). Two studies utilized global measures of memory complaints 
(Comijs et al., 2002; Jorm et al., 2004), which were assessed using three or fewer 
questions. Another study used multiple established measures (Ponds & Jolles, 1996). 
The seven studies assessing the association between memory complaints and 
personality that met criteria in Table 9 are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Studies Examining Personality and Memory Complaints 
Study N/n (age-years) 
Personality 
Measure 
Complaint 
Measure 
Association 
Comijs et al. (2002) 2032 (55-85) Multiple 1 Q Yes 
Hanninen et al. (1994) 423 (67-78) MMPI MAC-Q Yes 
Jorm et al. (2004) 2546 (60-64) EPQ-R 3 Qs Yes 
Pearman & Storandt (2004) 283 (45-94) NEO-FFI MAC-S Yes 
Pearman & Storandt (2005) 85 (M = 73.2) NEO PI-R MAC-S Yes 
Ponds and Jolles (1996) 57 (M = 63.1) Multiple Multiple No 
Slavin et al. (2010) 827 (70-90) NEO-FFI MAC-Q Yes 
Note: EPQ-R = Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Revised, MAC-Q = Memory 
Complaint Questionnaire, MAC-S = Memory Assessment Clinic’s Self-Rating Scale, 
MMPI = Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, NEO-FFI = NEO Five-Factor 
Inventory, NEO PI-R = Revised NEO Personality Inventory. 
A cross-sectional study by Hanninen et al. (1994) incorporating a total of 423 
older adults between the age of 67 and 78 years was one of the earliest to examine 
the relationship between memory complaints and features of personality. Hanninen 
et al. used measures to examine whether affective states (the Geriatric Depression 
Scale, Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986), features of personality (Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory, Butcher et al., 1989) or objective measures of memory, 
including Benton’s Visual Retention Test (Benton, 1974) and the Paired-Associated 
Learning Test from the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS, Wechsler, 1987), differed in 
those with and without subjective memory complaints. Hanninen et al. reported that 
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personality traits, and not memory performance, was associated with complaints, 
finding that memory complaints were associated with low confidence in one’s own 
abilities. 
Perhaps the most prominent research published on the relationship between 
personality and memory complaints were two studies undertaken by Pearman and 
Storandt (2004, 2005). In their initial study, Pearman and Storandt examined a 
number of possible predictors of memory complaints in 283 community-dwelling 
adults aged between 45 and 94 years. Included in these predictors were the 
personality traits that make up the Five-Factor Model of Personality (McCrae & 
Costa, 1987; McCrae & Oliver, 1992). Of those five traits, memory complaints were 
found to be related to both neuroticism and conscientiousness (assessed via the 
NEO-FFI, Costa & McCrae, 1992). Neuroticism (r = -.42) and conscientiousness (r 
= .46) were found to be better predictors of memory complaints than LM 
performance (Wechsler, 1997), scores on the Geriatric Depression Scale (Sheikh & 
Yesavage, 1986), scores on the Anxiety About Aging scale (Lasher & Faulkender, 
1993) and a general health rating. 
Consequently, Pearman and Storandt (2005) further examined personality 
traits as predictors of subjective memory complaints in a smaller sample of 85 
community-dwelling older adults via telephone. This study utilised the more detailed 
personality inventory, the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992), to 
measure overall trait scores (for neuroticism and conscientiousness) as well as 
specific facets of these measures (e.g., self-consciousness, impulsiveness and 
vulnerability). In addition to personality, Pearman and Storandt again took measures 
of self-esteem (Crook & Larrabee, 1992) and objective memory performance, 
including the LM subtest (Wechsler, 1987) and prospective memory tasks (e.g., 
asking participants to call the researchers when they received a pack in the mail). 
Correlations suggested that personality traits as well as some specific features of 
them were related to memory complaints, including neuroticism (r = -.36), 
conscientiousness (r = .40), self-discipline (a facet of conscientiousness, r = .40) and 
self-conscientiousness (a facet of neuroticism, r = -.45). In addition, self-esteem was 
again found to correlate with memory complaints (r = .35). Thus, Pearman and 
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Storandt proposed that treatments for older adults complaining of memory problems 
should target self-discipline and self-concept. 
In an earlier, much larger study, Jorm et al. (2004) assessed 2546 adults 
between 60 and 64 years of age. The study assessed older adults on a range of 
measures, including demographics, cognitive functioning, psychiatric state, 
personality, physical health measures and number of visits to a general practitioner 
in those who did and did not present with global memory complaints. Complainers 
and non-complainers differed significantly on several of the measures (partly due to 
high statistical power on account of the large sample size), including demographics, 
cognitive function, psychiatric state, physical health and visits to a general 
practitioner. In addition, those who reported memory complaints exhibited higher 
levels of neuroticism, ruminative behaviour (a measure of one’s inclination to focus 
on negative emotions) and behavioural inhibition (a measure of how responsive 
someone is to punishment). Furthermore, those who reported complaints about their 
memory also exhibited lower levels of extraversion and mastery (a measure of 
whether one feels in control of their life) than those not complaining of memory 
problems. Across the personality measures, ruminative behaviour and neuroticism 
were found to be most strongly associated with memory complaints. 
Slavin et al. (2010) focussed on an older sample of 827 participants aged 
between 70 and 90 years and found comparable results. Among a range of other 
cognitive abilities and measures of affective distress, the study assessed whether 
memory complaints (Memory Complaint Questionnaire, Crook et al., 1992) were 
associated with measures of neuroticism, openness and conscientiousness (NEO-FFI, 
Costa & McCrae, 1992). Whilst sub-groups representing different degrees of 
memory impairment did not exhibit different degrees of memory complaints, 
complaints were found to be associated with higher neuroticism scores and lower 
conscientiousness scores. 
A smaller study undertaken by Ponds and Jolles (1996) incorporating 102 
older adults (50 presenting with memory complaints and 52 matched controls) again 
reiterated the importance of neuroticism in memory complaints. Ponds and Jolles 
reported in their paper that neuroticism scores, whilst considerably different between 
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the groups, did not differ significantly (p = .054) in those who did and did not 
complain of memory problems. However, the neuroticism measure was added to the 
study in a later phase and only administered to 28 memory complainers and 29 
controls. When a Cohen’s d value is calculated for their results, based on the means 
and standard deviations presented, it suggests a medium-strength relationship 
between memory complaints and neuroticism (Cohen’s d = 0.52); a similar strength 
relationship to that of memory complaints and depression (Cohen’s d = 0.48). 
Another large-scale study (Comijs et al., 2002) that followed 2032 
participants over a six-year period also provided very strong evidence for the 
importance of personality (particularly neuroticism) in memory complaints. Comijs 
et al. assessed mastery (via the Pearlin Mastery Scale, Pearlin & Schooler, 1978), 
perceived self-efficacy (via the General Self-Efficacy Scale, Bosscher & Smit, 1998) 
and neuroticism (via the Dutch Personality Questionnaire, Luteijin, Starren, & van 
Dijk, 1985) as predictors of whether or not one has complaints about their memory. 
Odds ratios indicated that participants exhibiting high levels of neuroticism were 
almost twice as likely (OR = 1.81) to complain of memory problems than those 
exhibiting low levels of neuroticism. Similarly, low self-efficacy (OR = 1.39) and 
low mastery (OR = 1.56) were also predictive of participants complaining about 
memory. 
In summary, scientific literature strongly suggests that aspects of personality 
(particularly measures of neuroticism) are associated with memory complaints in 
community-dwelling older adults. In some cases these measures exceeded the 
predictive value of better-documented predictors, such as measures of depression 
and anxiety. Effect sizes for various measures of personality were typically found to 
be medium in size. In particular, measures of neuroticism were found to be 
consistently associated with measures of memory complaints, suggesting complaints 
may primarily be driven by worry or features associated with it. Conscientiousness 
appears to be another feature of personality (negatively) associated with complaints, 
suggesting more conscientious individuals tend to complain of fewer or less severe 
problems with memory. 
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Personality and Affective Distress 
Depression 
The relationship between characteristics of personality and the onset, 
maintenance and course of depression has been of great research interest over a 
sustained period of time (Akiskal, Hirschfeld, & Yerevanian, 1983; Bagby et al., 
2008; Brown, Svrakic, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 1992; Klein et al., 2011; Klein, 
Wonderlich, & Shea, 1993). Research has consistently indicated that a relationship 
exists between aspects of personality (particularly neuroticism) and depression (e.g., 
Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010; Farmer, Redman, Harris, Mahmood, & Sadler, 2002; 
Hettema, Neale, Myers, Prescott, & Kendler, 2006; Roberts & Kendler, 1999; Weber 
et al., 2011). For example, a study of 79 depressed outpatients and 102 healthy 
controls by Weber et al. recently reported that neuroticism (assessed via the NEO-
Personality Inventory, Costa & McCrae, 1992) uniquely accounted for 25% of the 
variance in depression status (i.e., depressed or not depressed), even after age, 
education, scores measuring physical disease (assessed via the Clinical Illness Rating 
Scale, Conwell, Forbes, Cox, & Caine, 1993) and extent of home care required 
(hours per week) were already accounted for. 
Given the large number of studies identifying relationships between aspects 
of personality and depression, more recent research efforts have attempted to explain 
why (rather than whether) the two concepts are related. Despite the robustness of the 
relationships between aspects of personality and depression, considerable debate 
continues with regard to the causal mechanisms that underpin them and whether or 
not one is an outcome of the other (Klein et al., 2011). For this reason, and for the 
sake of conciseness and relevance to the current study, the following section 
discusses a range of models that attempt to explain the relationship between 
personality and depression as well as a selection of key empirical studies that have 
assessed them. 
A recently-published review (Klein et al., 2011) summarises various types of 
models depicting possible relationships between personality and depression. Klein et 
al. identified seven types of models that can effectively be grouped into one of three 
categories. The first category includes three models that propose personality and 
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depression do not causally influence each other but rather share a common 
underlying cause that influences both. Included in this category are the common-
cause, continuum/spectrum, and precursor models. The second category describes a 
group of models that propose depression is an outcome of personality. Included in 
this category are the predisposition and pathoplasticity models. A third category 
proposes, contrary to the second category, that personality is an outcome of 
depression. The concomitants and consequence/scars models make up this third 
category. 
Common-cause, continuum/spectrum and precursor models. According 
to Klein et al. (2011), the common-cause model proposes that the association 
between personality and depression exists not because one factor influences the other 
but because both are the result of the same or a very similar set of etiological factors. 
In the case of neuroticism and depression, for example, such factors might include 
genetic vulnerabilities or learned behaviours that predispose an individual to 
negative thinking. Such factors could increase the likelihood of higher levels of 
neuroticism and features of depression without necessarily implying a direct 
connection between them. The continuum/spectrum model also implies that 
personality characteristics and depression share a common etiology; however, this 
model proposes that the two concepts are not separate entities but rather part of the 
same spectrum. For example, individuals differ in terms of depressive personality 
traits, and the continuum/spectrum model proposes that clinical levels of depression 
simply reflect greater severity or a higher number of these traits – not because they 
increase the risk of depression but because they are in fact just different 
approximations (i.e., on-going and current) of the same underlying concept. The 
precursor model also implies that both personality characteristics and depression are 
outcomes of common etiological factors; however, it also assumes that depression is 
an end product to escalated levels of a particular set of traits. The model does not 
assume that personality characteristics cause depression but rather asserts that the 
presence or absence of depression typically follows them. 
Support in the literature exists for both the common cause and 
continuum/spectrum models (Klein, 1999; Klein & Miller, 1993; Orstavik, Kendler, 
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Czajkowski, Tambs, & Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2007) as well as for the precursor 
model (Kwon et al., 2000). Orstavik et al., for example, examined genetic and 
environmental risk factors for Depressive Personality Disorder and Major 
Depressive Disorder in a study of 1777 female and 1024 male twins. The results of 
the study indicated that genes accounted for a considerable amount of the shared 
variance between each diagnosis (approximately 48%, the remaining 52% was 
attributed to environmental factors). Whilst additional genetic contributions existed 
for Major Depressive Disorder that were not associated with Depressive Personality 
Disorder, the research still suggests considerable overlap in the genetic 
predispositions to these two diagnoses, providing support for models based on the 
premise that the relationship exists on account of shared etiology (i.e., the common 
cause, continuum/spectrum and precursor models). 
Contrary to the continuum/spectrum model, however, literature also suggests 
that personality characteristics relevant to depression and depression itself may in 
fact represent separate entities, despite their considerable overlap (Klein, 1990; Klein 
& Miller, 1993). Klein and Miller, for example, examined current and life-time 
psychiatric diagnoses (according to DSM-III criteria, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987) in college students who did (n = 36) and did not (n = 149) meet 
Akiskal’s (1983) criteria for Depressive Personality Disorder. Klein and Miller 
reported significantly greater rates of current and lifetime mood disorders in the 
depressive personality group, including Major Depressive Disorder and Dysthymia. 
Despite this association, almost 40% of individuals who met criteria for depressive 
personality at the time of the study had never met DSM-III criteria for a mood 
disorder. Such data suggests a considerable, but not complete, overlap between 
depressive personality traits and depression, thus challenging the notion put forward 
by the continuum/spectrum model that the two concepts represent different degrees 
of severity of the same underlying phenomenon. 
Further evidence exists for the precursor model (Kwon et al., 2000), which 
suggests that a diagnosis of Depressive Personality Disorder may precede an 
increased risk of a Dysthymia diagnosis (a less severe, more chronic  mood disorder 
than Major Depressive Disorder, outlined in the DSM-5, American Psychiatric 
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Association, 2013). In a study incorporating 72 women diagnosed with Depressive 
Personality Disorder (with no other comorbid axis I or axis II disorder, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) and 75 healthy, age-matched controls, Kwon et al. 
examined rates of Dysthymia and Major Depressive Disorder at baseline and 3-year 
follow-up. The results indicated that the group diagnosed with Depressive 
Personality Disorder at baseline exhibited significantly higher scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, 1987) at follow-up relative to baseline (though no 
significant difference was observed for the control group) and significantly increased 
risk of Dysthymia. Together with previous research suggesting personality and 
depression share etiological processes to a considerable degree (Klein, 1999; Klein 
& Miller, 1993; Orstavik et al., 2007), Kwon et al.’s study provides support for the 
precursor model, indicating that underlying processes may contribute to both 
personality and depression but that changes in personality may still precede a 
diagnosis of a mood disorder. 
Predisposition and pathoplasticity models. As indicated, the second 
category of models speculating on the relationship between personality 
characteristics and depression specify that changes in personality do not just precede 
depression (as in the precursor model); rather they instigate it. The first of the two 
models in this category, the predisposition model, asserts that personality 
characteristics contribute to one’s risk of depression (Klein et al., 2011). Like the 
precursor model, the predisposition model suggests that personality characteristics 
precede the onset of depression; however, in contrast to the precursor model, 
depression need not share any etiological features with characteristics of personality. 
The model signifies a chronological process between personality and depression, 
whereby genes and environment contribute to personality, which in turn contributes 
(in combination with genes and environment) to depression vulnerability. 
Furthermore, the predisposition model suggests that the relationship between 
personality and depression is mediated and/or moderated by environmental variables, 
such as increased stress or negative life experiences (e.g., dysfunctional 
relationships). 
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Whilst Kwon et al.’s (2000) longitudinal data does not necessarily imply a 
causal relationship between personality characteristics and depression, it does 
support the predisposition model to some degree, since the results indicate 
personality differences precede changes in depression symptomatology and closely 
related mood disorders. Recent research by Rudolph and Klein (2009) also observed 
a relationship between traits of Depressive Personality Disorder and symptoms of 
depression at 12-month follow-up. As part of a study of 143 young people, Rudolph 
and Klein examined the developmental consequences of depressive personality traits 
(assessed via a 16-item inventory, Klein, 1990). Depressive personality traits at 
baseline were found to be a significant predictor of depressive disorders at follow-up 
(assessed via the Schedule of Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School-Age 
Children - Epidemiologic Version, Orvaschel, 1995), even after variance associated 
with baseline depressive disorders (e.g., Major Depressive Disorder and Dysthymia) 
and non-depressive disorders (e.g., anxiety) was partialled out. Furthermore, the 
results suggested that the relationship between depressive personality traits and 
depression severity was mediated by increased familial stress. Such a result provides 
relatively strong support for the predisposition model, which predicts that personality 
influences depression via mediating variables. 
The second model proposing a causal influence from personality to 
depression, the pathoplasticity model, differs from the predisposition model in that it 
proposes personality influences the expression of depression (or associated 
symptoms), rather than impacting directly on depression itself. Thus, personality is 
said to contribute not to the onset of depression but to its presentation, severity, 
chronicity and response to treatment. The pathoplasticity model implies that traits of 
neuroticism and depressive personality, for example, do not directly contribute to 
depression. Rather they may expose particular symptoms (e.g., displays of suicidal 
ideation initiated through higher levels of pessimism), increase severity (e.g., 
increased feelings of worthlessness through more frequent self-criticism), help to 
maintain a depressive episode (e.g., via ongoing feelings of guilt or remorse) or limit 
treatment efficacy (e.g., via feelings of inadequacy). 
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The pathoplasticity model is also supported by the results of Kwon et al.’s 
(2000) longitudinal study. Indeed, one could argue that the increased risk of 
Dysthymia and increased scores on the Beck Depression Inventory at 3-year follow-
up are associated with baseline depressive personality traits not because personality 
factors instigate depression but because they increase the likelihood of it being 
detected. Furthermore, evidence also exists suggesting that depressive personality is 
associated with poorer outcomes for some treatments in individuals diagnosed with 
Major Depressive Disorder (Ryder, Quilty, Vachon, & Bagby, 2010). In a 
randomized control trial of 120 individuals with major depression, Ryder et al. 
examined treatment outcomes for interpersonal therapy (Weissman, Markowitz, & 
Kierman, 2000), cognitive behavioural therapy (Greenberger & Padesky, 1995) and 
antidepressant medication (administered according to Kennedy, Lam, Cohen, 
Ravindran, & CANMAT Depression Work Group, 2001) across those with and 
without traits of Depressive Personality Disorder. Whilst traits of Depressive 
Personality Disorder did not impact on outcomes for cognitive behavioural therapy 
and antidepressant medication, Ryder et al. observed poorer treatment outcomes for 
interpersonal therapy in those with more symptoms of Depressive Personality 
Disorder. Thus, as predicted by the pathoplasticity model, characteristics of 
Depressive Personality Disorder may be associated on some level with treatment 
outcomes in major depression. 
Concomitants and consequences/scars models. The final category of 
models attempting to explain the nature of the relationship between personality 
characteristics and depression are the concomitants and consequences/scars models. 
In contrast to the predisposition and pathoplasticity models, these models assert that 
the relationship exists not because personality influences depression but because 
depression influences personality. The concomitants model, for example, proposes 
that evaluations of personality are shaped by the presence of depression, thus 
influencing its presentation. For example, neuroticism and depressive personality 
traits are presumed to be relatively consistent during periods of reasonable mental 
health; however, the appearance of these characteristics changes considerably during 
periods of poor mental health, whereby such characteristics are amplified. 
Furthermore, the concomitants model proposes that this change in the appearance of 
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personality during periods of poor mental health is temporary and that personality 
returns to a stable baseline upon re-establishing a reasonable level of mental health. 
There is support for the concomitants model within the literature al well. For 
example, several studies have observed distinct personality profiles in those with and 
without a diagnosis of depression (e.g., Bagby & Ryder, 2000; Cox, McWilliams, 
Enns, & Clara, 2004; Enns & Cox, 1997). Perhaps more importantly, however, there 
is also evidence that some aspects of personality change with remission of a 
depressive episode (Bagby, Joffe, Parker, Kalemba, & Harkness, 1995; Fava et al., 
2002). 
Bagby et al. (1995) examined changes in characteristics of neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness (assessed via the NEO-
Personality Inventory, Costa & McCrae, 1992) in 57 outpatients diagnosed with 
Major Depressive Disorder over a three-month period. Correlations indicated that 
baseline depression severity, assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
1987) and Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (Hamilton, 1967), was most 
consistently associated with neuroticism scores. However, neuroticism scores were 
significantly lower and extraversion scores significantly higher in individuals who 
no longer met depression criteria relative to those who did meet criteria at 3-month 
follow-up. Thus, changes in personality accompanied remission of the depressive 
episode, consistent with the notion that depression impacts on the assessment of 
personality characteristics (see also De Fruyt, Van Leeuwen, Bagby, Rolland, & 
Rouillon, 2006). However, even over such short periods with this design, one cannot 
rule out the possibility that changes in neuroticism influenced depression status (as 
suggested by the predisposition and pathoplasticity models) or, indeed, that a third 
underlying variable is responsible for changes in both (as suggested by the common 
cause, continuum/spectrum and precursor models). 
Klein (1990) provided some evidence against the concomitants model, 
suggesting that the assessment of Depressive Personality Disorder traits using a 
semi-structured interview is not influenced by whether or not the individual is 
experiencing a Major Depressive Episode at the time of the assessment. The study 
examined Depressive Personality Disorder traits in outpatients at baseline and 6-
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month follow-up. To examine the effect of depression on depressive personality 
traits, Klein compared the number of depressive personality traits at baseline and 
follow-up in outpatients (n = 25) who met a diagnosis for a mood disorder at 
baseline but who reported no more than two mild depressive symptoms at follow-up 
(and thus no longer met criteria for Major Depressive Disorder). No significant 
difference in the number of Depressive Personality Disorder traits was found 
between these time points, suggesting depressive personality characteristics are 
independent of mood disorder status. However, these results are inconsistent with 
those reported by Bagby et al. (1995), which may be partly attributable to the manner 
in which personality disorder traits were assessed (i.e., questionnaire assessment vs. 
interview). 
The consequences/scars model, like the concomitants model, also suggests 
that depression impacts on personality. However, while the concomitants model 
proposes personality is simply distorted by depression, the consequences/scars 
model argues that personality is in fact altered by it. Thus, personality is presumed to 
be altered over the course of the depressive episode and this change is presumed to 
be long-lasting, if not permanent. Research provides strong support that major 
depression is directly associated with concurrently elevated levels of self-criticism 
(Cox et al., 2004). The concomitants model suggests this is simply because 
depressive symptoms alter the presentation patterns of self-criticism. However, the 
consequences/scars model proposes that such changes in self-criticism should remain 
long after remission of the depressive episode. Evidence on whether enduring 
personality changes result from depression is mixed, with some studies observing 
long-term changes to personality (Fanous, Neale, Aggen, & Kendler, 2007; Kendler, 
Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1993) and others observing no lasting change 
(Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Vollebergh, 2004; Shea et al., 1996). 
Fanous et al. (2007) examined the nature of causal relationships between 
Major Depressive Disorder and characteristics of personality (neuroticism and 
extraversion) in a large-scale population based study of 3030 male twins. Controlling 
for levels of neuroticism at baseline, Fanous et al. found Major Depressive Disorder 
was still a significant predictor of neuroticism at follow-up. Such a result is 
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consistent with the consequences/scar model and suggests Major Depressive 
Disorder may be related to future levels of neuroticism irrespective of neuroticism 
levels at baseline. In addition, neuroticism levels at baseline were also indirectly 
predictive of Major Depressive Disorder status at follow-up (via a range of genetic 
and environmental factors), providing further support for the predisposition models. 
An earlier study (Shea et al., 1996) of 94 depressed (first episode) and 708 
non-depressed individuals, however, reported that personality characteristics were 
not altered or ‘scarred’ by major depression. In a 6-year follow-up study, Shea et al. 
examined baseline and follow-up levels of neuroticism, extraversion, emotional 
reliance, social self-confidence, sociability, ascendance/dominance, general activity, 
restraint, thoughtfulness and hysteria in individuals with no history of affective 
disorders that did and did not meet diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder 
during the 6-year interval. Whilst an effect of depression was observed on measures 
of neuroticism, emotional reliance and thoughtfulness, no depression by time 
interactions were significant for any of the personality measures, suggesting a 
diagnosis of depression was not associated with changes in any of the personality 
measures. Klein et al. (2011) suggest the discrepancy between these results and those 
obtained by Fanous et al. (2007) may be attributable to a shorter follow-up or less 
stringent remission criteria. In addition, this difference might also be due to sample 
differences, whereby ‘scarring’ is more likely to be observed in individuals with a 
prior history of depression (who were excluded in Shea et al.’s study). 
In summary, whilst personality is unquestionably associated with depression, 
considerable debate continues regarding the causal mechanisms that instigate this 
relationship. Several models argue specific personality characteristics increase the 
risk of subsequent depression, others suggest personality is distorted or shaped by 
depression, whilst yet another group of models propose the two are not directly 
related at all but rather outcomes of the same or a similar set of etiological factors. 
There is empirical support for each of these approaches, suggesting no one particular 
model may be entirely sufficient to fully explicate the relationship between 
depression and characteristics of personality. Indeed, it may be the case that 
personality and depression are linked through a complex combination of specific 
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etiological processes as well as both direct and indirect reciprocal influences on each 
other. 
Anxiety 
As with personality characteristics and depression, considerable evidence 
exists demonstrating a clear pattern of association between personality and anxiety 
(Bienvenu, 2007; Kotov et al., 2010; Kotov et al., 2007; Kristensen, Mortensen, & 
Mors, 2009; Matsudaira & Kitamura, 2006; Middeldorp et al., 2006). Indeed, a 
recent and comprehensive meta-analytic review of almost 30 years of literature 
(Kotov et al., 2010) indicated a very strong positive association between several 
anxiety disorders (i.e., Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 
Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia, Social Phobia, Specific Phobia and Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder) and neuroticism (mean Cohen’s d = 1.77). Strong negative 
associations were also generally observed between anxiety and conscientiousness 
(mean Cohen’s d = -0.97) as well as anxiety and extraversion (mean Cohen’s d = -
0.93). 
Whilst there is clear support for an association with neuroticism across most, 
if not all, anxiety disorders, the association with other aspects of personality 
(particularly extraversion) is somewhat more complicated. For example, research 
generally suggests that across disorders, extraversion still accounts for a significant 
amount of variance in anxiety in addition to that already explained by neuroticism 
(Kotov et al., 2010; Middeldorp et al., 2006). Extraversion exhibits a mean effect 
size indicative of a strong association with anxiety disorders overall (Kotov et al., 
2010), though Cohen’s d values varied considerably between particular disorders and 
are estimated to be as low as .20 for Specific Phobia and as high as 1.31 for Social 
Phobia. Thus, the circumstances that trigger the anxiety are likely a key determinant 
in the extent to which characteristics of personality are involved. 
Despite these intricacies, recent research has at the same time also focussed 
on the manner in which anxiety and personality are causally related. As with 
depression, a number of explanations have been put forward to account for the 
relationship between anxiety and characteristics of personality (Andersen & 
Bienvenu, 2011; Brandes & Bienvenu, 2006). Perhaps not surprisingly, given the 
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conceptual and structural overlap between depression and anxiety (e.g., Clark & 
Watson, 1991), these relationships can be considered within a similar framework to 
the relationship between personality and depression. Whilst a recent review by 
Anderson and Bienvenu (2011) proposed four basic models detailing the relationship 
between anxiety and personality characteristics, the framework is effectively a 
summarised version of the seven models proposed for depression by Klein et al. 
(2011). The four models include (1) the vulnerability hypothesis, (2) the scar 
hypothesis, (3) the pathoplasty hypothesis and (4) the common cause/spectrum 
hypothesis. 
The vulnerability hypothesis. The vulnerability hypothesis proposes that 
one or more characteristics of personality predispose an individual to an increased 
risk of affective distress and psychiatric conditions (Andersen & Bienvenu, 2011). In 
the context of depression, this hypothesis is referred to by Klein et al. (2011) as the 
predisposition model. With regard to anxiety, for example, Andersen and Bienvenu 
suggest that lower levels of extraversion may precede the development of social 
phobia given it is associated with less frequent and less vigorous attempts to seek out 
social interaction. Presumably such a relationship would at least, in part, be mediated 
by a process of habituation, whereby decreases in subjective and objective measures 
of anxiety are observed with continued exposure to anxiety-provoking situations 
(Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2003). Considerable empirical support has been 
provided for the vulnerability hypothesis in the context of personality and anxiety 
(e.g., Bienvenu et al., 2009; Bramsen, Dirkzwager, & van der Ploeg, 2000; Johnson 
et al., 1999; Krueger, 1999). 
Results from longitudinal research support the notion that certain personality 
characteristics precede increased levels of anxiety (Krueger, 1999). In a study of  
961 participants from the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study, 
Krueger examined how well personality traits (assessed via the Multidimensional 
Personality Questionnaire, Tellegen, 1982) at age 18 predicted anxiety disorders 
(assessed via the Diagnostic Interview Schedule, Robins, Helzer, Cottler, & 
Goldring, 1989) and anxiety severity (assessed by summing scores on the Diagnostic 
Interview Schedule) at age 21. In the prediction of affective disorders at age 21, two 
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of four broad factor scales assessing personality were significant predictors of 
anxiety disorder status beyond disorder status at age 18. Negative Emotionality (a 
trait conceptually similar to neuroticism) and Constraint (a trait conceptually related 
to Openness to Experience and Extraversion, Costa & McCrae, 1992) returned odds 
ratios of 1.63 and 1.31, respectively. At a more detailed level, two subscales (out of 
10) significantly predicted anxiety disorder status at age 21 beyond disorder status at 
age 18; Stress Reaction and Alienation (both subscales from the Negative 
Emotionality scale), which returned odds ratios of 1.43 and 1.38, respectively. When 
examining severity rather than disorder status, anxiety was significantly predicted by 
the Negative Emotionality scale as well as the Stress Reaction and Harm Avoidance 
subscales. Thus, the results provided by Krueger strongly suggest specific 
personality characteristics play a role in predicting future anxiety disorder status and 
anxiety severity beyond baseline anxiety disorder status. Furthermore, these 
characteristics are largely reflective of a tendency to experience negative emotions. 
In a more recently published longitudinal study assessing the relationship 
between personality disorder traits and subsequent development of psychiatric 
conditions, Bienvenu et al. (2009) reported that specific personality traits precede 
Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia. In a sample of 432 adults, the study reported that 
traits of avoidance and dependence at baseline predicted the onset of both Panic 
Disorder and Agoraphobia at 12- to 15-year follow-up. Furthermore, this relationship 
was maintained even when baseline symptoms of panic were taken into account. 
Based on the data, Bienvenu et al. propose that personality characteristics are not 
simply associated with such psychiatric conditions but rather precede them, possibly 
acting as a predisposing factor. 
The scar hypothesis. In contrast to the Vulnerability hypothesis, the Scar 
hypothesis suggests that the association between personality and affective distress is 
attributable to the impact of affective distress on personality (Andersen & Bienvenu, 
2011; Klein et al., 2011). That is, rather than characteristics of personality increasing 
the risk of anxiety, changes in personality are said to result partly from experiences 
of above-normal levels of anxiety. Whilst there is considerably fewer studies 
examining the chronological impact of anxiety on personality than personality on 
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anxiety, there is still good evidence that anxiety precedes certain dysfunctional 
personality characteristics (Kasen, Cohen, Skodol, Johnson, & Brook, 1999; Kasen 
et al., 2001). 
Kasen et al. (1999), for example, examined the association between 
psychiatric disorders in childhood and personality disorders in adulthood in a 
longitudinal study of 551 individuals over a 9-year period. The study reported that 
the presence of an anxiety disorder at baseline predicted both cluster A (Paranoid, 
Schizoid and Schizotypal) and cluster C (Avoidant, Dependent, Obsessive-
Compulsive) personality disorders at follow-up. However, baseline anxiety disorders 
were found not to be associated with an increased risk of cluster B (Antisocial, 
Borderline, Histrionic and Narcissistic) personality disorders. Kasen et al. propose 
that the association with cluster A and cluster C personality disorders may stem from 
two particular features of anxiety; namely separation anxiety (i.e., anxiety induced 
by social situations outside of immediate family) and social phobia (i.e., a more 
general fear and avoidance of social situations). Kasen et al. suggest that the 
presence of these features may lead to avoidance of social interactions during 
childhood, which leads to increased levels of anxiety and a preference for seclusion. 
This may in turn hinder the development of social skills and lead to further isolation, 
beginning a cyclical and persistent pattern of behaviour that resembles part of the 
diagnostic criteria for cluster A and cluster C personality disorders. 
The pathoplasty hypothesis. Whilst the vulnerability and scar hypotheses 
propose that personality and anxiety are causally related, other models suggest that 
they need not be. The Pathoplasty hypothesis, for example, proposes that personality 
and anxiety are related, but indirectly through variables that mediate this 
relationship. For example, very high levels of neuroticism may decrease one’s 
awareness of positive aspects of their abilities and increase one’s awareness of the 
negative aspects. Such a disposition might then contribute to avoidance of, or intense 
anxiety in, social activities as a result of elevated fears of scrutiny. Thus, neuroticism 
does not directly cause anxiety but increases the risk via its impact on self-efficacy 
judgements. However, very little empirical research has been conducted on the 
pathoplasty hypothesis in the context of anxiety. 
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Schmidt and Bates (2003) provide some evidence in support of a pathoplastic 
relationship between personality and clinical levels of anxiety. In a study of 147 
patients diagnosed with Panic Disorder, Schmidt and Bates examined whether 
anxiety sensitivity (i.e., the belief that anxiety can be harmful) impacted on 
comorbidity, medication use and disorder status at 6-month follow-up. The results of 
the study suggested anxiety sensitivity was significantly associated with a comorbid 
diagnosis of depression, medication use and several anxiety-related factors at 6-
month follow-up, including self-reported anxiety, anticipatory anxiety and avoidance 
of anxiety sensations. These outcomes occurred despite many patients obtaining 
anxiety sensitivity scores typical of non-clinical participants. Thus, the results 
suggest that anxiety sensitivity has a considerable influence on the expression and 
course of Panic Disorder without necessarily impacting on the diagnosis itself. 
The common cause hypothesis. The vulnerability, scar and pathoplasty 
hypotheses all assume that anxiety and personality are separate constructs and have 
the potential to influence each other, either directly or indirectly. However, the 
common cause model proposes that anxiety and personality are simply 
manifestations of the same underlying etiology (Kotov et al., 2010). Several large-
scale studies support this hypothesis, suggesting that some features of personality 
and anxiety have shared underlying genetic predispositions (Bienvenu, Hettema, 
Neale, Prescott, & Kendler, 2007; Hansell et al., 2012; Hettema et al., 2006; 
Hettema, Prescott, & Kendler, 2004). 
The most recent study performed by Hansell et al. (2012) examined the 
extent of genetic overlap between anxiety and neuroticism in 2459 twins (including 
2268 pairs) aged 12-25 years. Hansell et al. reported strong correlations between 
neuroticism scores on the Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1975) and NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), and anxiety symptoms 
assessed via the PSYCH-14 subscale of the Somatic and the Psychological Health 
Report (Hickie et al., 2001). Furthermore, 56% of the overlap between neuroticism 
and anxiety could be explained by commonalities in genetic makeup. Thus, Hansell 
et al.’s study provides strong support for the argument put forward by the common 
cause hypothesis. 
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Another large-scale study incorporating more than 8000 twins conducted 
earlier by Hettema, Prescott and Kendler (2004) reported even stronger genetic 
associations. The study examined the extent of genetic and environmental overlap 
between neuroticism, assessed via the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Short 
Form (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), and lifetime Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 
assessed via the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (Spitzer & Williams, 
1985). Whilst only a small proportion of environmental risk factors were shared 
between neuroticism and lifetime occurrences of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 
Hettema et al. concluded that “the genetic factors underlying neuroticism are nearly 
indistinguishable from those that influence liability to Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder” (p. 1585). Hence, the study advocates strongly for the idea that 
neuroticism and Generalized Anxiety Disorder have much in common with regard to 
etiology and provides further support for the common cause hypothesis. 
In an equally large follow-up study published shortly after, Hettema et al. 
(2006) examined genetic contributions to both neuroticism, using the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire-Short Form (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), and a range of 
anxiety disorders, including Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, 
Agoraphobia, Social Phobia, Animal Phobia and Situational Phobia. The results 
largely supported those findings reported in the previous study (Hettema et al., 
2004), suggesting Generalized Anxiety Disorder shared considerable genetic overlap 
(r = .77) but little environmental overlap (r = .24) with neuroticism. The results were 
similar for the remaining anxiety disorders assessed, with correlations for genetic 
overlap with neuroticism ranging between .58 (for Animal Phobia) and .82 (for 
Social Phobia), and correlations for environmental overlap with neuroticism ranging 
between .05 (for Animal Phobia) and .27 (for Agoraphobia). Thus, the follow-up 
study by Hettema and colleagues again provides strong support for the common 
cause hypothesis. 
A fourth study, undertaken by Bienvenu et al. (2007), also investigated the 
genetic basis of personality traits and specific anxiety disorders. Again, the study 
reported results consistent with the common cause model. A total of 7800 twins were 
assessed on measures of neuroticism and extraversion (via the Eysenck Personality 
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Questionnaire-Short Form, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) as well as for Social Phobia, 
Agoraphobia and Animal Phobia (via the Diagnostic Interview Schedule, Version 
III, Robins et al., 1989). Bienvenu et al. reported that any genetic predisposition to 
Social Phobia and Agoraphobia could be accounted for entirely by the genetic 
predisposition to neuroticism and extraversion. Furthermore, all three anxiety 
disorders shared considerable genetic overlap with neuroticism alone. 
In summary, considerable evidence also exists for a relationship between 
anxiety and features of personality. The literature offers four hypotheses depicting 
the relationship between anxiety and specific features of personality. These 
hypotheses are conceptually similar or identical to the models provided in the 
literature that attempt to account for the relationship between personality and 
depression. As with depression, empirical evidence within the anxiety literature is 
available to support each of these hypotheses, although there is particularly strong 
support for the common cause hypothesis. As with depression, it is possible that 
personality and anxiety are associated with one another through complex etiological 
processes as well as both direct and indirect influences on each other. 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter Four 
 Theory on subjective memory complaints has developed slowly over the past 20 
to 25 years. 
 Four models attempting to predict memory complaints that incorporate affect 
and/or personality have been proposed: the Memory Self-Efficacy Framework, 
the Social Support Model, the Mediation Model and the Clinically-Differentiated 
Model. 
 The Memory Self-Efficacy Framework proposes that mood state or physiological 
arousal can impact on subjective judgements of memory abilities through 
pessimism and hopelessness as well as associated physiological experiences 
(e.g., shakiness) being interpreted as a vulnerability to poor performance. 
 The final version of the Social Support Model proposes that memory complaints 
are directly predicted by depressed mood, which in turn, is directly predicted by 
social support. 
 The Mediation Model proposes that depression impacts on memory complaints 
via its impact on negative cognitive bias (e.g., feelings of hopelessness and low 
self-esteem). 
 The Clinically-Differentiated Model proposes that both affective states and 
personality traits impact on memory complaints but also that personality traits 
can impact on affective states as well. 
 Two major limitations to theory attempting to predict memory complaints are a 
lack of empirical studies testing these theories as well as a lack of consideration 
for personality characteristics in the prediction of memory complaints. 
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CHAPTER 4: Theoretical Accounts of Memory Complaints 
Whilst the structure and function of memory has been one of the most heavily 
researched topics across social and cognitive psychology (Kurtz-Costes, Schneider, 
& Rupp, 1995), emphasis on the subjective aspects of memory functioning has 
gained momentum only over the past 20 to 25 years. Furthermore, in contrast to 
much of the cognitive psychology and neuropsychology literature, research into the 
subjective aspects of memory has been somewhat slow in its theoretical development 
and is in many cases not guided by theory at all. Much of the literature has 
disregarded relevant theory and instead chosen to focus on the diagnostic 
implications of memory complaints (e.g., Gallassi, Bisulli, Oppi, Poda, & Felice, 
2008; Harwood et al., 2004; Jessen et al., 2007). 
However, four models that include aspects of affective distress and/or features 
of personality have been proposed that attempt to provide an explanation of what 
factors are associated with, or predictive of, memory complaints: the Memory Self-
Efficacy (MSE) Framework (Berry, 1999), Chan et al.’s (2007) Social Support 
Model, Crane et al.’s (Crane, Bogner, Brown, & Gallo, 2007) Mediation Model and 
Niederehe’s (1998) Clinically Differentiated Model (CDM). The MSE Framework, 
Chan et al.’s model and Crane et al.’s model each speculate on the potential 
influences of affective state on subjective memory complaints. Niederehe’s CDM is 
the only model to incorporate the influence of characteristics of personality. This 
chapter summarizes the pertinent components of these four theories and comments 
on potential deficiencies in the memory complaint literature with regard to affect and 
personality. 
The Memory Self-Efficacy Framework 
The MSE Framework (Berry, 1999) is a model depicting a person’s beliefs and 
judgements pertaining to their memory abilities and is derived directly from 
Bandura’s (1997) Self-Efficacy Theory. Like Bandura’s theory, the MSE framework 
primarily speculates on the manner in which beliefs about one’s abilities impact on 
task performance; that is, how beliefs about one’s memory impact on memory task 
performance. Whilst the current thesis is primarily concerned with predictors of the 
subjective aspects of memory functioning (i.e., beliefs about one’s own memory, 
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rather than objective memory performance), the MSE framework is still relevant to 
the current study in that the model also speculates on several factors that may impact 
on subjective memory judgements, including physiological arousal and mood state. 
The model is composed of four chronologically-arranged sections; sources of 
MSE, MSE itself, mediating effects of MSE, and task performance (see Figure 1). 
The first two components of the model (i.e., MSE and its sources) are discussed 
below, given their relevance to this thesis. Since the second component (MSE itself) 
is arguably the most fundamental part of the model, the following section first 
describes how the framework conceptualises MSE, followed by the manner in which 
psychological state or mood is hypothesized to influence it. The final two 
components of the model (mediators of MSE and memory performance) are 
designed to explain how beliefs about memory impact on memory task performance. 
These components are not directly relevant to the aims of this thesis and for the sake 
of brevity are not discussed here. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The chronological association between components of the Memory Self-
Efficacy framework (adapted from Berry, 1999). 
Berry (1999) describes MSE as a changeable and self-evaluating collection of 
beliefs and judgements pertaining to one’s ability to perform memory tasks. For the 
most part, it has been operationally defined either through items developed within 
the framework of Bandura’s Self-Efficacy Theory (e.g., Beaudoin, Agrigoroael, 
Desrichard, Fournet, & Roulin, 2008; Berry, West, & Dennehey, 1989) or through 
scales pertaining to common types of memory problems derived through factor 
analysis (e.g., Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 1988; Gilewski et al., 1990). MSE defined 
via Self-Efficacy Theory simply reflects an individual’s belief in their own ability to 
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successfully complete a specific memory task. For example, the Memory Self-
Efficacy Questionnaire (Berry et al., 1989) asks, “If a friend asked me to do 10 
errands, five minutes later I could remember two of the errands I had to do”; to 
which the individual responds with whether or not they agree (Yes or No) and how 
confident they are (as a percentage). Factor analytic scales, however, are generally 
designed to assess memory competence in a variety of contexts, rather than ability 
for a specific task. For example, the MFQ (Gilewski et al., 1990) asks an individual 
to rate (on a Likert scale of 1 to 7) the extent of memory problems they experience 
with names, faces, appointments, directions, phone numbers and various other tasks 
and stimuli, which can then be summed together to provide an overall measure of 
memory complaint. 
Mood State and Physiological Arousal as a Source of Memory Self-Efficacy 
The MSE framework proposes that such judgements about one’s own memory 
abilities are based on input from four sources; (1) mastery experiences, (2) modelling 
or vicarious experience, (3) verbal persuasion, and (4) physiological arousal or mood 
state. The model speculates little on inter-relationships amongst the four sources, 
though each is proposed to contribute to MSE judgements (Berry, 1999). The MSE 
framework also proposes that the relationship between physiological arousal or 
mood state and subjective memory judgements is a direct one, such that arousal or 
mood state directly influences memory complaints (Berry, 1999). 
Bandura (1997) emphasizes that because high levels of arousal have the 
potential to adversely affect task performance, people typically anticipate that their 
performance will be better when little or no physiological arousal is present. Thus, a 
person experiencing high levels of anxiety and associated physiological arousal (e.g., 
increased heart rate, shakiness, sweating) during or prior to a memory task will 
interpret these experiences as a vulnerability to poor performance. According to the 
MSE framework, such feelings of vulnerability would both reduce one’s self-
efficacy and increase the likelihood of memory complaints being made. Similarly, 
negative mood states have the potential to increase the likelihood of memory 
complaints as a result of distorted perception. Depression, for example, is often 
associated with increased feelings of pessimism (Maltby, Lewis, & Hill, 1998) and 
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hopelessness (Nekanda-Trepka, Bishop, & Blackburn, 1983), both of which would 
presumably increase memory complaints. 
The Social Support Model 
Chan et al.’s (2007) Social Support Model was generated primarily to predict 
memory complaints in Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) patients. However, 
little exploration has been carried out to examine whether or not this model 
generalizes effectively to non-HIV populations. For this reason, and because it 
incorporates concepts relevant to memory complaints more generally, it is 
incorporated here. Chan et al. provide two versions of the model; an initial model 
based on intuition and a simplified final model based on the results of a regression 
analysis. 
Chan et al.’s (2007) initial model is composed of five chronologically-arranged 
factors, ending with memory complaints. Objective memory performance and 
depressive mood are postulated as the two predictors of memory complaints, such 
that poorer objective memory performance and a more severe depressed mood both 
increase the likelihood of memory complaints being made. Depressive mood is then 
also proposed to be predicted by medical symptoms and social support, such that a 
greater number or more severe medical symptoms and less social support both 
increase the likelihood or severity of the depressed mood. 
Following an empirical study, Chan et al. (2007) made adjustments to the 
initial model to reflect the results obtained. The final model was adjusted to 
incorporate three chronologically-arranged factors, suggesting subjective memory 
complaints could be explained primarily by a depressive mood, which in turn could 
be explained primarily by social support. That is, poor social support is suggested as 
a risk factor for depressive mood, which consequently serves to increase the number 
or severity of complaints made about memory. Notably, Chan et al.’s Social Support 
Model suggests a direct relationship between depressive mood and subjective 
memory complaints. 
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The Mediation Model 
Whilst the previous two models were designed primarily to understand the key 
factors associated with memory complaints, Crane, Bogner, Brown and Gallo’s 
(2007) Mediation Model was instead designed to clarify the relationship between 
memory complaints and depression. The model assumes a link between memory 
complaints and depression but proposes that the link is mediated by negative 
cognitive bias (e.g., feelings of hopelessness and low self-esteem). That is, 
depression is predictive of memory complaints, though not directly associated with 
them. 
Data from 299 older adults supported Crane et al.’s (2007) model, suggesting 
depression is associated with memory complaints but that this relationship can 
largely be explained by negative cognitive bias. When predicting subjective memory 
complaints on the MFQ, Crane et al. found three measures of negative cognitive bias 
(i.e., the Beck Hopelessness Scale, two questions assessing ideation about death and 
two questions assessing low self-esteem) were all found to be significantly 
associated with memory complaints. Likewise, depressive symptoms assessed via 
the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale were also found to be a 
significant predictor. However, when measures of both depression and negative 
cognitive bias were entered into a regression model predicting memory complaints, 
regression coefficients for depression tended towards zero, suggesting negative 
cognitive bias operates as a mediator between depression and memory complaints. 
The Clinically Differentiated Model 
Chan et al.’s Social Support Model (2007) and Crane et al.’s Mediation Model 
(2007) differ fundamentally from the MSE framework in that they were designed to 
predict memory complaints rather than memory performance. Likewise, Niederehe’s 
(1998) CDM was also designed to predict memory complaints, though it also 
incorporates a number of other important demographic and contextual features. As 
with the MSE framework (Berry, 1999), the CDM incorporates the role of mood 
state. However, the model also includes the roles of aging, physiological disorders, 
contextual variables (e.g., how others respond to one’s complaints) and, most 
notably, a distinction between the influences of psychological state and personality 
81 
 
trait factors. The structure of the model is outlined in Figure 2 (adapted from 
Niederehe, 1998). Given the complexity of the model and the number of directional 
relationships incorporated, the following section describes only how mood state and 
personality traits are proposed to influence memory complaints in the CDM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The hypothesized relationships among all variables in Niederehe’s 
Clinically Differentiated Model (adapted from Niederehe, 1998). 
State and Trait Influences on Memory Complaints 
In the CDM (Niederehe, 1998), memory complaints are seen as the direct 
outcome of five factors: (1) transient affective states, (2) enduring personality traits, 
(3) actual memory impairment, (4) knowledge of the presence of physiological 
disorders and (5) various contextual variables. The model does not specify which 
variables tend to play a greater role in determining complaints, though all are 
believed to have a direct influence. 
Affective states, whilst not defined by the CDM (Niederehe, 1998), refer to the 
fluctuating and temporary emotional experiences of an individual (Allport & Odbert, 
1936); for example, one’s heightened anxiety during a public performance. 
Niederehe’s CDM suggests that the level of memory complaint exhibited by an 
individual will depend largely on their affective state at the time of the self-
assessment. The memory complaints of individuals exhibiting characteristics of 
depression, for example, will presumably be greater in number and/or severity than 
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those not exhibiting such characteristics. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is 
considerable support for this relationship in the literature. 
Personality traits are more stable than affective states and can be thought of as 
enduring patterns of behaviour through which one interacts with their environment 
(Allport & Odbert, 1936). The distinction between states and traits can be made 
predominantly on the basis of how consistent the patterns of behaviour are over time, 
where states fluctuate widely but traits remain fairly consistent (Zuckerman, 1983). 
Just as affective states are suggested to influence memory complaints in the CDM, so 
too do traits or characteristics of personality. For example, Niederehe (1998) 
suggests that someone who displays stronger neurotic tendencies will report more 
frequent or serious complaints of memory problems than someone who shows fewer 
neurotic tendencies. As reviewed in Chapter 3, there is also support for the notion 
that specific features of personality (particularly neuroticism) are predictive of 
memory complaints. 
A feature of the CDM (Niederehe, 1998) that is pertinent to this thesis is the 
manner in which affective states and personality traits interact with one another, 
prior to their proposed influence on memory complaints. As is evident in Figure 2, 
Niederehe’s model proposes that personality traits directly influence affective states 
as well as memory complaints. Thus, the model also proposes personality traits have 
a second (and indirect) influence on the number and/or severity of memory 
complaints via affective states. In essence, this aspect of Niederehe’s model is 
consistent with the predisposition and pathoplasticity models outlined by Klein et al. 
(2011). 
Limitations to Existing Memory Complaint Theories 
As mentioned, one of the major limitations to memory complaint literature is 
the lack of empirical studies examining relevant theory. A vast number of published 
empirical studies that have examined the MSE framework (Berry, 1999) are 
available, though it was not designed primarily for predicting or explaining memory 
complaints. Alternatively, dedicated memory complaint theories, such as the Social 
Support Model (Chan et al., 2007), Mediation Model (Crane et al., 2007) and the 
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CDM (Niederehe, 1998) are designed to explain the etiology of memory complaints, 
though these theories have undergone little empirical investigation. 
A second major limitation to memory complaint theory that is central to this 
thesis is that the impacts of personality factors on memory complaints have been 
largely overlooked. Each of the four models discussed make an attempt to delineate 
the impact of affect or mood on memory appraisals, though only Niederehe’s (1998) 
CDM has incorporated personality factors. For example, the MSE framework 
proposes that mood state or physiological arousal impacts directly on memory self-
efficacy judgements (Berry, 1999); Chan et al.’s (2007) Social Support Model 
proposes a direct effect of depression on memory complaints; and Crane et al.’s 
(2007) Mediation Model suggests depression impacts on memory complaints 
through cognitive bias. For these three models, however, no consideration is given to 
the simultaneous contribution of characteristics of personality to memory 
complaints. This is an important omission given clear evidence for an association 
between particular aspects of personality and affective states (discussed in Chapter 
3). 
Niederehe’s (1998) CDM offers a more satisfactory theoretical explanation 
of the impact of personality, suggesting that personality factors impact on both 
subjective memory complaints and affect. However, as mentioned, this model has 
been subjected to little or no empirical investigation. What remains as a serious 
limitation to memory complaint theory then, is a realistic summary and investigation 
into the simultaneous contributions of affect and personality in the prediction of 
memory complaints. 
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SECTION ONE SUMMARY 
Prior to addressing the study reported in the second section of this thesis, 
readers may find it useful to revisit the key points emphasised in Chapters 1 to 4. 
Whilst the number of empirical studies on memory complaints has grown rapidly 
over the past two decades, few have found relationships with objective memory 
performance strong enough to be of any clinical utility. Regardless of whether 
formal, established or more global measures of memory complaints are utilized, 
memory performance has typically been found to be at best only a weak predictor of 
memory complaints. Alternatively, research indicates a clear association between 
affective distress and memory performance, which further complicates the meaning 
of memory complaints. 
More recent research suggests affective distress (particularly depression and 
anxiety) and specific features of personality (particularly neuroticism) provide a 
more fitting estimate of memory complaints. However, whilst a large number of 
memory complaint studies have examined the predictive utility of affective distress 
and personality characteristics, few or no studies have attempted to disentangle the 
relationship between them in order to better understand their unique contributions to 
memory complaints. The absence of such research is surprising not only because the 
relationship between affect and personality has been so fervently investigated, but 
because the benefits of understanding the unique contributions of affect and 
personality to memory complaints will have important theoretical and clinical 
implications in this area. Furthermore, such research will assist with the 
interpretation of much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 that examines the 
relationship between affective distress and memory complaints. 
The manner in which affective distress and features of personality make 
unique contributions to memory complaints is largely dependent on how the two 
concepts are related. Whilst a great deal of research has demonstrated links between 
characteristics of personality and affective distress, considerable debate still exists 
with regard to whether causal mechanisms underpin them. For both depression and 
anxiety, their relationship with personality can be captured within three broad 
categories. One group of models suggests personality can increase a person’s 
86 
 
vulnerability to affective distress, either directly or through a range of mediating 
factors. A second group of models suggests affective distress impacts on the 
presentation of personality, either temporarily or permanently. A third group of 
models propose that personality and affective distress are not directly related; 
instead, they are purported to either make up different ends of the same spectrum, or 
only appear to influence each other on account of common etiological factors. 
In terms of memory complaint theory, four models have postulated on the 
relationship memory complaints hold with affective distress and/or personality. 
Three of the models make no mention of personality but rather speculate on what 
factors are responsible (either through mediation or indirectly) for the relationship 
between memory complaints and affective distress. A fourth model, Niederehe’s 
(1998) CDM, provides a more satisfactory explanation of how personality and 
affective distress interact with each other prior to their influence on memory 
complaints. However, this model and other dedicated memory complaint models 
have been subjected to little empirical investigation. Instead, much of the memory 
complaint literature has focussed on investigating what neuropsychological deficits 
appear to be associated with complaints or what the clinical implications of such 
findings might be. 
The second half of this thesis focusses on the current study. Chapter 5 
outlines the rationale, objectives and questions for the research. Chapter 6 provides 
the methodology for the research, including details of participants, the materials 
utilized in the research and the procedures used for data collection. Chapter 7 reports 
the analyses (both preliminary and primary) used and the results obtained from these 
analyses. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a detailed discussion of these results in the 
context of the research questions, previous literature and relevant theory. This final 
chapter also includes discussion of the clinical implications of the results and future 
directions for research. A final summary of the thesis is then provided at the 
conclusion of Chapter 8. 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter Five 
 The overarching objective of the current study is to examine the distinct role of 
affective distress in memory complaints made by older adults, beyond what can 
already be attributed to personality characteristics. 
 The current study looks at both overall measures and specific features of 
depression and anxiety as predictors of memory complaints beyond 
characteristics of personality. 
 In addition, the current study examines associations between affective distress 
and memory complaints in older adults for both applied and global measures of 
complaint. 
 There are a number of possible benefits of this study, including improved 
interpretation of previous literature (empirical), improved understanding of the 
role of affective distress in memory complaints (theoretical) and improved 
mental health screening (clinical). 
 Each of the objectives in the current study is examined within the context of a 
range of contextual variables, including memory performance, age, education, 
gender and premorbid intelligence. 
 The chapter ends with a list of three research questions that are addressed in the 
final chapters of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Current Study 
 The purpose of this chapter is to (1) outline the objectives of the study 
reported in this thesis, (2) provide a rationale for these objectives and (3) list the 
research questions that are investigated. It begins with the objectives for the current 
study, and then provides a rationale for the research by discussing the potential 
empirical, theoretical and clinical benefits of achieving them. The chapter finishes 
with a list of the research questions investigated in the current study, which leads 
into Chapter 6 (methodology) and Chapter 7 (analyses and results). 
Objectives 
There are three objectives for the study reported in this thesis. The first 
objective is to address the gap in memory complaint literature that concerns the 
distinct role overall measures of affective distress play in memory complaints made 
by older adults beyond what can already be explained by characteristics of 
personality. Empirical studies have shown depression and anxiety, as well as 
personality, to be consistently related to memory complaints. Despite this, little or no 
effort has been invested in examining the unique contributions of depression and 
anxiety to memory complaints within the context of personality. This may in part be 
attributable to research efforts mostly searching for ‘what’ is associated with 
memory complaints, rather than ‘why’ such factors might be important. This, in turn, 
may be attributable to difficulties associated with identifying the key predictors of 
memory complaints. Consequently, the current study attempts to untangle the unique 
roles of affective distress and personality in memory complaints made by older 
adults. 
The second objective of the study reported in this thesis is to examine whether 
memory complaints are more robustly associated with overall measures of affective 
distress (i.e., depression and anxiety) relative to the specific features that comprise 
them (e.g., pessimism, lack of interest in daily activities, physiological arousal). 
Given depression and anxiety are characterised by a cluster of behavioural 
symptoms, it is possible that some of these symptoms exhibit stronger relationships 
with memory complaints than others. For example, it may be the case that overall 
measures of depression and anxiety incorporate some features that exhibit little or no 
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relationship with memory complaints – of course, such features would reduce the 
strength of the relationships between memory complaints and these overall measures 
of affective distress. Thus, the current study also examines specific features of 
depression and anxiety (in addition to overall measures) as predictors of memory 
complaints beyond personality. 
As part of this second objective, the study also looks at whether unique 
contributions of affective distress towards memory complaints differ for specific 
features of depression and anxiety. That is, if specific features of depression and 
anxiety both uniquely contribute to memory complaints beyond personality, are 
these specific features conceptually similar? A handful of memory complaint studies 
have incorporated measures of both depression and anxiety (e.g., Derouesne et al., 
1999; Potter & Hartman, 2006; Slavin et al., 2010), though little emphasis has been 
placed on understanding why or why not they exhibit differences in their predictive 
value, let alone understanding their contributions beyond personality. It may be the 
case that similar features of depression and anxiety are important in the context of 
memory complaints (e.g., low confidence); or it may be the case that distinct, 
unrelated features contribute from depression (e.g., feeling dispirited) and from 
anxiety (e.g., apprehension). Of course, it may also be the case that no specific 
features of affect are useful predictors of memory complaints beyond personality at 
all. Existing evidence provides little indication regarding these issues. 
The third objective of the study reported in this thesis is to examine whether 
unique associations between affective distress and memory complaints, beyond 
personality, differ for memory complaints assessed via applied measures relative to 
an overall, global memory complaint measure. Whilst research suggests the 
associations memory complaints exhibit with affective distress and personality are 
relatively consistent regardless of whether complaints are assessed globally or via 
applied scenarios (see Chapters 2 and 3), the relative importance of affective distress 
and personality (assessed via their unique contributions) may differ according to how 
complaints are assessed. For this reason, the current study examines affective 
distress and personality as predictors of memory complaints assessed both via 
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applied situations (e.g., memory for recalling phone numbers) and via a global 
memory complaint measure. 
Contextual Variables 
Whilst the emphasis of the current study is on memory complaints, affective 
distress and personality, examining relationships between these concepts in isolation 
trivializes the inherent complexity of memory complaints and their predictors. For 
this reason, each of the objectives outlined for the current study are examined within 
the context of a number of other variables identified in the literature as important to 
memory complaints and the predictors being examined in the current study. These 
contextual variables include memory performance, age, education, gender and 
premorbid intelligence. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, memory performance forms an important part of a 
triad of relationships between performance, complaints and affective distress. If not 
taken into account when observing relationships between memory complaints and 
affective distress, memory performance potentially forms a source of unexplained 
variance. For example, two individuals experiencing similar levels of affective 
distress but exhibiting vast differences in memory performance might be expected to 
show greater differences in memory complaints than two individuals experiencing 
similar levels of affective distress and memory performance. In addition, there is 
some evidence to suggest memory performance is also associated with specific 
features of personality (e.g., Coolidge, Segal, & Applequist, 2009; Cuttler & Graf, 
2007; Schwartz, 1975). For this reason, the study reported in this thesis incorporates 
measures of memory performance when observing relationships between memory 
complaints, affective distress and personality (details regarding the measures are 
provided in Chapters 6 and 7). 
A second contextual variable that has not been discussed to this point but that 
is still important in the context of memory complaints is age. According to 
Niederehe’s (1998) CDM, age is assumed to contribute indirectly to memory 
complaints via other variables incorporated into the theory (including affective 
distress and an increased likelihood of physiological disorders). Likewise, empirical 
studies suggest age is related to a number of key variables in the context of memory 
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complaints, including affective distress (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Jorm, 2000; 
Wittchen & Uhmann, 2010), memory performance (e.g., Luo & Craik, 2008; Small, 
2001; Small, Yaakov, Tang, & Mayeux, 1999) and in some cases, memory 
complaints themselves (Gilewski et al., 1990; Larrabee & Crook, 1994). Given age 
may also act as a source of unexplained variance, it is incorporated into the current 
study as well. 
A third contextual variable that was included in this study is the amount of 
formal education completed. Whilst education has not been incorporated into any of 
the four theories discussed in Chapter 4, several empirical studies have found it to be 
associated with memory complaints (e.g., Bassett & Folstein, 1993; Gagnon et al., 
1994; Jonker et al., 1996; Schofield et al., 1997). Whilst few explanations have been 
provided for why this might be the case (beyond suggestions it may somehow 
influence sample selection), it may be that education and memory complaints are 
associated indirectly via their relationship with features of personality. For example, 
it is conceivable that more conscientious individuals might obtain a higher level of 
education and be more critical of their own abilities than less conscientious 
individuals. Such associations would give rise to an indirect relationship between 
education and memory complaints. Consequently, education is also incorporated into 
the current study. 
There is also some evidence to suggest memory complaints are associated with 
gender, such that females tend to exhibit more severe or frequent complaints of 
memory problems than males (Gagnon et al., 1994; O’Connor et al., 1990). Again, 
few have speculated on possible reasons for the effect of gender on memory 
complaints, although one possible explanation for results reported in these previous 
studies is that females, on average, live longer than males (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010). Consequently, female 
participants may exhibit higher rates of age-related memory problems, which in turn 
may impact on memory complaints. Alternatively, differences in memory complaints 
between males and females may be attributable to overall gender differences in 
personality characteristics or experiences in levels of affective distress. For this 
reason, gender is also incorporated into the current study. 
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The final contextual variable to be incorporated into the analysis is premorbid 
intelligence. Measures of premorbid intelligence are typically used as an estimate of 
peak intellectual function across the lifespan (e.g., McGurn et al., 2004). In the same 
way that differences in memory performance might contribute to unexplained 
variance in the relationship between memory complaints and affective distress, so 
too might premorbid intelligence. For example, two individuals experiencing similar 
levels of affective distress but exhibiting vast differences in peak intellectual 
functioning might be expected to show greater differences in memory complaints 
than two individuals experiencing similar levels of affective distress and premorbid 
intelligence. For this reason, premorbid intelligence is included in the current study 
as the final contextual variable. 
Rationale 
The potential benefits of such a study extend to the empirical and theoretical 
literature as well as to clinical practice with older adults. With regard to empirical 
literature, understanding how affect and personality interact in the prediction of 
memory complaints will assist with understanding the nature of the relationship 
between affect and memory complaints. Firstly, it will assist with interpreting 
previous research that has found affective distress to be a key predictor of memory 
complaints. It may be the case that depression, for example, is not directly related to 
memory complaints but rather an outcome of personality features that can account 
for both memory complaints and affect. Many studies continue to assume the 
relationship between affective distress and memory complaints is a direct one (e.g., 
Dux et al., 2008; Minett et al., 2005; Potter et al., 2009), and so such a finding would 
be important for providing clarity on the nature of this relationship. Secondly, the 
current study will provide clarity with regard to how useful affective distress and its 
features are as predictors of memory complaints, beyond personality. 
Theoretical accounts of memory complaints have also largely overlooked how 
affect and personality interact with one another in the context of memory complaints. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Niederehe’s (1998) CDM incorporates personality as a 
separate variable in the context of predicting memory complaints, yet this theory has 
been the subject of little or no empirical investigation. Whilst testing Niederehe’s 
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CDM in its entirety is beyond the scope of the study reported here, it will shed light 
on key aspects of the theory, including how affect and personality interact with each 
other in their contributions to memory complaints. The study will allow for 
recommendations to be made with regard to how affect might more appropriately be 
conceptualised in the context of memory complaints in the MSE Framework (Berry, 
1999), Chan et al.’s (2007) Social Support Model, Crane et al.’s (2007) Mediation 
Model and Niederehe’s CDM. 
The results of the study reported in this thesis are also important from a clinical 
perspective. As was discussed in Chapter 2, memory complaints exhibit medium-
strength relationships with depression, which has prompted suggestions in the past 
that older adults complaining of memory problems should be screened for mental 
health problems (Harwood et al., 2004). However, neuroticism may also prove 
useful in the context of screening for mental health problems. Given neuroticism is 
associated with both affective distress and memory complaints (discussed in Chapter 
3), such complaints in older adulthood may also be indicative of an ongoing risk of 
affective distress (even if this relationship is of an indirect nature). Understanding 
the unique contributions of neuroticism and affective distress to memory complaints 
will help to clarify whether this may be the case. 
Research Questions 
There are three research questions that are addressed in the study reported in 
this thesis. These research questions are derived directly from the objectives 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Each of the questions are examined within the 
context of memory performance, age, education, gender and premorbid intelligence. 
The questions to be addressed are: 
1. To what extent are memory complaints made by older adults associated with 
overall measures of affective distress (in this case, depression and anxiety 
symptomatology) beyond personality characteristics and relevant contextual 
variables? 
2. To what extent are memory complaints made by older adults associated with 
specific features of affective distress (i.e., specific features of depression and 
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anxiety symptomatology) beyond personality characteristics and relevant 
contextual variables? If specific features of both depression and anxiety 
symptomatology are predictive of memory complaints, are these specific 
features conceptually similar? 
3. Do the associations between memory complaints and measures of affective 
distress beyond personality and relevant contextual variables differ for 
applied versus global measures of complaints? 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter Six 
 Participants who made up the sample were English-speaking, community-
dwelling older adults between 65 and 90 years of age with little or no discernible 
impairment to vision, hearing, memory or language, and who had not previously 
received feedback pertaining to formal memory testing. 
 Methods described by Cohen (1992) and Hsieh (1989) were used to determine 
required sample sizes for multiple linear regression and binary logistic regression 
analyses, respectively, which suggested a minimum sample size of 149. 
 A total of 177 male and female older adults participated in the study. 
 The study adopted a correlational approach and examines relationships between 
concurrent scores on measures of memory complaint, affective distress, 
personality, memory performance, age, gender, education and premorbid 
intelligence. 
 Testing sessions for the research were carried out within the participants’ homes 
and typically took between 90 and 100 minutes. 
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CHAPTER 6: Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodology utilized in the current study. The 
chapter begins with a brief discussion of the participants involved in the research, 
including criteria for participant selection and how the required sample size was 
estimated. Following this, the chapter details the measures utilized (and associated 
psychometric properties where available), research design and procedures for the 
testing session. 
Participants 
Criteria 
In order to participate in the study, participants were required to be between 
the ages of 65 and 90 years. Whilst different age cut-offs have been used for 
participant selection in memory complaint research in the past (e.g., Pearman & 
Storandt, 2004, 2005; Smith et al., 1996), 65 to 90 years of age was chosen for the 
current study for three reasons. Firstly, 65 years of age was chosen as the lower cut-
off because it was the recommended retirement age in Western Australia at the time 
the data was collected, which some studies have found is accompanied by changes in 
measures of cognitive functioning due to changes in day-to-day activities (Coe, Von 
Gaudecker, Lindeboom, & Maurer, 2012; Von Gaudecker, 2009). Secondly, it is 
commonplace in memory complaint literature to use a lower cut-off of 65 years of 
age (e.g., Gagnon et al., 1994; Geerlings, Jonker, Bouter, Ader, & Schmand, 1999; 
St John & Montgomery, 2002; Taylor et al., 1992; Wang et al., 2004). Thirdly, these 
age cut-offs fit well with testing and scoring procedures for the Wechsler Memory 
Scale – Fourth Edition (WMS-IV, Wechsler, 2009a), which stipulates different 
procedures for people over and under the age of 65 years and an upper limit of 90 
years of age. 
Given the measures utilized in the current study for verbal memory and 
premorbid intelligence (detailed later in this chapter) are largely dependent on 
English language skills, participants in the current study were also required to 
fluently speak English. Participants were not excluded from the study if they spoke 
English as an additional language, though it was noted and their first or preferred 
language(s) recorded. In addition, given most of the tasks completed during the 
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testing session for this study were dependent on satisfactory vision and hearing, 
participants with vision or hearing impairments that might affect performance (e.g., 
age-related macular degeneration, cataracts, tinnitus) were not included in the current 
study. Vision and hearing problems were screened via self-reports from participants 
prior to beginning the testing session. 
In addition to restrictions pertaining to age, English language proficiency and 
satisfactory vision and hearing, participants were also screened for prior memory 
testing via self-report. Participants who had previously received formal testing of 
memory abilities (either for clinical purposes or via previous research participation) 
and who had received feedback on their performance were excluded from the current 
study given such feedback may exert excessive influence on memory complaint 
reporting. As well as this set of criteria, medication use, previous head injuries and 
evidence of stroke were also assessed via self-report and recorded. Participants were 
not excluded from the study on the basis of these factors, though they were recorded 
for the purpose of better informing the process of data screening where necessary. 
Required Sample Size 
The primary forms of analyses used in the current study include multiple 
linear regression and binary logistic regression. Various suggestions have been made 
regarding sample size calculations in linear and logistic regression, though given 
their widespread use in published literature, the current study opted for methods 
described by Cohen (1992) and Hsieh (1989). Cohen provides a method for 
determining adequate sample size in multiple linear regression based on the 
maximum number of predictor variables (k), anticipated effect size (
2
), specified 
alpha level ( ) and required level of statistical power (1 - ). Although highly 
unlikely that all variables would enter the model, the maximum number of predictors 
that could enter any of the models in any of the regression analyses in the current 
study was 18, so k was set at this value. Medium-sized effects for affective distress 
and relevant personality characteristics (e.g., neuroticism) were anticipated based on 
previous literature, so 
2
 was set at .15, as suggested by Cohen. Values for alpha (α) 
and statistical power (1 - ) were set at .05 and .80, respectively, given their 
conventional use. Where k = 18, 
2
 = .15, α = .05 and 1 -  = .80 for a multiple linear 
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regression analysis, Cohen’s methods suggest a minimum sample size of 149 
participants. 
For binary logistic regression, Hsieh (1989) provides a method for estimating 
required sample size based on alpha (α), statistical power (1 – β), the expected odds 
ratio (OR), the overall event proportion (P) and a multiplier for incorporating 
multiple predictors, which reflects the inverse of the squared multiple correlation 
coefficient between each individual predictor and the remaining predictors (i.e., 1 – 
ρ2). The overall event proportion (P) simply reflects the likelihood (expressed as a 
proportion) of the least likely result on the binary outcome variable. For example, if 
a sample of 120 participants includes 30 participants complaining of memory 
problems and 90 not complaining of memory problems, the least likely outcome is a 
memory complaint (since 30 < 90) and P = .25 (i.e., 30 / 120). Given the current 
study anticipated splitting participants into two groups for the binary logistic 
regression (i.e., high vs. low memory complaints) using a median value, it was 
anticipated that groups would be relatively even in size and that P would be no less 
than .40. Consequently a value of .40 was used.  For the multiplier, a medium-sized 
correlation coefficient (ρ = .30) was used given some predictors included in the 
current study were likely to exhibit strong relationships (e.g., neuroticism and 
depression) and others were likely to share little or no association (e.g., age and 
premorbid intelligence). Again, values for alpha (α) and statistical power (1 - ) were 
set at .05 and .80, respectively. The recommended minimum sample size for binary 
logistic regression where α = .05, 1 – β = .80, OR = 2 (the minimum 'practically' 
significant effect for a binary variable, Ferguson, 2009), P = .40 and ρ = .30 is 84 
participants. Thus, the recommended minimum sample size for either form of 
regression was 149. 
Sample 
Participants were invited to partake in the study via an advertisement placed 
in a local newspaper distributed widely around the Perth metropolitan area (see 
Appendix B). A total of 177 participants (115 females, 62 males) between 65 and 90 
years of age (M = 73.62 years, SE = 0.48, Range = 66-90 years) participated in the 
study. Mean years of formal primary, secondary and post-secondary education 
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completed by the participants was 12.56 (SE = 0.21) and ranged from 8 to 24 years. 
Further participant details regarding levels of affective distress, characteristics of 
personality, premorbid intelligence and memory performance are detailed in Chapter 
7, following discussion later in this chapter of how these variables were assessed. 
  Design 
Research into memory complaints almost invariably adopts a quasi-
experimental or correlational design. This is partly because it is often assumed 
memory complaints are an outcome of affective distress, personality characteristics 
and memory performance, and not the reverse (e.g., Amariglio et al., 2011; Mendes 
et al., 2008; Snitz et al., 2008), but primarily because it is difficult or unethical to 
manipulate many of the concepts included in such studies (e.g., personality or 
affective distress). The current study examines relationships between many variables 
that would be difficult to manipulate as would be required for an experimental 
design. However, the primary purpose for utilizing an experimental approach is to 
establish causation, which is of little interest to the research questions under 
investigation in the current study (indeed, causation is yet to be firmly established 
even between affective distress and personality – see Chapter 3). For these reasons, 
the current study adopted a correlational approach by examining relationships 
between concurrent scores on measures of memory complaints and measures of 
affective distress, personality, memory performance, age, gender education and 
premorbid intelligence. 
Measures 
Memory Complaints 
A considerable number of measures have been developed for examining 
memory complaints (e.g., Derouesne et al., 1989; Schmand et al., 1996; Schmidt et 
al., 1999; Smith et al., 2000; Zelinski et al., 1980), yet there is little consensus in the 
literature regarding a gold standard. The Memory Complaint Questionnaire (Crook 
et al., 1992) and the GFF scale from the MFQ (Gilewski et al., 1990) are perhaps the 
most widely used measures in published literature. For the current study, the 
instrument was required to: (1) provide both an applied measure and a global 
measure of memory complaints, (2) be appropriate for use with older adults between 
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the ages of 65 and 90 years, and (3) demonstrate acceptable psychometric properties. 
Whilst both the Memory Complaint Questionnaire and GFF scale meet these criteria, 
the Memory Complaint Questionnaire was initially designed for use with older 
adults with memory impairment. Thus, given the sample for the current study was 
expected to comprise predominantly of healthy, community-dwelling older adults, 
the GFF scale was chosen as the measure for memory complaints. 
The GFF scale comprises the first 33 items of the MFQ (Gilewski et al., 
1990). All items are assessed on a 7-point Likert scale, resulting in self-report scores 
ranging from 33 (extreme problems with memory) through to 231 (no problems with 
memory). The GFF scale queries how often common memory problems arise (e.g., 
difficulties remembering names, faces and appointments), how often problems with 
recall arise during reading, and how well events can be recalled from last month to 
between 6 and 10 years ago. The GFF scale takes approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. 
The first question from the GFF scale of the MFQ (Gilewski et al., 1990) was 
utilised as the global measure of memory complaint. The question asks participants, 
“How would you rate your memory in terms of the kinds of problems you have?” As 
with the remaining items on the GFF scale, the participant responds on a 7-point 
Likert scale, giving several possible outcomes ranging from ‘major problems’ (1 or 
2) to ‘some minor problems’ (3 to 5) to ‘no problems’ (6 or 7). Based on these 
responses, participants were categorised into either a low or high memory complaint 
group based on an ad-hoc defined cut-off that provided two evenly sized groups. 
Categorizing participants into complaint groups is commonly used in the memory 
complaint literature (e.g., Amariglio et al., 2011; Minett et al., 2008; Snitz et al., 
2008) and the process for creating these groups in the current study is detailed in 
Chapter 7. 
The MFQ was developed from the 92-item Metamemory Questionnaire (MQ; 
Zelinski et al., 1980) via exploratory factor analysis, which was used to remove 
redundant items that did not load significantly on any one factor (one of which is the 
GFF scale). Across all scales, Gilewski, Zelinski and Schaie (1990) reported 
excellent test-retest reliability on the MFQ over a three year period (goodness-of-fit 
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= .98). In addition, the internal consistency for the GFF yielded a Cronbach’s alpha 
value of .94, suggesting very high reliability of items within each scale. 
Demographic characteristics (age, education and overall health) were found to 
account for only a small proportion (9%) of the variance across all scales of the 
MFQ, suggesting good resilience to these factors. The GFF scale also demonstrates 
good concurrent validity. After partialling out the effects of depression, health and 
education, concurrent validity was tested via comparisons with various laboratory 
and clinical tests of memory (Zelinski, Gilewski, & Anthony-Bergstone, 1990). The 
GFF scale was a significant predictor of performance on word recall and recognition 
tasks, various clinical tests assessing cognitive function (including the mini-mental 
state examination) and diary reports of memory failures. 
Affective Distress 
As discussed in Chapter 2, levels of affective distress (particularly 
depression, but also anxiety) are often reported to be associated with memory 
complaints. Given the current study intended to utilize a community sample and that 
only a small number of participants were expected to meet formal diagnostic criteria 
for depressive and/or anxiety disorders (particularly given involvement in the study 
required voluntarily contacting the researcher), the current study opted for a measure 
of depression and anxiety severity appropriate for use with both clinical and non-
clinical samples. The full-length version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 
(DASS, Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b) is a 42-item self-report questionnaire used to 
assess symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress experienced over the previous 
week. Notably, it measures anxiety and depression states, rather than traits. For the 
current study, the 14-item scales pertaining to depression and anxiety were utilized 
to obtain measures of each of these concepts. Each of the 14 items within each scale 
contain a statement (e.g., ‘I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all’), 
to which the participant responds on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (‘did not 
apply to me at all’) to 3 (applied to me very much or most of the time), providing 
scores ranging from 0 to 42 for each of the scales. Categories reflecting severity of 
symptomatology are also provided in the DASS manual (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995b). Depression scale scores can be categorized as normal (0-9), mild (10-13), 
moderate (14-20), severe (21-27) or extremely severe (28+). Likewise, anxiety scale 
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scores can also be categorized as normal (0-7), mild (8-9), moderate (10-14), severe 
(15-19) or extremely severe (20+). Together, the scales take approximately 10 
minutes to complete. 
The depression and anxiety scales of the DASS also assess a range of more 
specific features of affective distress. Subscales for the depression scale assess 
experiences over the past week of dysphoria, hopelessness, devaluation of life, self-
deprecation, anhedonia and inertia (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). The dysphoria 
subscale reflects feelings of sadness. The hopelessness subscale reflects a lack of 
hope or optimism for the future. The devaluation of life subscale reflects the extent 
to which a person feels that life is meaningless or hollow. The self-deprecation 
subscale provides a measure of feelings of self-worthlessness. The lack of 
interest/involvement subscale reflects a loss of interest or enthusiasm for day-to-day 
activities. The anhedonia subscale measures the loss of positive feelings and 
enjoyment. Finally, the inertia subscale reflects difficulty finding motivation and 
initiative. The manner in which scores on the scales and subscales were used in the 
current study is detailed in Chapter 7. 
For the anxiety scale of the DASS, subscales include autonomic arousal, 
skeletal musculature effects, situational anxiety and subjective experiences of 
anxious affect (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). The autonomic arousal subscale 
reflects an awareness of features associated with physical arousal, including 
increased heart rate, dryness of the mouth, breathing difficulties and difficulty 
swallowing. The skeletal musculature effects subscale assesses shakiness or 
trembling in the body. The situational anxiety subscale reflects worry, panic or 
anxiety associated with specific situations or tasks. Finally, the subjective 
experiences of anxious affect subscale reflects general feelings of panic, terror, fear 
or faintness. 
A number of studies have examined the psychometric properties of the 
DASS. In non-clinical samples, research has found the DASS to possess good to 
excellent internal consistency reliability (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 
1998; Crawford & Henry, 2003; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a; Norton, 2007), good 
construct validity (Henry & Crawford, 2005; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a) and be 
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resilient to demographic factors (Crawford & Henry, 2003; Norton, 2007). Crawford 
and Henry, for example, found internal consistency (assessed via Cronbach’s Alpha) 
for the depression and anxiety scales to be .93 and .95, respectively, suggesting 
excellent consistency between items within each scale. In a study including both 
clinical and non-clinical groups, Antony et al. (1998) demonstrated that the DASS 
effectively distinguished clinically-diagnosed depression from physical arousal, 
psychological tension and feelings of agitation. 
In clinical populations, the DASS has demonstrated equally good 
psychometric properties, with good to excellent internal consistency reliability 
(Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997; Gloster et al., 2008; Page, Hooke, & 
Morrison, 2007), convergent validity (Brown et al., 1997; Gloster et al., 2008; Ng et 
al., 2007) and discriminative validity (Brown et al., 1997; Gloster et al., 2008). 
Studies have also indicated that the DASS discriminates well between various 
anxiety and mood disorder groups (Antony et al., 1998; Brown et al., 1997). 
Moreover, Antony et al. suggest the DASS can identify characteristics of depression 
and anxiety more effectively than several other established measures, including 
Hamilton’s scales for assessing depression and anxiety (Hamilton, 1960; Maier, 
Buller, Philipp, & Heuser, 1988b) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et al., 
1988). Whilst there is some evidence for a ceiling effect on the DASS in clinically-
depressed samples (Page et al., 2007), it was anticipated this would have little or no 
impact in the current study given a community sample was being targeted. 
Personality 
As with depression and anxiety, various features of personality have also 
been found to be associated with memory complaints (see Chapter 3). Neuroticism, 
in particular, has often been found to be a useful predictor of whether older adults 
report difficulties with their memory (e.g., Pearman & Storandt, 2004, 2005). To 
assess levels of neuroticism as well as the remaining four domains of the Five Factor 
Model of Personality (Digman, 1990), the current study utilized the NEO-FFI (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992). The NEO-FFI is a self-report questionnaire that provides a 
general, yet comprehensive evaluation of the five major domains of personality: 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. The 
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shorter NEO-FFI was chosen as the measure of personality in the current study 
rather than the longer, 240–item NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 
1992) because it could be completed with the researcher present (the NEO 
Personality Inventory was too lengthy for this), thus reducing errors due to 
participants misinterpreting items or misunderstanding instructions. Furthermore, 
despite having fewer items, research has found the NEO-FFI to be an equally reliable 
and valid measure of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
The NEO-FFI includes a total of 60 items, with 12 items allocated to each of 
the five domains of personality. Akin to the depression and anxiety scales of the 
DASS, each item consists of a statement (e.g., ‘I would rather go my own way than 
be a leader of others’), to which the participant indicates the extent to which they 
agree with that statement. Responses are recorded on a 5-point (0-4) Likert scale as 
‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘neutral’, ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’, providing scores 
ranging from 0 to 48 for each measure of personality (whereby higher scores reflect 
higher levels of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness). The neuroticism scale provides a measure of emotional stability. 
Items in the extraversion scale measure tendencies towards sociability and 
gregariousness versus reservedness and a preference for seclusion. The openness 
scale provides a measure of willingness to engage in new experiences versus more 
conservative behaviour and a preference for conventional methods. Items in the 
agreeableness scale measure the propensity to be cooperative and amiable as 
opposed to sceptical and antagonistic. The conscientiousness scale provides a 
measure of ambition and determination versus nonchalance. The NEO-FFI takes 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
The NEO-FFI was developed from the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & 
McCrae, 1985); a longer and more comprehensive self-report personality 
questionnaire. Items for the NEO-FFI were chosen from the NEO Personality 
Inventory primarily on the basis of factor loadings (those with the highest positive or 
negative loadings for the five given domains) but with consideration also given to 
diversity of item content (to maintain reliability and validity but not at the expense of 
conciseness) and proportion of positive and negative factor loadings (to control for 
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agreeable responding). Prior to the development of the NEO-FFI, the NEO 
Personality Inventory underwent rigorous development and validation protocol (see 
Costa & McCrae, 1985). 
Internal consistency reliability (calculated using Cronbach’s Alpha) for the 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness scales 
were .86, .77, .73, .68 and .81 (Costa & McCrae, 1992), respectively, suggesting 
good to excellent agreement between items within each of the five scales (see also, 
Egan, Deary, & Austin, 2000). In addition, correlations between self-reports of 
personality characteristics obtained during development of the NEO Personality 
Inventory (McCrae & Costa, 1985) and during development of the NEO-FFI (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992) suggested good convergent and divergent validity. Correlations 
between items (i.e., convergent validity) across the five features of personality were 
.62 (Neuroticism), .60 (Extraversion), .56 (Openness), .57 (Agreeableness) and .61 
(Conscientiousness), suggesting adequate reliability between items for corresponding 
domains. All convergent correlations were significant at p < .001. Additionally, 
correlations between scores on different personality features (divergent validity) 
were all below .20. 
Memory Performance 
Historically, memory has largely been conceptualised as a system composed 
of multiple components that (1) rely on distinct visual or auditory resources 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) and (2) draw on different processes for information stored 
over varying periods of time (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Consequently, the current 
study opted for measures of memory that evaluated both verbal and non-verbal 
aspects of memory as well as over varying periods of time. Several measures are 
available for assessing verbal (e.g., Adams, 2003; Schmidt, 1996; Woodcock, 
McGrew, & Mather, 2001) and non-verbal (e.g., Benedict, 1997; Trahan & Larrabee, 
1988; Williams, 1991) memory; however, the Wechsler Memory Scales provide 
perhaps the most widely used and comprehensively validated measures of memory 
currently available. The WMS-IV (Wechsler, 2009a) offers two subtests suitable for 
assessing immediate, delayed and recognition memory for both verbal and non-
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verbal material. Consequently, the current study utilized the LM and VR subtests 
from the WMS-IV as measures of verbal and non-verbal memory. 
Three measures of non-verbal memory were obtained using the VR subtest, 
including one measure of short-term memory (assessed via free recall) and two 
measures of long-term memory (free recall and recognition). Part one of the VR 
subtest (VR-I) offers a score for short-term non-verbal memory ranging from 0 to 43. 
Part two (VR-II), which is assessed after a 20 to 30-minute delay, provides two long-
term non-verbal memory scores; a free recall score ranging from 0 to 43 and a 
recognition score ranging from 0 to 7. An optional 'copy' task in the VR subtest can 
also be administered to rule out problems associated with motor control or perceptual 
difficulties that may unknowingly impact on performance. Given participants were 
not screened for problems that could impair motor function (e.g., tremors), this task 
was also administered, providing a ‘copy’ score ranging from 0 to 43. 
Three comparable measures of verbal memory were obtained using the LM 
subtest, including one measure of short-term memory (assessed via free recall) and 
two measures of long-term memory (free recall and recognition). Part one of the LM 
subtest (LM-I) provides a short-term verbal memory score ranging from 0 to 53. Part 
two (LM-II), also assessed after a delay, provides two long-term verbal memory 
scores; a free recall score ranging from 0 to 39 and a recognition score ranging from 
0 to 23. For each of the measures obtained in the VR and LM subtests, higher scores 
signify better recall. The manner in which raw scores on all measures of verbal and 
non-verbal memory (including immediate, delayed and recognition measures) were 
used in the current study is detailed in Chapter 7. 
All subtests in the WMS-IV have undergone extensive reliability and validity 
checks (Wechsler, 2009b). The average internal consistency (calculated via Fisher’s 
z transformation) of the immediate (VR-I) and delayed (VR-II) components of the 
VR subtest for people aged between 65 and 90 years was excellent (.93 and .96, 
respectively), suggesting high reliability between items within each of the immediate 
and delayed measures of non-verbal memory. For immediate (LM-I) and delayed 
(LM-II) verbal memory, internal consistency was also excellent (.86 and .87 for LM-
I and LM-II, respectively). Test-retest reliability over a mean of 23 days (using 
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Pearson Product-moment correlations) in people aged 65 to 90 years was good for 
VR-I and VR-II (.78 and .69) as well as for LM-I and LM-II (.79 and .77). Whilst 
these values are adequate, test-retest reliability is typically low in non-repeatable 
memory tasks due to improved performance resulting from practice effects 
(Wechsler, 1997, 2009b). Inter-scorer reliability (i.e., the rate of agreement between 
two independent scorers, as a percentage) for subtests requiring some degree of 
interpretation ranged between 96% and 97%, suggesting very high reliability with 
different scorers. 
Extensive checking of concurrent validity (i.e., the degree to which test 
scores correlate with alternative measures) has also been undertaken for the WMS-
IV (Wechsler, 2009b). After minor updates to both the VR and LM subtests in the 
fourth edition, correlations (calculated via Fisher’s z transformation) between scores 
on the WMS-IV and WMS-III for VR-I, VR-II, LM-I and LM-II were .60, .62, .75 
and .76, respectively, suggesting good concurrent validity. In addition, moderate 
correlations were found between scores on the Repeatable Battery for the 
Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (Randolph, Tierney, Mohr, & Chase, 
1998) and both the immediate measures of the LM and VR subtests (.53 and .48, 
respectively). Moderate correlations were also reported for the delayed measures of 
the LM and VR subtests (.49 and .61, respectively). Finally, in two small-scale 
standardization studies (Wechsler, 2009b), healthy age and education-matched 
controls performed significantly better than participants with Alzheimer’s disease 
and Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) on VR-I, VR-II, LM-I and LM-II (all ps < 
.01). All of these results suggest good concurrent validity. 
Premorbid Intellectual Functioning 
Measures of premorbid intellectual functioning are often used in studies 
assessing memory and associated concepts (e.g., Christensen et al., 1997; House, St. 
Pierre, Foster, Martin, & Clarnette, 2006; Schmand, Jonker, Geerlings, & 
Lindeboom, 1997) because they provide an estimate of intelligence prior to many 
forms of cognitive decline. There are several different measures of premorbid 
intellectual functioning (e.g., see Lowe & Rogers, 2011), though perhaps the most 
widely used is the National Adult Reading Test (NART, Nelson, 1982; Nelson & 
114 
 
Willison, 1991). The NART requires participants to read aloud 50 orthographically-
irregular words (e.g., ache, subtle, phlegm). The test provides an estimate of 
premorbid intelligence utilizing knowledge of words that are unlikely to be correctly 
pronounced without previously having encountered them (given the words do not 
conform to typical English orthographic rules). 
Many studies have indicated that NART scores provide an accurate measure 
of premorbid intellectual functioning in healthy elderly people (Bright, Jaldow, & 
Kopelman, 2002; Crawford, Deary, Starr, & Whalley, 2001; Schretlen, Buffington, 
Meyer, & Pearlson, 2006). Although Mathias, Bowden and Barrett-Woodbridge 
(2007) found NART scores underestimated the intellectual quotient (IQ) scores of 
younger adults (aged 18-60) on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third 
Edition (Wechsler, 1997), it was found to be a better predictor of IQ scores than the 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001); an alternative reading test for 
estimating intelligence that was co-normed with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale – Third Edition. For this reason, the NART was used to assess premorbid 
intelligence in this study. The NART takes around five minutes to complete, 
providing a score from 0 to 50, representing the total number of words 
mispronounced (errors) in the 50 item list. Appendix C provides a summary of all 
measures used in this study. 
Procedure 
Prior to data collection, ethics approval was obtained for the current study 
from the Edith Cowan University Ethics Committee. Given testing involved an 
assessment of depression and anxiety symptomatology, a procedure was put in place 
for participants who consistently reported the presence of symptoms of affective 
distress (as assessed via the DASS). Given time did not permit for DASS responses 
to be scored during the testing session, participants were briefly queried about their 
responses at the completion of the questionnaire. Participants who reported few 
symptoms of depression or anxiety on the questionnaire and who recounted few day-
to-day difficulties with regard to mental health were not queried further. Participants 
who reported several symptoms of depression or anxiety on the DASS (i.e., several 
items scored as 2 or 3), or who reported day-to-day difficulties not captured by the 
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DASS, were provided with contact details for the Edith Cowan University 
Psychological Services Clinic, beyondblue (a depression research and services 
foundation) and Lifeline (a telephone crises support service). Suicidal ideation and 
self-harm were examined in participants provided with these contact details. No 
participant reported self-harming or a desire to end their life. 
All testing for the current study was carried out in a quiet room within the 
homes of participants. Prior to testing, an information sheet was provided to 
participants outlining the purpose of the study and the risks and benefits of 
participating (see Appendix D); any questions participants had about the research 
were then clarified. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to 
commencing any of the testing (see Appendix E). Before beginning the testing 
session, various details were collected from participants, including their date of birth, 
gender, medication use as well as information pertaining to any known vision, 
hearing, language or memory impairments. A full list of details obtained from 
participants can be seen in Appendix F, which displays the information collected 
prior to testing. 
The order of testing was determined primarily by time restrictions imposed 
by the VR and LM subtests. The order in which tasks were completed is outlined in 
Table 11, although small variations to this schedule occurred from time to time as a 
result of differences in the speed at which participants moved through the tasks. 
Using a stop-watch, a 20-minute interval was always maintained between the 
completion of VR-I and the commencement of VR-II. During this time, participants 
completed the LM-I subtest and began the NEO-FFI and DASS questionnaires (time 
permitting). Whilst the estimated combined time of completion for LM-I and the 
NEO-FFI was 20 minutes, participants sometimes required more or less time than 
this. Where the participant completed LM-I and the NEO-FFI in less than 20 
minutes, they were asked to begin filling in the DASS until 20 minutes had elapsed. 
When 20 minutes had elapsed (regardless of where participants were up to on 
the NEO-FFI or DASS), they were asked to stop filling in the questionnaires and the 
VR-II and LM-II tasks were administered. No participant completed all three tasks 
(LM-I, NEO-FFI and DASS) within the 20-minute period between completion of 
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VR-I and commencement of VR-II. Following completion of the VR-II and LM-II 
tasks, participants were invited to have a short break (5 to 10 minutes). Following 
the break, the VR-II copy section of the VR subtest was administered and any 
remaining questions on the NEO-FFI and DASS questionnaires were completed. The 
GFF scale from the MFQ and NART were completed last. The procedure for each of 
the tasks completed is described in more detail in the remaining sections of this 
chapter. All scoring was carried out at completion of the testing session. In total, the 
entire testing session (including break and collection of personal information prior to 
testing) typically lasted between 90 and 100 minutes. 
Table 11 
Order of Tasks Completed During the Testing Session 
Task Measure(s) 
Approximate Duration 
(minutes) 
Memory VR-I, LM-I 15 
Questionnaires NEO-FFI, DASS 15 
Memory VR-II, LM-II 20 
Break - 5 – 10 
Screening VR-II Copy 5 
Questionnaires NEO-FFI*, DASS*, GFF 15 
Premorbid IQ NART 5 
Note: A gap of 20 minutes was always maintained between VR-I and VR-II. *Unfinished 
questions remaining from earlier in the testing session 
DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, GFF = General Frequency of Forgetting Scale, LM-I 
= Logical Memory I, LM-II = Logical Memory II, NART = National Adult Reading Test, NEO-
FFI = NEO Five-Factor Inventory, VR-I = Visual Reproduction I, VR-II = Visual Reproduction 
II. 
Visual Reproduction I 
VR-I was administered according to the procedure outlined in the WMS-IV 
administration and scoring manual (Wechsler, 2009a). During VR-I the participant 
was asked to briefly view and then draw from memory five different designs (line 
drawings). Each design was presented by itself for 10 seconds (measured via 
stopwatch), at which point the design was concealed and the participant asked to 
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draw it from memory using a pencil and booklet provided. Participants were able to 
make use of an eraser provided to them during the task to make any corrections they 
felt necessary. The VR-I task took participants approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. A countdown was initiated (using the stopwatch) at the end of VR-I to 
monitor when 20 minutes had elapsed and when VR-II was to be administered. 
Logical Memory I 
As with VR-I, LM-I was administered according to the procedure outlined in 
the WMS-IV administration and scoring manual (Wechsler, 2009a). During LM-I 
the participant was verbally presented with two short stories. After each short story, 
the participant was asked to verbalize everything they could recall about the story, as 
close to verbatim as possible. To allow for an adequate baseline in participants who 
experience difficulty in recalling the information, the first story is presented twice 
prior to moving on to the second short story. No time limit was imposed on 
participants during their attempts to recall the short stories and responses were 
recorded using a digital audio recorder for later scoring. The LM-I task took 
participants approximately five minutes to complete. 
NEO Five-Factor Inventory 
 Following the LM-I task, participants commenced filling in the NEO-FFI 
questionnaire. The NEO-FFI was administered according to instructions provided in 
the NEO-FFI manual (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and on the front of the NEO-FFI 
questionnaire booklet. Participants were able to ask questions pertaining to the 
questionnaire whilst it was being completed. The questionnaire typically took around 
15 minutes to complete. No time limit was imposed on participants when completing 
the NEO-FFI. 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 
 If participants completed the NEO-FFI and 20 minutes had not yet elapsed 
since completion of the VR-I task, participants were asked to begin filling in the 
DASS. The DASS was administered according to the precise explanation provided 
on the DASS itself. Again, participants were able to ask questions pertaining to the 
questionnaire whilst it was being completed. No time limit was imposed on 
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participants and it typically took around 10 minutes to complete. If, whilst filling in 
the NEO-FFI and DASS questionnaires, 20 minutes elapsed since the completion of 
VR-I, participants were asked to put the questionnaires aside to complete them later 
in the session and the VR-II and LM-II components of the VR and LM subtests were 
completed. 
Visual Reproduction II 
 Following a 20-minute delay after completion of VR-I, VR-II was 
administered. The VR-II task includes two parts that assess delayed free recall and 
recognition memory for non-verbal material. First, participants were asked to draw 
from memory the designs presented during VR-I, in any order (delayed free recall). 
The participants were then shown each of the original five designs, one at a time, 
which were presented amongst five other similar designs (not shown in VR-I). The 
participants were then asked to point out which of the designs matched the original 
design presented previously. Both parts of VR-II were administered according to the 
procedures outlined in the WMS-IV administration and scoring manual (Wechsler, 
2009a). This second section of the VR subtest took participants approximately 10 
minutes to complete. 
Logical Memory II 
 LM-II was then administered following completion of VR-II. Given the 20-
minute delay between completion of VR-I and the start of VR-II, and that LM-I and 
VR-II take approximately 5 and 10 minutes to complete, respectively; LM-II 
commenced around 25 minutes after completion of LM-I. This falls within the 20 to 
30-minute range suggested in the WMS-IV administration and scoring manual 
(Wechsler, 2009a). As with VR-II, LM-II provides measures of both delayed free 
recall and recognition memory. To assess delayed free recall for verbal material, 
participants were asked to recount whatever they could recall from the two short 
stories read out in LM-I. To assess recognition memory, participants were asked a 
series of yes/no questions pertaining to the two short stories. Both parts of LM-II 
were administered according to the procedures outlined in the WMS-IV 
administration and scoring manual (Wechsler, 2009a). This section of the LM 
subtest typically took participants around 10 minutes to complete. 
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Break 
Once the LM-II component of the LM subtest had been completed, 
participants were invited to take a short, 5 to 10-minute break from testing. During 
this time, participants were encouraged to get up, walk around, stretch and get a 
drink of water if required. The break was delayed until both the VR and LM subtests 
were complete to avoid inconsistent interference effects that might result from 
conversations arising during the break. 
Visual Reproduction – Copy 
After a 5 to 10-minute break, participants were asked to copy the five designs 
shown during the VR-I task. The designs were left in full view of participants until 
they had finished copying them and no time limit was imposed. The VR-II copy task 
is used to rule out possible motor control and/or visuo-constructional problems as 
well as poor attention to detail. Low scores on the copy component of the VR subtest 
indicate that lower scores on the VR-I and VR-II free recall tasks may be attributable 
to factors not associated with memory (e.g., tremors associated with medication use 
or poor motor control associated with apraxia). This component of the VR subtest 
was administered according to the procedures outlined in the WMS-IV 
administration and scoring manual (Wechsler, 2009a) and took participants 
approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
General Frequency of Forgetting Scale 
After completing the VR-II copy task, participants then completed the GFF 
scale from the MFQ. The GFF scale was completed in accordance with instructions 
provided by Gilewski, Zelinski and Schaie (1990) and according to instructions 
provided on the MFQ itself. Again, participants were able to ask questions while the 
questionnaire was being completed. No time limit was imposed on participants, 
though it typically took approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
National Adult Reading Test 
Following the GFF scale, participants completed the NART. The NART was 
administered in accordance with instructions provided in the test manual (Nelson, 
1982). For the NART, participants were given the list of 50 orthographically-
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irregular words and asked to read them aloud one at a time. Participants were 
allowed to ask questions prior to beginning the task (e.g., “Can I pass on a word?”). 
No time limit was imposed on participants but the task was typically completed 
within 5 minutes. 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter Seven 
 Multiple linear and binary logistic regressions were conducted to examine 
measures of affective distress as predictors of GFF scores and global (high vs. 
low) complaint status beyond personality and within the context of memory 
performance, age, gender, education and premorbid intelligence. 
 All assumptions for these analyses were met. 
 Overall depression status and the presence of anhedonia both significantly 
predicted memory complaints assessed via GFF scores and global (high vs. low) 
complaint status. 
 Overall anxiety status and the presence of situational anxiety significantly 
predicted memory complaints assessed via GFF scores. 
 The presence of situational anxiety but not overall anxiety status significantly 
predicted global (high vs. low) complaint status. 
 No measure of affective distress (either overall or specific) was a significant 
predictor of memory complaints assessed via GFF scores or global (high vs. low) 
complaint status with important measures of personality also in the model. 
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CHAPTER 7: Analyses and Results 
This chapter outlines the analyses and results for the current study. It 
provides an outline of the analyses used to address each of the research questions, 
including how variables were operationalized for the analyses. The relevant 
assumptions of the analyses used are then discussed. Finally, the chapter details the 
results obtained for the study reported in this thesis. 
Analyses 
 Two overarching forms of analyses were used to address the research 
questions presented in this chapter. To examine overall and specific features of 
depression and anxiety as predictors of memory complaints, beyond features of 
personality and the contextual variables, the current study employed two sets of 
regression analyses. To examine the capacity of these predictor variables to account 
for responses on the GFF scale, the study employed a series of four multiple linear 
regression analyses. Separate multiple linear regression analyses were carried out to 
examine (1) overall depression status, (2) specific depressive symptoms, (3) overall 
anxiety status and (4) specific anxiety symptoms as predictors of applied memory 
complaint scores within the context of personality, memory performance, age, 
gender, education and premorbid intelligence. 
To examine affective distress, personality and the contextual variables as 
predictors of a global measure of memory complaint dichotomized as high versus 
low (details are provided in the next section on how memory complaints were 
dichotomized), a series of four binary logistic regression analyses were utilized. 
Again, separate regression analyses were employed to examine (1) overall 
depression status, (2) specific depressive symptoms, (3) overall anxiety status and 
(4) specific anxiety symptoms as predictors of high versus low memory complaints 
beyond personality and within the context of memory performance, age, gender, 
education and premorbid intelligence. Whilst discriminant function analysis is 
sometimes seen as preferable to logistic regression for assessing such relationships 
(see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012), logistic regression was chosen as the preferred 
method of analysis in this case because (1) the outcome variable is binary rather than 
multinomial, (2) one of the predictor variables was categorical (i.e., gender), (3) the 
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major emphasis of the current study was to assess individual predictors rather than 
the overall efficacy of the model, and (4) a key assumption of discriminant function 
analysis (homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices) was not met. The precise 
manner in which variables were entered into the regression models for each of these 
analyses is addressed in the relevant sections in this chapter. The following section 
addresses how the variables included in the analyses were operationalized, including 
how scores for non-raw-score data were treated. 
Variables Used in Analyses 
 For the analyses reported in this chapter, several of the variables utilized raw 
data, including applied memory complaints (raw scores on the GFF scale), 
personality (raw scores on the NEO-FFI personality scales), gender (female = 0, 
male = 1), education (years) and premorbid intelligence (NART errors). However, 
raw data was not used for global memory complaints, measures of affective distress, 
memory performance or age, given how they were assessed or the shape of their 
distributions. The following section details the variables used in the main analyses, 
including why raw scores for some of the variables were not utilized and how they 
were quantified for the regression analyses. As a reference, Appendix G provides 
(Pearson or Phi) correlations between all variables utilized in the analyses. 
Memory Complaints 
For applied memory complaints, raw scores from the GFF scale were 
utilized. The mean score on the GFF scale for the sample was 157.30 (SE = 1.96), 
which represents a mean score of 4.77 for individual items (on a scale from 1 to 7, 
with higher scores indicating lower levels of complaint).  There was a small but 
significant effect of gender on GFF scores, t(175) = 2.09, p = .038, d = .32. Overall, 
GFF scores for females (M = 160.28, SE = 2.38) were significantly higher than for 
males (M = 151.77, SE = 3.33), suggesting females in the sample had fewer or less 
serious complaints of memory problems than males in the sample. 
Global memory complaints were assessed using the first question from the 
GFF scale of the MFQ (Gilewski et al., 1990), which asks, “How would you rate 
your memory in terms of the kinds of problems you have?” Participants respond to 
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the question on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (major problems) through 
to 7 (no problems). Data defined on a seven-point Likert scale is ordinal and so 
cannot be incorporated as a continuous measure that would be required for an 
outcome variable in a linear regression analysis. For this reason, global memory 
complaints were conceptualised as being either ‘high’ or ‘low’ according to whether 
they fell above or below an ad hoc defined cut-off. Cut-off values providing the most 
evenly sized groups were those of 1 to 4 (deemed the high complaint group) and 5 to 
7 (deemed the low complaint group). According to headings provided on the MFQ, 
the high complaint group would incorporate those who felt they had major problems 
with their memory as well as those who felt they had a considerable number of 
noticeable minor problems. Participants in the low complaint group would 
incorporate those who felt they had few or only very minor problems, or those 
reporting no problems at all. Of the 177 participants in the sample, 88 (49.7%) were 
classified as belonging to the high complaint group and 89 (50.3%) to the low 
complaint group. This overall event proportion value of .497 (49.7%) for the high 
complaints group exceeds the minimum value of .40 utilized for estimating sample 
size (see Chapter 6, ‘Required Sample Size’). No significant effect of gender on 
global complaint status was found, U = 3284.00, p = .318, r = .08. 
Affective Distress 
 Whilst depression and anxiety are among the most commonly reported 
mental health problems (e.g., Kessler et al., 2005), they are still reported in only a 
relatively small proportion of community-dwelling older adults (Beekman et al., 
1998; Djernes, 2006; Fuentes & Cox, 1997; Steffens et al., 2000). For this reason, 
raw score data from the DASS scales and subscales each exhibited a very strong 
positive skew. Given (1) univariate normality is an assumption of linear models, (2) 
skewed data can reduce the strength of correlations and (3) transforming skewed data 
to normal can lead to difficulties with linearity (see Dunlap, Burke, & Greer, 1995) 
and interpretation, the current study opted for ad hoc defined cut-off values for the 
depression and anxiety scales to categorize participants as either ‘depressed’ or ‘not 
depressed’ and ‘anxious’ or ‘not anxious’ on the basis of clinical cut-offs specified in 
the DASS manual (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). Grouping participants this way 
was also logical given the groups have meaningful applications. 
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Guidelines specified in the DASS manual (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b) 
provide cut-offs for depression and anxiety severity ratings ranging from ‘normal’, to 
‘mild’, ‘moderate’, ‘severe’ and ‘extremely severe’. These categories are 
distinguished from one another on the basis of percentiles derived from the 
normative sample used in the development of the DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995b). The severity ratings of normal, mild, moderate, severe and extremely severe 
are separated by the 78th, 87th, 95th and 98th percentiles, respectively. For the 
current study, participants were categorized as depressed or not depressed and 
anxious or not anxious on the basis of normal versus above normal (i.e., mild 
through to extremely severe) levels. When dealing with raw scores, participants can 
be separated into these two groups using cut-offs of 0-9 (not depressed) and 10-42 
(depressed) for depression, and 0-7 (not anxious) and 8-42 (anxious) for anxiety. 
These categories were coded as 0 (no depression or no anxiety) or 1 (depression 
present or anxiety present). 
Given data for each of the individual DASS subscales also exhibited strong 
positive skews, participants were also placed into dichotomous categories for each of 
the seven subscales of depression and four subscales of anxiety. Clinical cut-offs are 
not provided for the subscales on the DASS as they are with the depression and 
anxiety scales. Furthermore, no clinical cut-off could be meaningfully derived for 
these subscales given the concepts they measure do not reflect a diagnosis per se. 
Therefore, participants in the current study were categorized either as having 
reported no subscale symptoms (e.g., dysphoria not reported) or some subscale 
symptoms (e.g., dysphoria reported); coded as 0 or 1, respectively. 
The prevalence (and proportion) of participants scoring above nine on the 
depression scale or above seven on the anxiety scale are reported in Table 12. 
Prevalence rates are also reported for each of the symptoms measured by the 
subscales of the depression and anxiety scales of the DASS (i.e., symptoms reported 
vs. symptoms not reported). An effect of gender was found for overall anxiety status 
and self-deprecation status, on which females exhibited significantly higher rates 
than males for both. Rates of anxiety in females and rates of depression in both 
males and females were slightly higher in the current study than previously reported 
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in recent community samples (Fiske, Wetherell, & Gatz, 2009; Pirkis et al., 2009; 
Steffens, Fisher, Langa, Potter, & Plassman, 2009; Wolitzky-Taylor, Castriotta, 
Lenze, Stanley, & Craske, 2010). This may be an outcome of the manner in which 
participants were allocated to groups here, though it is perhaps more likely 
attributable to the recruitment method utilized in the current study. Given this study 
recruited participants for a study on memory complaints, it is possible the sample 
included a large proportion of participants with subjective or objective memory 
problems; both of which are associated with depression (reviewed in Chapter 2). 
Table 12 
Prevalence Rates for Depression, Anxiety and Specific Features of Each 
Measure 
Prevalence (%) 
Female Male Total r 
Depression 25 (21.7%) 8 (12.9%) 33 (18.6%) .11 
 Dysphoria 49 (42.6%) 20 (32.3%) 69 (39.0%) .10 
 Hopelessness 34 (29.6%) 15 (24.2%) 49 (27.7%) .06 
 Devaluation of Life 29 (25.2%) 9 (14.5%) 38 (21.5%) .12 
 Self-Deprecation 34 (29.6%) 8 (12.9%) 42 (23.7%) .19
*
 
 Lack of Interest 39 (33.9%) 18 (29.0%) 57 (32.2%) .05 
 Anhedonia 48 (41.7%) 26 (41.9%) 74 (41.8%) .02 
 Inertia 59 (51.3%) 29 (46.8%) 88 (49.7%) .05 
Anxiety 22 (19.1%) 4 (6.5%) 26 (14.7%) .17
*
 
 Autonomic 58 (50.4%) 23 (37.1%) 81 (45.8%) .13 
 Skeletal 26 (22.6%) 10 (16.1%) 36 (20.3%) .08 
 Situational 47 (40.9%) 29 (46.8%) 76 (42.9%) .06 
 Anxious Affect 28 (24.3%) 14 (22.6%) 42 (23.7%) .02 
Note: Anxious Affect = Subjective Experiences of Anxious Affect, Autonomic = Autonomic Arousal, 
Situational = Situational Anxiety, Skeletal = Skeletal Musculature Effects 
*p < .05
 
129 
 
Personality Characteristics 
 Raw scores from the neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness scales of the NEO-FFI were utilized as measures of personality in 
the analyses. Scores on each of the scales can range from 0 through to 48. Means and 
standard errors for each of the scales are presented in Table 13. A small but 
significant effect of gender was observed for scores on the conscientiousness scale, 
t(175) = 2.51, p = .013, d = 0.38. For this measure, females scored higher than males, 
suggesting slightly higher self-reported tendencies toward conscientious behaviour in 
female participants in the sample. 
Table 13 
NEO-FFI Scores by Gender for the Sample Utilized in the Current Study 
Personality Measure 
Mean Scale Score (Standard Error) 
Females Males Total d 
Neuroticism 19.89 (0.68) 17.63 (0.94) 19.10 (0.56) 0.29 
Extraversion 28.10 (0.53) 27.37 (0.79) 27.85 (0.44) 0.12 
Openness 27.63 (0.52) 27.47 (0.68) 27.57 (0.41) 0.03 
Agreeableness 33.10 (0.56) 31.44 (0.69) 32.51 (0.44) 0.27 
Conscientiousness 34.77 (0.52) 32.56 (0.70) 34.00 (0.43) 0.38
*
 
*
p < .05 
Contextual Variables 
Memory performance. Six measures of memory were obtained from the 
tasks completed by participants in the current study. Scores for immediate, delayed 
and recognition memory are provided for verbal and non-verbal material by the LM 
and VR subtests, respectively. Whilst all of these measures could have been 
simultaneously entered into the regression analyses as measures of memory, 
incorporating predictors that are strongly related (which was anticipated, based on 
data presented by Wechsler, 2009b) in a single regression model can severely distort 
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coefficients and misrepresent their true relationships with the outcome variable. For 
this reason, a preliminary factor analysis was carried out to determine whether a 
smaller number of latent measures of memory could adequately account for memory 
performance. Raw scores from the immediate, delayed and recognition measures of 
verbal and non-verbal memory were subjected to Principal Axis factoring and a 
Direct Oblimin rotation. A non-orthogonal rotation was chosen because factors were 
expected to correlate to some degree, regardless of the underlying structure. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic (.78) indicated good to very good sampling 
adequacy (in addition, all six individual measures of memory exceeded .72), 
suggesting factor analysis was appropriate for analysing the data. Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity indicated sufficiently-strong correlations between the measures, 
2
(15) = 
560.82, p < .001. Two factors had eigenvalues greater than 1, which each explained 
57.3% and 20.5% of the variance in memory performance scores. The measures of 
verbal memory loaded heavily on the first factor; namely LM-I (.84), LM-II (.98) 
and LM-R (.65). The measures of non-verbal memory loaded heavily on the second 
factor; that is, VR-I (.89), VR-II (.87) and VR-R (.68). All other loadings ranged 
between -.07 and .05, suggesting two measures of memory were appropriate and that 
separate measures of verbal and non-verbal memory should be incorporated into the 
analyses. The correlation of .545 between the two factors was not strong enough to 
warrant concern for multicollinearity. Verbal and non-verbal memory factor scores 
derived from the factor analysis were utilized as measures of memory in both the 
multiple linear regression analyses and binary logistic regression analyses. No effect 
of gender was found for VR factor scores, t(175) = 0.86, p = .393, d = 0.13. 
However, a small effect of gender was observed for LM factor scores, t(175) = 2.16, 
p = .032, d = 0.33, whereby female participants marginally outperformed male 
participants. 
To provide an indication of the sample’s overall performance on the memory 
tasks utilized in the study, Table 14 details the mean, standard error and gender-
based effect sizes for scaled scores on the LM-I, LM-II, VR-I and VR-II tasks 
(scaled scores cannot be derived for LM-R or VR-R). Scaled scores on the WMS-IV 
represent a participant’s score relative to the normative sample on which the WMS-
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IV was standardized. Scaled scores can range from 1 to 19 and have a mean of 10 
with a standard deviation of three. According to means obtained for the sample 
utilized in the current study, scaled scores suggest participants scored slightly higher 
than the normative sample. Scaled scores ranged from 10.05 (for males on the LM-II 
task) through to 11.71 (for females on the VR-II task). The scaled scores presented in 
Table 14 suggest participants used in the current study performed equally well or 
slightly better than participants in the standardisation sample. No significant (p < 
.05) differences were found between males and females on any of the four measures 
of memory performance. 
Table 14 
Mean and Standard Error for WMS-IV Scaled Scores on the WMS-IV 
Measure Females Males Total d 
LM-I SS 11.63 (0.22) 10.92 (0.37) 11.38 (0.19) 0.27 
LM-II SS 10.81 (0.23) 10.05 (0.34) 10.54 (0.19) 0.30 
VR-I SS 11.65 (0.23) 11.65 (0.38) 11.65 (0.20) 0.00 
VR-II SS 11.71 (0.26) 11.27 (0.37) 11.56 (0.21) 0.15 
Note: LM-I SS = Logical Memory I Scaled Score, LM-II SS = Logical Memory II Scaled Score, VR-I 
SS = Visual Reproduction I Scaled Score, VR-II SS = Visual Reproduction II Scaled Score. 
Individual scores from participants on the VR copy task suggested errors 
made on the VR-I and VR-II tasks were likely attributable to difficulties recalling the 
line drawings and not motor control or visuo-constructional problems, or poor 
attention to detail. The overall mean score (out of 43) for the VR copy task was 
42.38 (SE = 0.07). No significant difference was found between females (M = 42.39, 
SE = 0.08) and males (M = 42.35, SE = 0.12) for this task, t(175) = 0.25, p = .800, d 
= 0.04. Only four participants (2.26%) made more than three errors on the VR copy 
task, two of whom scored 38 (five errors) and two 39 (four errors). All four 
participants obtained comparable scores for measures of verbal and non-verbal 
memory, suggesting the cause(s) of the errors made on the VR copy task likely did 
not drastically impair performance on the VR measures relative to their performance 
on the LM measures. For this reason, data from all participants was retained. 
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Age. The majority of participants who came forward to participate in the 
current study were at the younger end of the 65 to 90 years age spectrum. 
Consequently, as with scores on the depression and anxiety scales of the DASS, age 
also showed a strong positive skew. For reasons already outlined in the section 
detailing how depression and anxiety were operationalized, the age variable was also 
dichotomized (age categories are frequently utilized in memory complaint studies, 
see Aarts et al., 2011; Bay, Kalpakjian, & Giordani, 2012; Steinberg et al., 2013). 
For age, participants were divided into two groups using the value that provided the 
two most evenly sized groups. Ranges of 65 to 71 years (younger, n = 88) and 72 to 
90 years (older, n = 89) provided the most evenly sized groups. 
Table 15 details scores for both of the age categories for measures of memory 
complaints, affective distress, personality, memory performance, premorbid 
intelligence and education for participants in the current study. Small to medium- 
sized differences between the age groups were observed for inertia symptoms, 
openness scale scores and errors on the NART. Older participants were found to 
exhibit a greater likelihood of experiencing symptoms of inertia, exhibited lower 
levels of openness, and made more errors on the NART. Large effect sizes between 
the groups were found on the LM and VR factor scores, whereby older participants 
performed less well than younger participants on these tasks. 
Gender. Of the 177 participants in this study, most were female (n = 115, 
65.0%). Gender has the potential to play an important role in memory complaints, 
given some previous studies have found it to be related to memory performance 
(e.g., Pauls, Petermann, & Lepach, 2013; Persson et al., 2013), affect (e.g., McLean, 
Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann, 2011; Parker & Brotchie, 2010), personality (e.g., 
Weisberg, DeYoung, & Hirsh, 2011) and memory complaints themselves (e.g., 
Holmen et al., 2013). In the current study, no differences were found between males 
and females on the original scaled scores for the WMS-IV, though a small difference 
was found on the LM factor scores used to characterize verbal memory performance. 
As noted earlier in the chapter, gender differences were also found for some 
measures of affective distress, personality, and for scores on the GFF scale. 
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Table 15 
Mean (and SE) or Mean Rank for Key Variables According to Age Category 
Measure 
Mean (SE) or Mean Rank 
Size of Effect 
Younger (65-71) Older (72-90) 
GFF scores 157.74 (2.68) 156.87 (2.86) d = 0.03 
High vs. Low Complaints 85.23 92.73 r = .08 
Depression 89.60 88.41 r = .02 
 Dysphoria 91.71 86.32 r = .06 
 Hopelessness 91.65 86.38 r = .07 
 Devaluation of Life 88.10 89.89 r = .02 
 Self-Deprecation 92.14 85.90 r = .08 
 Lack of Interest 90.67 87.35 r = .04 
 Anhedonia 89.21 88.79 r = .00 
 Inertia 97.30 80.80 r = .19
*
 
Anxiety 90.08 87.93 r = .03 
 Autonomic 85.71 92.25 r = .07 
 Skeletal 87.09 90.89 r = .05 
 Situational 90.22 87.79 r = .03 
 Anxious Affect 91.13 86.89 r = .06 
Neuroticism 19.53 (0.77) 18.66 (0.80) d = 0.12 
Extraversion 27.98 (0.62) 27.72 (0.64) d = 0.04 
Openness 28.70 (0.59) 26.45 (0.56) d = 0.42
**
 
Agreeableness 32.64 (0.69) 32.39 (0.57) d = 0.04 
Conscientiousness 34.11 (0.67) 33.89 (0.53) d = 0.04 
LM factor scores 0.32 (0.08) -0.31 (0.11) d = 0.70
*** 
VR factor scores 0.43 (0.08) -0.43 (0.10) d = 1.03
*** 
NART errors 8.77 (0.51) 10.35 (0.48) d = 0.34
*
 
Education 12.90 (0.32) 12.22 (0.29) d = 0.24 
Note: Autonomic = Anxious Affect = Subjective Experiences of Anxious Affect, Autonomic Arousal, 
Education = Years of Education, GFF = General Frequency of Forgetting Scale, LM = Logical 
Memory, Situational = Situational Anxiety, Skeletal = Skeletal Musculature Effects, VR = Visual 
Reproduction. 
*
p < .05, 
***
p < .001. 
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Premorbid intelligence. Premorbid intelligence was assessed via the number 
of errors made on the NART. Across the entire sample, the mean number of errors 
(out of 50) made by participants on the NART was 9.56 (SE = 0.36). No difference 
was observed between the number of errors made by females (M = 9.57, SE = .0.42) 
and males (M = 9.55, SE = 0.66), t(175) = 0.03, p = .973, d = .01. 
Education. Education was assessed via the number of years of formal 
primary, secondary and post-secondary education completed. The mean years of 
education completed by the sample was 12.56 (SE = 0.22). No difference was found 
between females (M = 12.46 years, SE = 0.24) and males (M = 12.74 years, SE = 
0.42) with regard to the amount of formal education completed, t(175) = 0.63, p = 
.528, d = .10. 
Assumptions for Primary Analyses 
Prior to using or interpreting the regression analyses detailed below, it is a 
requirement that several assumptions of the data be met. Given binary logistic 
regression has relatively few assumptions, the following section applies mostly to 
the multiple linear regression analyses. However, binary logistic regression is 
incorporated where necessary. Assumptions of the analyses utilized in this chapter 
include: (1) appropriate levels of measurement for variables, (2) predictor variables 
being uncorrelated with external variables, (3) adequate sample size, (4) non-zero-
variance in predictor variables, (5) absence of univariate and multivariate outliers, 
(6) linearity between all variables in the regression analysis, (7) no multicollinearity 
(or singularity) between predictor variables, (8) homoscedasticity of residuals and 
(9) normally distributed residuals (addressed in Field, 2005). The following section 
describes the process by which each of these assumptions were examined, as well as 
any actions taken. 
Appropriate Level of Measurement 
Field (2005) stipulates that it is a requirement of multiple linear regression 
that all predictors must be either continuous (i.e., interval or ratio scale) or 
categorical (with two categories only) and that the outcome variable must be either 
continuous and free of constraint (in the case of multiple linear regression) or 
dichotomous (in the case of binary multiple logistic regression). Predictors used in 
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the regression analyses included scale scores from the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 
1992), dichotomized scale and subscale scores from the DASS (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995b), verbal and non-verbal memory factor scores derived from the 
WMS-IV (Wechsler, 2009a), age (dichotomized), education (in years), gender and 
errors on the NART. Outcome variables included GFF scale scores (for multiple 
linear regression) and a dichotomized global memory complaint measure (for binary 
logistic regression). Whilst the Likert scale data obtained from the scale scores on 
the NEO-FFI are, strictly speaking, not of an interval level (see Jamieson, 2004), 
evidence strongly suggests that such measures are still appropriate for use in a range 
of statistical tests, including regression models (Carifio & Perla, 2007; Norman, 
2010). Therefore, scale scores on the NEO-FFI were considered appropriate for use 
in the regression analyses in this chapter. 
Another issue relating to levels of measurement in multiple linear regression 
is the possibility of data on the outcome variable being constrained (i.e., limited at 
either upper or lower values). Whether data on continuous outcome variables is 
constrained or not can be difficult to determine, although a limited range and/or a 
strong positive or negative skew can be indicative of data restriction. To evaluate the 
continuous outcome variable used in the current study, histograms and descriptive 
statistics were examined. Histograms revealed normal distributions for GFF scores, 
which ranged from 76 to 207, suggesting a good spread of scores over the scale 
(which can range from 33 to 231). Thus, the continuous outcome variable used in the 
current study exhibited little or no evidence of constraint based on these screening 
methods. 
External Variables 
In regression models proposing causal influences among variables, the results 
rest partly on the assumption that no external variables (i.e., variables unaccounted 
for in the analysis) considerably influence the outcome variable (Field, 2005). This 
assumption is not of key importance to the current analyses, given the primary 
objective is to examine the utility of individual predictors rather than the overall 
quality of any one regression model. Nonetheless, the current study incorporates 
pertinent contextual variables (i.e., memory performance, age, gender, education and 
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NART errors) when examining the utility of affective distress as a predictor of 
memory complaints beyond characteristics of personality. Memory performance, 
age, education, gender and premorbid intellectual functioning all have the potential 
to play a role in the complex associations between memory complaints, affective 
distress and personality. For this reason, these variables were incorporated into all of 
the regression analyses. 
Non-Zero Variance in Predictors 
Given correlations between two variables can only be calculated when values 
on both variables vary to some degree (Field, 2005), both linear and logistic 
regression require that scores on each predictor variable show some level of variation 
(i.e., have greater than zero variance). To assess this, descriptive statistics were 
examined for all predictors prior to conducting any of the regression analyses. All 
variables obtained variances greater than zero. 
Outliers 
Univariate. Given the relative sensitivity of continuous variables in linear 
regression techniques to outliers, the data was initially screened for univariate 
outliers via z-scores, histograms and boxplots within each of the measures. No z-
scores exceeded a value of 3 for the GFF scale, education (years), premorbid 
intelligence (NART errors), VR factor scores, LM factor scores, or for any of the 
five measures of personality. Histograms and boxplots also conveyed an absence of 
outlying scores for each of these measures. Consequently, no action was taken with 
regard to any of these variables. 
Multivariate. Multivariate outliers were assessed via Mahalanobis’ distance 
values calculated on measures of personality, memory complaints, education, 
premorbid intelligence, VR factor scores and LM factor scores. No case exceeded 
the critical Chi-square value of 29.59 (df = 10, p < .001) and an absence of outliers 
for each of these variables was supported by boxplots, histograms and outlier 
identification based on z-score cut-offs (mean ±3 standard deviations). For this 
reason, data from all 177 participants who participated in the research was retained 
for the main analysis. 
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Linearity 
Given multiple linear regression is based on the method of least squares, it is 
assumed that any relationships between variables included in the regression model 
are linear. Linearity between variables was assessed simply by observing scatterplots 
between each pair of variables included in the regression analysis. Scatterplots 
between all pairs of variables were examined prior to any of the regression analyses 
to check for linearity. For all pairs of variables included in the multiple linear 
regression analyses, the associations were clearly linear. 
Multicollinearity and Singularity 
Multicollinearity and singularity between predictors in a multiple linear 
regression model are problematic because they (1) limit the size of R
2
, (2) make it 
difficult to determine which predictors are truly important to the model, and (3) 
reduce the reliability of regression coefficients for predictors (Field, 2005). Field 
suggests several methods for assessing multicollinearity and singularity, including 
correlations between predictor variables as well as variance inflation and tolerance 
factors. Multicollinearity is generally evident when correlations between predictors 
exceed .80 (Field, 2005), variance inflation factors exceed 10 (Myers, 1990), or 
when tolerance levels are below .20 (Menard, 1995). 
The strongest association between any of the predictor variables (i.e., NEO-
FFI scales, depression group, anxiety group, DASS subscale groups, LM and VR 
factor scores, age group, education, gender and NART errors) was the correlation 
between scores on the depression and devaluation of life subscale (Kendall’s Tau-B 
= .704, p < .001). However, these variables were examined separately in the current 
study, so at no point were these variables included as predictors in the same 
regression analysis. The strongest association between any two predictor variables 
included in the same regression analysis was between the devaluation of life subscale 
and the self-deprecation subscale of the DASS (Kendall’s Tau-B = .614, p < .001). 
Whilst this represents a strong relationship between these two variables, it was not 
considered problematic with regard to multicollinearity. Furthermore, variance 
inflation factors did not exceed 10 nor did tolerance levels fall below .20 for any of 
the multiple regression analyses. Furthermore, at no point in any of the primary 
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analyses were these variables forced into the same regression model (how variables 
were entered into the regression models is addressed later in this chapter). 
Residuals 
Homoscedasticity. Another assumption of multiple linear regression is that 
the residuals or degree of error in the model should be approximately even across 
different predicted values (Field, 2005). Without this, statistics pertaining to the 
accuracy of the regression model are overestimated at some values of the outcome 
variable and underestimated at others. This assumption was tested by plotting the 
standardized residual values against the standardized predicted values derived from 
each regression model. These values were plotted for each regression analysis prior 
to interpreting the main results. Homoscedasticity was clearly evident for all 
regression analyses. 
Normality. In addition to residuals or the degree of error in a linear 
regression model being even across different predicted values, it is also assumed that 
these residuals are randomly distributed around zero (Field, 2005). This was assessed 
via a normal probability plot of the standardized residuals for each regression 
analysis, whereby the plot should show a normal distribution of standardized 
residuals grouped around zero. Normal distributions of the residuals were obtained 
for all regression analyses carried out. 
Results 
The following section details the results of the regression analyses utilized to 
examine the value of depression and anxiety (and specific features of them) in 
predicting memory complaints beyond characteristics of personality and within the 
context of memory performance, age, gender, education and premorbid intelligence. 
The results are reported first for overall depression status followed by specific 
depressive symptoms. The analyses examining overall anxiety status are presented 
next, followed by specific anxiety symptoms. Within the two sections focussing on 
depressive symptomatology and anxiety symptomatology, predictions of applied 
memory complaints (GFF scores) using multiple linear regression are presented first, 
followed by predictions of global memory complaints (high versus low) using binary 
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logistic regression. Correlations between all variables utilized in the study are 
reported in Appendix G. 
Depressive Symptomatology as a Predictor of Memory Complaints 
Applied complaints. To examine overall depression status as a predictor of 
memory complaints, the current study first employed a four-stage multiple linear 
regression analysis predicting scores on the GFF scale. In the first stage, depression 
status (depressed vs. not depressed) was entered into the model. In stage two, 
neuroticism scale scores were entered given neuroticism is the personality 
characteristic most consistently reported in the literature to be associated with 
memory complaints and depression (reviewed in Chapter 3). In stage three, a 
forward analysis (based on contribution to the R
2
 value) was conducted on the 
remaining personality scales (i.e., extraversion, openness, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness) to assess whether they too may contribute to GFF scores beyond 
depression status and neuroticism scale scores. In stage four, a stepwise analysis 
(again based on their contribution to R
2
) was conducted on the contextual variables 
(i.e., LM and VR factor scores, age group, gender, education and NART errors). A 
stepwise method was used on the contextual variables in stage four because this is 
the most practical method for assessing variables in terms of their unique 
contribution to an outcome variable as well as any effects of suppression on other 
predictor variables included in the model. For the stepwise analyses used in stage 
four, variables were only retained in the model if their removal resulted in a 
significant (p < .05) reduction in the R
2
 value. 
Depression status accounted for a small but significant amount of unique 
variance in GFF scores in stage one (r = -.18, p = .016). When neuroticism scale 
scores were entered into the model in stage two, they too accounted for a significant 
amount of unique variance in GFF scores (semi-partial r = -.334, p < .001). 
However, with neuroticism scale scores in the model, depression status no longer 
accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores (semi-partial r 
= .00, p = .984). In stage three, extraversion (semi-partial r = .24, p = .002), 
openness (semi-partial r = .19, p = .011) and conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .19, 
p = .015) scale scores all accounted for a significant amount of additional unique 
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variance in GFF scores and were entered into the model. With these three additional 
personality measures included in the model, depression status still failed to account 
for a significant amount of unique variance (semi-partial r = -.02, p = .792). 
Neuroticism scale scores, however, still accounted for a small but significant amount 
of unique variance (semi-partial r = -.16, p = .035). In stage four, LM factor scores 
and education were entered into the model. In this model, neuroticism (semi-partial r 
= -.20, p = .009), extraversion (semi-partial r = .22, p = .004), openness (semi-partial 
r = .20, p = .010), conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .17, p = .024), LM factor 
scores (semi-partial r = .23, p = .002) and education (semi-partial r = -.16, p = .040) 
all accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in memory complaints, 
though depression status (semi-partial r = .03, p = .724) did not. Summary statistics 
for each model are reported in Table 16. 
Table 16 
Predicting GFF Scores from Depression, Personality and Contextual Variables 
Model Predictors Included 
Variance 
Accounted For 
 Increase in Variance 
Accounted For 
R
2
 F p 
 
R
2
 F p 
1 Dep .05 8.69 .004 
 
- - - 
2 Dep, Neu .14 14.27 <.001 
 
.09 18.94 < .001 
3 
Dep, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con 
.28 13.04 <.001 
 
.14 10.61 <.001 
4 
Dep, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con, LM, Edu 
.33 11.46 <.001 
 
.05 5.70 .004 
Note: Consc = Conscientiousness scale scores, Dep = Depression status, Edu = Education (years), 
Extra = Extraversion scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor scores, Neurot = Neuroticism scale 
scores, Open = Openness scale scores. 
Given not all variables included in stage four of the model accounted for a 
significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores, the analysis was re-run with 
only significant predictors included. In this final model, neuroticism (semi-partial r = 
-.21, p = .006), extraversion (semi-partial r = .22, p = .004), openness (semi-partial r 
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= .20, p = .008) and conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .18, p = .020) scale scores, as 
well as LM factor scores (semi-partial r = .23, p = .002) and education (semi-partial 
r = -.16, p = .041) each accounted for a significant amount of variance. The final 
model accounted for a total of 31.93% of the variance in GFF scores, F(6, 170) = 
13.92, p < .001. 
To examine specific features of depression as a predictor of memory 
complaints, a four-stage multiple linear regression analysis predicting scores on the 
GFF scale was also used. However, in the first stage, a forward analysis was applied 
to the presence or absence of symptoms measured by each of the seven depressive 
subscales of the DASS (dysphoria, hopelessness, devaluation of life, self-
deprecation, lack of interest, anhedonia and inertia). A subscale was included in the 
model if its inclusion resulted in a significant increase in the R
2
 value. Stages two, 
three and four were identical to those used to examine overall depression status. That 
is, neuroticism scale scores were entered in stage two, a forward analysis of the 
remaining personality variables was conducted in stage three, and a stepwise analysis 
of the contextual variables was conducted in stage four. 
In stage one, anhedonia accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
GFF scores (r = -.20, p = .007). No other subscale from the DASS depression scale 
accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores. In stage two, 
neuroticism accounted for a significant amount of unique variance (semi-partial r = -
.326, p < .001) in GFF scores. However, as with overall depression status, anhedonia 
failed to account for a significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores with 
neuroticism scale scores in the model (semi-partial r = -.05, p = .500). In stage three, 
extraversion (semi-partial r = .24, p = .002), openness (semi-partial r = .19, p = .011) 
and conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .18, p = .015) scale scores each accounted for 
a significant amount of unique variance. With these three additional personality 
measures in the model, neuroticism scale scores remained a significant predictor of 
GFF scores (semi-partial r = -.17, p =.025), though anhedonia still failed to account 
for a significant amount of unique variance (semi-partial r = -.02, p = .792). In stage 
four, LM factor scores (semi-partial r = .23, p = .003) and education (semi-partial r = 
-.16, p = .042) accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores, 
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as did neuroticism (semi-partial r = -.19, p = .012), extraversion (semi-partial r = .22, 
p = .005), openness (semi-partial r = .20, p = .008) and conscientiousness (semi-
partial r = .18, p = .021) scale scores. Again, however, anhedonia failed to account 
for a significant amount of unique variance (semi-partial r = -.02, p = .841). 
Summary statistics for each model are reported in Table 17. A final regression 
analysis including only significant predictors in the model was not run because the 
remaining predictors were the same as those in the final model examining overall 
depression status. 
Table 17 
Predicting GFF Scores from Depressive Features, Personality and Contextual 
Variables 
Model Predictors Included 
Variance 
Accounted For 
 Increase in Variance 
Accounted For 
R
2
 F P 
 
R
2
 F p 
1 Anhed .04 7.47 .007 
 
- - - 
2 Anhed, Neu .14 14.50 <.001 
 
.10 20.70 < .001 
3 
Anhed, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con 
.27 12.61 <.001 
 
.13 9.87 <.001 
4 
Anhed, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con, LM, Edu 
.32 11.33 <.001 
 
.05 6.22 .002 
Note: Anhed = Anhedonia, Consc = Conscientiousness scale scores, Edu = Education (years), Extra = 
Extraversion scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor scores, Neurot = Neuroticism scale scores, 
Open = Openness scale scores. 
Global complaints. To examine overall depression status as a predictor of 
global, dichotomized (high vs. low) memory complaints, a four-stage binary logistic 
regression analysis was run. Predictor variables were entered (or not entered) into the 
model using a similar approach to that used in the multiple linear regressions when 
predicting GFF scores. In the first stage, depression status (depressed vs. not 
depressed) was entered into the model using a forced-entry method. In stage two, 
neuroticism scale scores were entered using a forced-entry method. In stage three, a 
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forward entry method (based on likelihood ratios) was utilized to determine whether 
any of the remaining personality variables (i.e., extraversion, openness, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness) made a significant, unique contribution to the 
model beyond depression status and neuroticism scale scores. In stage four, a 
backward entry method (based on changes to the model’s log likelihood value) was 
utilized to determine whether any of the contextual variables (i.e., LM or VR factor 
scores, age group, gender, education and NART errors) resulted in a significant 
contribution to the model (either through prediction or suppressor effects on other 
variables in the model). 
In stage one, depression status was a weak but significant predictor of global 
memory complaint status (OR = 2.36, 95% CI [1.07, 5.23], p = .034). In stage two, 
neuroticism scale scores were entered into the model, though neither depression 
status (OR = 1.60, 95% CI [0.65, 3.94], p = .303) or neuroticism scale scores (OR = 
1.05, 95% CI [0.99, 1.10], p = .070) were significant predictors of global memory 
complaint status with both variables in the model. In stage three, only extraversion 
scale scores reached significance as a predictor of global memory complaint status 
(OR = 0.94, 95% CI [0.88, 0.99], p = .026). Depression status (OR = 1.53, 95% CI 
[0.62, 3.82], p = .358) and neuroticism scale scores (OR = 1.02, 95% CI [0.97, 1.08], 
p = .357) again failed to reach significance. In stage four, LM factor scores were the 
only contextual variable retained in the model (OR = 0.62, 95% CI [0.44, 0.87], p = 
.006). In this model, depression status (OR = 1.24, 95% CI [0.49, 3.18], p = .652), 
neuroticism scale scores (OR = 1.03, 95% CI [0.98, 1.08], p = .310) and extraversion 
scale scores (OR = 0.94, 95% CI [0.89, 1.00], p = .053) all failed to reach 
significance as predictors of global memory complaint status. Summary statistics for 
each model are reported in Table 18. 
A final binary regression analysis was run with only LM factor scores in the 
model, given it was the only significant predictor of high versus low memory 
complaint status. As the only predictor included in the model, LM factor scores 
significantly predicted global memory complaint status (OR = 0.57, 95% CI [0.41, 
0.80], p = .001). The model correctly predicted complaint status (high vs. low) 
membership 59.89% of the time, Nagelkerke R
2
 = .08, χ2(1) = 11.55, p = .001. 
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Table 18 
Predicting Global Memory Complaint Status from Depression, Personality and 
Contextual Variables 
Model Predictors Included Nagelkerke R
2
 
Correctly 
Classified 
χ2 p 
1 Dep .04 56.50% 4.73 .030 
2 Dep, Neu .06 59.89% 8.10 .017 
3 Dep, Neu, Ext .10 61.58% 13.20 .004 
4 Dep, Neu, Ext, LM .15 62.71% 21.10 <.001 
Note: Dep = Depression status, Extra = Extraversion scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor 
scores, Neurot = Neuroticism scale scores. 
To examine specific features of depression as a predictor of global, 
dichotomized (high vs. low) memory complaints beyond personality, a four-stage 
binary logistic regression analysis was again used. However, rather than entering the 
depression status variable in stage one, a forward analysis of the seven depression 
subscales assessed by the DASS (i.e., dysphoria, hopelessness, devaluation of life, 
self-deprecation, lack of interest, anhedonia and inertia) was carried out. A subscale 
was included in the model if its inclusion resulted in a significant increase in the 
Nagelkerke R
2
 value. Given neuroticism scale scores did not make a significant 
unique contribution to global memory complaint status in the previous regression 
analysis, they were not entered using a forced entry method in stage two. Rather, 
neuroticism scale scores were included in a forward entry method (based on 
likelihood ratios) in stage two with the remaining measures of personality 
(extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness scale scores). In stage 
three, a backward method based on log likelihood values was carried out to 
determine whether any of the contextual variables contributed significantly to the 
model (either through prediction or suppressor effects on other variables in the 
model). 
In stage one, anhedonia was a significant predictor of global memory 
complaint status (OR = 2.17, 95% CI [1.18, 3.98], p = .013). In stage two, 
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extraversion scale scores contributed significantly to the model (OR = 0.93, 95% CI 
[0.88, 0.98], p = .011), though anhedonia no longer made a significant, unique 
contribution with extraversion scale scores included (OR = 1.74, 95% CI [0.92, 
3.30], p = .088). In stage three, LM factor scores were the only contextual variable 
retained in the model (OR = 0.61, 95% CI [0.43, 0.86], p = .005). With LM factor 
scores in the model, extraversion still contributed significantly to the model (OR = 
0.94, 95% CI [0.89, 0.99], p = .030), though anhedonia did not (OR = 1.68, 95% CI 
[0.87, 3.23], p = .122). Summary statistics for each stage of the model are provided 
in Table 19. 
Table 19 
Predicting Global Memory Complaint Status from Depressive Features, Personality 
and Contextual Variables 
Model Predictors Included Nagelkerke R
2
 
Correctly 
Classified 
χ2 p 
1 Anh .05 59.32% 6.30 .012 
2 Anh, Ext .09 61.02% 13.15 .001 
3 Anh, Ext, LM .15 63.84% 21.48 <.001 
Note: Anh = Anhedonia, Extra = Extraversion scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor scores. 
A final binary logistic regression analysis was run with only LM factor 
scores and extraversion scale scores in the model. LM factor scores significantly 
predicted global memory complaint status (OR = 0.61, 95% CI [0.43, 0.85], p = 
.004), as did extraversion scale scores (OR = 0.93, 95% CI [0.88, 0.98], p = .008). 
The model correctly predicted complaint status (high vs. low) 64.4% of the time, 
Nagelkerke R
2
 = .14, χ2(2) = 19.09, p < .001. 
Anxiety Symptomatology as a Predictor of Memory Complaints 
 Applied complaints. To examine overall anxiety status as a predictor of 
memory complaints beyond personality, a four-stage multiple linear regression 
analysis predicting scores on the GFF scale was employed as it was with the multiple 
linear regression examining overall depression status. Anxiety status (anxious vs. not 
anxious) was entered into the model in stage one, followed by neuroticism scale 
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scores in stage two (given the relationship neuroticism exhibits with both memory 
complaints and anxiety, reviewed in Chapter 3). Stage three consisted of a forward 
analysis (based on increases in the R
2
 value) on the scale scores of the four 
remaining measures of personality (extraversion, openness, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness) to examine their value in the prediction of GFF scores beyond 
anxiety status and neuroticism scale scores. The final stage of the model involved a 
stepwise analysis of the six contextual variables (LM and VR factor scores, age 
group, gender, education and NART errors). Again, a stepwise method was used in 
stage four because it is the best method for assessing variables in terms of their 
unique contribution to the model as well as their role in suppressing the predictive 
utility of other predictors in the model. Contextual variables were only retained in 
the regression model if their removal resulted in a significant (p < .05) reduction in 
the overall R
2
 value. 
 As with the depression data, anxiety status accounted for a small but 
significant amount of variance in GFF scores in the first stage of the model (r = -.15, 
p = .049). Neuroticism scale scores accounted for a significant amount of unique 
variance in GFF scores in stage two of the model (semi-partial r = -.35, p < .001), 
though anxiety status no longer accounted for a significant amount of unique 
variance in GFF scores with neuroticism in the model (semi-partial r = .01, p = 
.915). Extraversion (semi-partial r = .24, p = .002), openness (semi-partial r = .19, p 
= .011) and conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .19, p = .015) scale scores each 
accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores and were 
entered into the model in stage three. Neuroticism scale scores also still accounted 
for a significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores with these additional 
measures of personality in the model (semi-partial r = -.17, p = .027), though anxiety 
status did not (semi-partial r = -.02, p = .842). In stage four, LM factor scores (semi-
partial r = .23, p = .002) and education (semi-partial r = -.16, p = .042) were the only 
contextual variables retained in the model. Neuroticism (semi-partial r = -.20, p = 
.009), extraversion (semi-partial r = .22, p = .004), openness (semi-partial r = .20, p 
= .009) and conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .17, p = .023) scale scores all still 
accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in this final stage, though 
anxiety status did not (semi-partial r = .02, p = .826). Summary statistics are reported 
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for each model in Table 20. A final regression analysis including only significant 
predictors in the model was not run because the remaining predictors were the same 
as those in the multiple linear regression analysis predicting GFF scores from overall 
depression status. 
Table 20 
Predicting GFF Scores from Anxiety, Personality and Contextual Variables 
Model Predictors Included 
Variance 
Accounted For 
 Increase in Variance 
Accounted For 
R
2
 F p  R
2
 F p 
1 Anx .02 3.93 .049 
 
- - - 
2 Anx, Neu .14 14.24 <.001 
 
.12 24.05 < .001 
3 
Anx, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con 
.28 10.76 <.001 
 
.14 7.90 <.001 
4 
Anx, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con, LM, Edu 
.32 10.00 <.001 
 
.05 5.86 .003 
Note: Anx = Anxiety, Consc = Conscientiousness scale scores, Edu = Education (years), Extra = 
Extraversion scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor scores, Neurot = Neuroticism scale scores, 
Open = Openness scale scores. 
To examine specific features of anxiety as a predictor of GFF scores, the 
same four-stage multiple linear regression analysis was used. However, a forward 
analysis of the presence or absence of symptoms measured by the anxiety subscales 
on the DASS (i.e., autonomic arousal, skeletal musculature effects, situational 
anxiety and subjective experience of anxious affect) was carried out in stage one 
rather than entering overall anxiety status into the model. A subscale was included in 
the model in stage one if it significantly increased the overall R
2
 value. Stages two, 
three and four were the same as those used to assess the value of specific features of 
depression beyond personality. Neuroticism scale scores were entered into the model 
in stage two, a forward analysis of the remaining personality variables was 
conducted in stage three, and a stepwise analysis of the contextual variables was 
conducted in stage four. 
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In stage one of the model, situational anxiety accounted for a significant 
amount of variance in GFF scores (r = -.261, p < .001). In stage two, neuroticism 
scale scores were entered into the model and accounted for a significant amount of 
unique variance in GFF scores (semi-partial r = -.322, p < .001). With neuroticism in 
the model, situational anxiety still accounted for a significant amount of unique 
variance in GFF scores (semi-partial r = -.17, p = .026). In stage three, extraversion 
(semi-partial r = .21, p = .006), openness (semi-partial r = .19, p = .012) and 
conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .20, p = .009) scale scores all accounted for an 
additional amount of unique variance in the model. With these additional measures 
of personality in the model, neuroticism scale scores (semi-partial r = -.16, p = .035), 
but not situational anxiety (semi-partial r = -.13, p = .086), remained a significant 
predictor in the model. In stage four, LM factor scores was the only contextual 
variable retained in the model (semi-partial r = .20, p = .007). With LM factor scores 
in the model, neuroticism (semi-partial r = -.16, p = .035), extraversion (semi-partial 
r = .19, p = .011), openness (semi-partial r = .16, p = .034) and conscientiousness 
(semi-partial r = .20, p = .008) scale scores all still accounted for a significant 
amount of unique variance in GFF scores, though situational anxiety did not (semi-
partial r = -.11, p = .139). Summary statistics for each model are reported in Table 
21. 
A final multiple regression analysis was run including only significant 
predictors in the model. In this final model, neuroticism (semi-partial r = -.19, p = 
.014), extraversion (semi-partial r = .22, p = .004), openness (semi-partial r = .16, p 
= .033) and conscientiousness (semi-partial r = .19, p = .011) scale scores each 
accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in GFF scores, as did LM 
factor scores (semi-partial r = .21, p = .005). The final model accounted for a total of 
30.24% of the variance in GFF scores, F(5, 171) = 14.83, p < .001. 
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Table 21 
Predicting GFF Scores from Anxiety Features, Personality and Contextual 
Variables 
Model Predictors Included 
Variance 
Accounted For 
 Increase in Variance 
Accounted For 
R
2
 F p 
 
R
2
 F p 
1 Sit Anx .07 12.82 <.001 
 
- - - 
2 Sit Anx, Neu .17 17.16 <.001 
 
.10 20.10 < .001 
3 
Sit Anx, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con 
.28 13.40 <.001 
 
.12 9.27 <.001 
4 
Sit Anx, Neu, Ext, 
Open, Con, LM 
.31 12.82 <.001 
 
.03 7.36 .007 
Note: Sit Anx = Situational Anxiety, Consc = Conscientiousness scale scores, Extra = Extraversion 
scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor scores, Neurot = Neuroticism scale scores, Open = 
Openness scale scores. 
Global complaints. To assess anxiety status as a predictor of global (high vs. 
low) memory complaints, a four-stage binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted as it was with overall depression status. Predictors were entered into the 
model using the same method utilized for the logistic regression analyses examining 
depression status. In stage one, anxiety status (anxious vs. not anxious) was entered 
into the model via a forced entry method. Neuroticism scale scores were again 
entered using a forced-entry method in stage two (given they may interact differently 
with memory complaints when anxiety status, rather than depression status, is in the 
model). Stage three involved a forward entry method based on likelihood ratios for 
scale scores on the four remaining personality measures. In the final stage, a 
backward method was conducted on the contextual variables to examine their 
contribution to the model. 
In stage one, anxiety status was not a significant predictor of high versus low 
memory complaint status (OR = 1.76, 95% CI [0.75, 4.12], p = .196). Given anxiety 
status was found not to be significantly related to global memory complaints in stage 
one (or in two, three or four), the remaining stages of the analysis are not reported 
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here and are instead presented in Appendix H. The final model incorporating only 
significant predictors of memory complaint status was identical to the binary logistic 
regression analysis predicting memory complaint status from depressive features. 
To examine specific features of anxiety as a predictor of global memory 
complaints beyond personality, a four-stage binary logistic regression analysis was 
conducted. In stage one, a forward entry analysis was conducted on the four anxiety 
symptoms measured by the DASS subscales (autonomic arousal, skeletal 
musculature effects, situational anxiety and anxious affect). As with the logistic 
regression analysis examining specific features of depression as predictors of global 
memory complaint status, specific features of anxiety were included in the model if 
they resulted in a significant (p < .05) increase in the Nagelkerke R
2
 value. 
Neuroticism scale scores were entered into the model in stage two using a forced-
entry method. A forward entry analysis (based on likelihood ratios) of extraversion, 
openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness scale scores was carried out in stage 
three. Stage four involved a backward analysis of the contextual variables to 
examine their contribution to the prediction of global memory complaints. 
In stage one, situational anxiety was a significant predictor of global memory 
complaint status (OR = 1.96, 95% CI [1.07, 3.58], p = .029). In stage two, 
neuroticism scale scores contributed significantly to the prediction of global memory 
complaints and were added to the model (OR = 1.05, 95% CI [1.00, 1.09], p = .039). 
With neuroticism scale scores in the model, however, situational anxiety was no 
longer a significant predictor of complaint status (OR = 1.62, 95% CI [0.86, 3.05], p 
= .137). Extraversion scale scores were the only additional measure of personality 
added to the model in stage three (OR = 0.94, 95% CI [0.89, 1.00], p = .043). With 
extraversion scale scores in the model, situational anxiety (OR = 1.42, 95% CI [0.74, 
2.73], p = .292) and neuroticism scale scores (OR = 1.03, 95% CI [0.98, 1.08], p = 
.223) were no longer significant predictors of global memory complaint status. In 
stage four, LM factor scores were again the only contextual variable retained in the 
model (OR = 0.62, 95% CI [0.44, 0.87], p = .006). With LM factor scores in the 
model, situational anxiety (OR = 1.30, 95% CI [0.66, 2.55], p = .445), neuroticism 
scale scores (OR = 1.03, 95% CI [0.98, 1.08], p = .250) and extraversion scale scores 
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(OR = 0.95, 95% CI [0.89, 1.01], p = .075) all failed to contribute significantly to the 
prediction of global memory complaint status. Summary statistics for each stage of 
the model are provided in Table 22. Again, a final binary regression analysis 
including only LM factor scores as a predictor was not conducted given the model 
would have been identical to that reported for the regression analysis predicting 
global complaint status from overall depression status. 
Table 22 
Predicting Memory Complaint Status from Anxiety Features, Personality and 
Contextual Variables 
Model Predictors Included Nagelkerke R
2
 
Correctly 
Classified 
χ2 p 
1 Sit Anx .04 58.19% 4.82 .028 
2 Sit Anx, Neu .07 60.45% 9.23 .010 
3 Sit Anx, Neu, Ext .10 61.58% 13.45 .004 
4 Sit Anx, Neu, Ext, LM .15 66.10% 21.47 <.001 
Note: Extra = Extraversion scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor scores, Neurot = Neuroticism 
scale scores, Sit Anx = Situational Anxiety. 
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Key Points Addressed in Chapter Eight 
 The results suggest that affective distress is not predictive of memory complaints 
beyond what can already be explained by features of personality. 
 The association between memory complaints and affective distress might simply 
be attributable to personality characteristics that can account well for both. 
 How memory complaints and affective distress are related depends on how one 
conceptualizes the relationship between affective distress and personality. In this 
chapter, the relationship between affective distress and memory complaints is 
considered within the range of models reviewed earlier in Chapter 3. 
 The results suggest a significant shift may be required with regard to how 
memory complaint theories view affective distress and memory complaints. 
 The results may explain why memory complaints are associated with a 
subsequent risk of depression, even in healthy older adults, and why otherwise-
healthy older adults complaining of memory problems may exhibit an increased 
risk of subsequent dementia. 
 Additional studies will need to replicate these results using different measures of 
affective distress and personality as well as examine whether the findings 
generalize to a clinical context. 
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 CHAPTER 8: Discussion 
This final chapter brings together the first and second sections of this thesis 
by discussing the results (detailed in Chapter 7) for the current study (detailed in 
Chapters 5 and 6) within the context of previous empirical literature and memory 
complaint theory (reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4). The chapter begins with a 
detailed synopsis of the results pertaining to the research questions that are listed at 
the end of Chapter 5. This section begins by examining the association between 
measures of affective distress (both overall and specific features for depression and 
anxiety) and memory complaints, beyond features of personality and the contextual 
variables (Questions 1 and 2). Next, this section discusses the results of the current 
study pertaining to the impact of how memory complaints are assessed; that is, the 
result of measuring memory complaints via a global measure or an applied measure 
(Question 3). 
The chapter then shifts its focus to the features of personality and contextual 
variables that played a role in memory complaints in the current study, either directly 
or indirectly, and discusses them within the context of relevant literature. The 
theoretical and clinical implications of the results obtained are then discussed, 
followed by the limitations of the current study and suggested directions for future 
research. The thesis then concludes with an overall summary of Section Two, which 
details the current study, results and implications. 
Memory Complaints and Affective Distress 
The first and second research questions outlined in Chapter 5 query the extent 
to which memory complaints made by older adults are associated with overall and 
specific measures of affective distress (in this case, depression and anxiety) beyond 
personality characteristics and relevant contextual variables. For the current study, 
the results examining the association between measures of affective distress and 
memory complaints uniformly suggest that affective distress is not related to 
memory complaints in older adulthood beyond features of personality and relevant 
contextual variables. Indeed, depression status, anxiety status and symptoms of 
anhedonia and situational anxiety, operationalized via scores on the DASS, all failed 
to predict memory complaints beyond what could already be accounted for by 
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relevant features of personality. These results were consistent regardless of the 
manner in which affective distress and memory complaints were assessed. 
When predicting applied memory complaints, overall depression status 
accounted for a small but significant amount of variance in GFF scores on its own. 
However, the relationship between overall depression status and memory complaints 
failed to materialize beyond measures of personality. More specifically, depression 
status did not contribute significantly to the prediction of GFF scores with 
neuroticism scale scores in the model. Given the semi-partial correlation for 
depression status declined almost to zero when neuroticism was entered into the 
model, little change in its predictive value occurred when the remaining measures of 
personality and the contextual variables were also entered into the model as well. 
The result was virtually identical when predicting applied memory 
complaints on the GFF scale via specific features of depression. Of the seven 
features of depression assessed by the DASS, the subscale assessing symptoms of 
anhedonia (i.e., the loss of positivity or enjoyment in day-to-day life) was found to 
be the best predictor. As with overall depression status, the presence of symptoms of 
anhedonia accounted for a small but significant amount of variance in GFF scores. 
Again, however, when neuroticism was entered into the model, the value of 
symptoms of anhedonia as a predictor of applied memory complaints decreased 
almost to zero. As with overall depression status, the semi-partial correlation for 
anhedonia symptoms changed little when the remaining measures of personality and 
the contextual variables were entered into the model. 
For global complaints of memory problems (i.e., high vs. low), the results 
again suggested that overall depression status as well as specific features of it 
contribute little beyond aspects of personality and the contextual variables included 
in the analysis. Overall depression status was a weak but significant predictor of high 
versus low memory complaint status. However, with neuroticism also in the model, 
depression offered little additional predictive value. The odds ratio for depression 
status showed little change when extraversion scale scores were entered into the 
model but did drop further with verbal memory in the model. 
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The final regression analysis for depression also supports the notion that 
depression contributes little to memory complaints beyond personality and 
contextual variables. Consistent with the results for situation-specific memory 
complaints, anhedonia was again found to be the only feature of depression 
measured by the DASS significantly associated with global memory complaints. 
Anhedonia was a weak to medium-strength predictor of global memory complaints 
on its own, though failed to reach significance with measures of personality in the 
model. Extraversion was found to be the only measure of personality related to 
global memory complaints in stage two of the model, yet anhedonia failed to reach 
significance with this measure of personality also in the model. The predictive value 
of anhedonia declined further when verbal memory scores were entered in stage 
three. 
Thus, in response to research questions one and two, depression (either 
overall depression status or specific features of it) was found not to be associated 
with memory complaints (either global or applied) beyond what could already be 
explained by measures of personality. In all four regression analyses, overall 
depression status or symptoms of anhedonia were modestly but significantly 
associated with memory complaints (both applied and global) as the only predictor in 
the model. However, for three of the four regression analyses, these measures of 
depression failed to provide any significant additional explanation of memory 
complaints beyond levels of neuroticism. For the final analysis, where neuroticism 
was found not to be uniquely associated with global memory complaints, anhedonia 
still failed to explain memory complaints beyond levels of extraversion. At least for 
the measures of depression utilized here, the results strongly suggest that affective 
distress contributes little to memory complaints in older adults beyond what can 
already be accounted for by measures of personality. 
As with depression status, overall anxiety status accounted for a small but 
significant amount of variance in applied memory complaints measured via the GFF 
scale. Again, however, the association between anxiety status and memory 
complaints decreased almost to zero when neuroticism scale scores were entered into 
the model in stage two. Consistent with the results for overall and specific measures 
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of depression, the predictive value of overall anxiety status changed little when the 
remaining personality measures and the contextual variables were entered into the 
model. 
For specific features of anxiety assessed via the DASS, symptoms of 
situational anxiety were the measure found to be most useful for predicting applied 
memory complaints measured via the GFF scale. Symptoms of situational anxiety 
accounted for a small to medium amount of variance in GFF scores; more than that 
accounted for by overall anxiety status. Whilst overall anxiety status and both 
measures pertaining to depression (overall status and symptoms of anhedonia) 
accounted for almost no variance in GFF scores with neuroticism in the model, 
situational anxiety still accounted for a small but significant amount of variance in 
applied memory complaints (GFF scores) beyond neuroticism. However, when the 
remaining personality measures of extraversion, openness and conscientiousness 
were entered into the model in stage three, situational anxiety also failed to account 
for a significant amount of unique variance. The strength of the association between 
memory complaints assessed via the GFF scale and symptoms of situational anxiety 
decreased further when relevant contextual variables (verbal memory performance 
and education) were entered in stage four. 
For overall anxiety status as a predictor of global memory complaints, 
affective distress was found not to be significantly associated with complaints, even 
as a zero-order relationship. Thus, the question of whether anxiety is associated with 
memory complaints in older adults beyond personality is irrelevant here. Even so, 
entering features of personality and the pertinent contextual variables into the model 
in stages two, three and four all reduced the predictive value of overall anxiety status 
considerably. 
For specific measures of anxiety assessed via the DASS subscales, situational 
anxiety was found to be the most useful (and only significant) predictor of global 
memory complaints. Situational anxiety was a weak predictor of global memory 
complaints on its own but again did not reach significance when neuroticism was 
added to the model. Again, the value of situational anxiety as a predictor of global 
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memory complaints declined further when additional personality and contextual 
variables were entered. 
Thus, in response to research questions one and two, anxiety (either overall 
status or specific features of it) was not associated with memory complaints (either 
global or applied) beyond what could already be explained by personality. Of the 
four regression analyses pertaining to anxiety, one indicated anxiety failed to predict 
memory complaints at all, two indicated that measures of anxiety failed to predict 
memory complaints beyond levels of neuroticism, and one indicated that anxiety 
failed to predict memory complaints beyond all relevant measures of personality. 
Contrary to the results for the analyses on depression, symptoms of situational 
anxiety did account for a significant amount of unique variance in memory 
complaints assessed via the GFF scale beyond levels of neuroticism, though they 
offered little value beyond other relevant measures of personality. Coupled with the 
results obtained for measures of depression, the results strongly suggest that affective 
distress contributes little to memory complaints in older adults beyond what can 
already be explained by personality. 
Reconsidering the Role of Affective Distress in Memory Complaints 
A considerable number of studies have examined the relationship between 
memory complaints and affective distress (or symptoms of it) in older adult 
populations. A total of 27 studies examining the association between affective 
distress and memory complaints in older adulthood were reviewed in Chapter 2. Of 
these 27 studies, all reported at least one significant association between them, with 
medium effect sizes typically reported for depression and a range of effect sizes 
reported for anxiety. To this point, affective distress (particularly depression or 
depressive symptoms) has arguably been the most consistent predictor of memory 
complaints in older adulthood identified to date. 
Various explanations have been put forward for why affective distress 
consistently predicts memory complaints. Dux et al. (2008) proposed that negative 
affect distorts perceptions of one’s own memory abilities, such that higher levels of 
negative affectivity leads to tougher appraisals of our own performance. 
Alternatively, Slavin et al. (2010) suggested cognitive decline may mediate the 
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relationship between affective distress and memory complaints. Depression, for 
example, appears to play a role in some forms of cognitive decline (e.g., Alzheimer’s 
disease), which in turn leads to more frequent or severe complaints of memory 
problems. However, an earlier study by Jorm et al. (2004) found memory complaints 
and depression to be associated beyond cognitive abilities, suggesting the 
relationship is not entirely mediated by cognitive function. 
Whilst memory complaints may well be associated with affective distress 
beyond any mediating role of cognitive function, the results obtained in the current 
study suggest affective distress and memory complaints might not be directly 
associated with one another beyond personality. That is, the relationship between 
memory complaints and affective distress in older adults might not be direct in 
nature, but rather the consequence of personality characteristics that account well for 
both. For example, older adults exhibiting higher levels of neuroticism are more 
likely to experience depression, anxiety or associated symptoms (e.g., Barnhofer & 
Chittka, 2010; Bienvenu et al., 2007; Kotov et al., 2010; Weber et al., 2011) and 
more likely to complain of memory problems (e.g., Pearman & Storandt, 2004, 
2005). Such associations would engender an indirect relationship between memory 
complaints and affective distress, without the two necessarily being causally related. 
However, the notion that memory complaints in older adults might only be 
indirectly related to depression and anxiety failed to transpire in an earlier study 
(Comijs et al., 2002). Comijs et al. incorporated measures of depression, anxiety and 
neuroticism, finding symptoms of depression and anxiety to be associated with 
memory complaints, even with a measure of neuroticism also in the model. The 
contributions of both depressive symptoms (OR = 1.30, 95% CIs [1.03, 1.66]) and 
anxiety symptoms (OR = 1.38, 95% CIs [1.09, 1.73]) with a measure of neuroticism 
in the model were small, but remained significant. However, Comijs et al. 
incorporated different measures of personality into the analysis (i.e., mastery and 
perceived self-efficacy), which may not have fully captured the association between 
affective distress and memory complaints. 
The discrepancy between the results of the current study and those of the 
study by Comijs et al. (2002) may be attributable to a number of factors. It is 
possible that the use of different measures of affective distress, memory complaints 
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and personality may partially explain the difference (i.e., whether or not depression 
was found to be a useful predictor of memory complaints beyond neuroticism). 
Comijs et al. utilized a Dutch translation of the CES-D (Radloff, 1977) to measure 
depression, the anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(Zigmund & Snaith, 1983) to measure anxiety, a single dichotomous question to 
assess memory complaints and the Dutch Personality Inventory (Luteijin et al., 
1985) to measure neuroticism. Alternatively, the current study utilized the DASS 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a), sections of the MFQ (Gilewski et al., 1990; Zelinski 
et al., 1990), and NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) to measure affective distress, 
memory complaints and personality, respectively. These measures emphasise 
slightly different aspects of depression, neuroticism and subjective memory 
appraisals, which may have contributed to differences between the results reported 
here and those reported by Comijs et al. 
An alternative and perhaps more compelling explanation for the contrasting 
results obtained in the current study and by Comijs et al. (2002) is that sample 
characteristics, attributable to the manner in which participants were recruited, may 
have played a role. In the study by Comijs et al., participants were selected at 
random from a larger sample of older adults aged 55 to 85 years that were recruited 
for a large-scale longitudinal project examining well-being and autonomy in the 
elderly (see also, Kliegel & Zimprich, 2005; Kliegel et al., 2005). In contrast, 
participants in the current study were recruited via a newspaper advertisement for a 
study specifically on memory (see Appendix B) and were required to actively seek 
out the researchers in order to participate. This method of recruitment may have 
prompted two key differences in the sample used here. Firstly, given involvement in 
the current study was primarily instigated by the participants, the sample used here 
may have exhibited fewer or less severe symptoms of depression and anxiety than 
those utilized in the study by Comijs et al. (given depression and anxiety can be 
associated with avoidance of situations, loss of interest in activities, and lethargy, see 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Consequently, the study may have 
included fewer participants with levels of affective distress high enough to instigate 
memory complaints to the same degree. Secondly, given the advertisement used for 
recruitment specifically emphasised the topic of memory, the current sample may 
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also have included a higher proportion of participants with genuine worries about 
their memory; the consequence of which would be a stronger association between 
memory complaints and concepts closely associated with worry (i.e., neuroticism). 
The fact that different sampling procedures may have contributed to 
inconsistent results between the current study and those reported by Comijs et al. 
(2002) should not be viewed as a limitation to the current study. Indeed, given the 
methods of recruitment utilized in this study and by Comijs et al., participants in the 
current study may have exhibited greater concern for or interest in their own memory 
performance than those approached for the study by Comijs et al. Consequently, 
participants in the current study may more accurately represent the population of 
community-dwelling older adults who present to health professionals or memory 
clinics with concerns about their memory. 
Given this premise, that community-dwelling older adults who seek 
professional assistance for problems with their memory (whether warranted or not) 
complain more as a result of personality than affective distress, the question still 
remains as to precisely how affective distress, memory complaints and personality 
are, or are not related to one another. Earlier in Chapter 3 a range of possible 
explanations for the association between affective distress and personality were 
reviewed, including the common-cause, predisposition and concomitants models for 
depression and the vulnerability, scar and pathoplasticity hypotheses for anxiety. 
Whilst the results obtained in the current study suggest affective distress and 
memory complaints are not associated with one another beyond characteristics of 
personality, the precise explanation for why this is the case depends on how one 
conceptualizes the relationship between affective distress (i.e., depression and 
anxiety) and personality. Consequently, the following section provides a range of 
possible explanations for why depression/anxiety and memory complaints may not 
be related beyond personality in some older adult groups. These explanations are 
derived directly from the models and hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. 
Depression. Three categories of models have been proposed that attempt to 
account for the association between depression and features of personality. The first 
group of models (common-cause, continuum spectrum, and precursor) all propose 
that depression and personality are not causally related (each for a different reason). 
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The second group of models (predisposition and pathoplasticity) both suggest 
personality causally influences depression severity. Finally, a third group of models 
(the concomitants and consequences/scar) propose that depression causally 
influences the expression of personality. Using the results presented in Chapter 7 and 
each of these groups of models as a framework, the following section provides a 
range of possible explanations for how depression, memory complaints and 
characteristics of personality might be associated with one another. 
The common-cause, continuum spectrum and precursor account. The 
common-cause, continuum spectrum and precursor models all propose that 
depression and personality do not causally influence one another (Klein et al., 2011). 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the common-cause and precursor models propose that 
depression and personality are associated with one another as a result of shared 
etiological factors (e.g., a predisposition to negative thinking due to genetic 
vulnerabilities or learned behaviours). If one is to adopt this viewpoint, then the 
reason depressive symptoms were found not to be related to memory complaints 
beyond personality in the current study is most likely the result of overlapping 
factors that make up depression and personality (primarily neuroticism) that are 
associated with memory complaints. This perspective is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationships between memory complaints, depression and personality in 
the current study, as postulated by the common-cause and precursor models. 
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Given the features of depression and neuroticism assessed by the DASS 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b) and NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), such 
common factors might include higher-than-normal emotional discomfort, low self-
worth and a loss of day-to-day positivity. Given symptoms of anhedonia were found 
to be the specific feature of depression most closely associated with memory 
complaints in the current study, and that they did not remain a useful predictor of 
memory complaints beyond neuroticism (suggesting it was a common factor 
between depression and personality), the loss of positivity or life satisfaction may 
play a key role in memory complaints. Whilst it requires further investigation, 
memory complaints may be more strongly associated with a lack of positive feelings 
than the presence of negative ones (i.e., positivity may buffer against negative self-
appraisals of memory). Also, since features of personality (typically neuroticism) 
generally remained as a significant predictor of memory complaints with measures 
of depression already accounted for, one might also assume that neuroticism is a 
unique predictor of memory complaints beyond the common factors shared with 
depression (see Figure 3). Such features might include increased feelings of worry, 
self-consciousness and nervousness. 
Alternatively, if one is to adopt the view promoted by the 
continuum/spectrum model, then a different perspective must be taken with regard to 
the results obtained in the current study. The continuum/spectrum model proposes 
that depression and personality are simply different ends of the same spectrum (i.e., 
current and ongoing reflections of psychological distress). Akin to the state-trait 
view of psychological distress (Zuckerman, 1983), depressive disorders are viewed 
as a more temporary, state-like experience of distress and personality features (e.g., 
neuroticism) as more permanent, trait-like characteristics. Given the results obtained 
in the current study (i.e., that depressive symptomatology did not significantly 
predict memory complaints beyond features of personality), proponents of the 
continuum/spectrum model would argue that memory complaints are associated 
more with ongoing features of psychological distress (i.e., those tied to personality). 
Since personality measures in the current study were useful predictors of memory 
complaints with depression measures already partialled out of the regression model, 
one could assume that ongoing aspects of psychological distress appear to impact on 
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memory complaints in a way temporary aspects of distress (e.g., symptoms of 
depression) do not. Furthermore, the model accounts well for why depression offers 
little or no additional explanation of memory complaints beyond personality (since 
they both make up the same spectrum). The manner in which depression and 
personality were found to be related to memory complaints in the current study, as 
perceived via the continuum/spectrum model, is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Relationships between memory complaints, depression and personality in 
the current study, as postulated by the continuum/spectrum model. 
The predisposition and pathoplasticity account. Unlike the common-cause, 
continuum/spectrum and precursor models, the predisposition and pathoplasticity 
models both propose that personality influences depression (Klein et al., 2011). The 
predisposition model states that personality impacts on depression status via various 
mediating factors (e.g., dysfunctional relationships) in addition to the effect of 
genetic and environmental factors. Alternatively, the pathoplasticity model proposes 
that personality influences the expression of depression (e.g., its presentation, 
response to treatment, chronicity and severity), rather than depression itself. 
From the perspective of the predisposition model then, the results of the 
current study can only be interpreted as reflecting the absence of a direct relationship 
between depression and memory complaints. Given the relationship between 
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depression and memory complaints diminished almost to zero when personality 
(primarily neuroticism) was entered into the model, it suggests memory complaints 
and depression are only associated with one another on account of both being 
associated (directly or indirectly) with personality. That is, in the same way ice-
cream sales and drowning rates are associated with one another on account of 
changes in weather activity, the predisposition model (along with the current set of 
results) suggests depression severity and memory complaints are only related via 
personality. For example, older adults exhibiting higher levels of neuroticism would, 
on average, exhibit an increased vulnerability to depression (via mediating factors, 
such as dysfunctional relationships) as well as complain more about their memory. 
Consequently, depression and memory complaints will shift in unison with one 
another with fluctuations in neuroticism between participants, without necessarily 
being directly related to one another. Presumably a range of other factors influence 
only depression vulnerability or memory complaints as well, and this may account 
somewhat for the relatively large proportion of unexplained variance in memory 
complaints beyond depression status. The manner in which the predisposition model 
can account for the results obtained in the current study is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Relationships between memory complaints, depression and personality in 
the current study, as postulated by the predisposition model. 
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The pathoplasticity model provides a similar account to the predisposition 
model for why depression and memory complaints were not found to be associated 
with one another beyond personality in the current study, with one important 
difference. If viewing the current set of results through the pathoplasticity model, 
one must again accept that depression and memory complaints are not causally 
linked, though the reasoning for this is vastly different to that of the predisposition 
model. The predisposition model implies that depression is only associated with 
memory complaints because both are associated (directly or indirectly) with features 
of personality (particularly neuroticism). However, the pathoplasticity model differs 
from the predisposition model in that personality is said only to influence how 
depression presents, not the subjective experience of depression itself (see Figure 6). 
Thus, the substantial loss of value for depression as a predictor of memory 
complaints when personality features are entered into the model cannot be accounted 
for by its relationship with personality (since the pathoplasticity model proposes that 
no such relationship exists). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Relationships between memory complaints, depression and personality in 
the current study, as postulated by the pathoplasticity model. 
With regard to the results reported for the current study then, the 
pathoplasticity model might be seen to suggest that memory complaints are 
associated only with how depression is expressed, rather than the subjective 
experience of depression itself. This interpretation would account well for why in 
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some analyses the relationship between depression and memory complaints also 
failed to materialize when personality measures besides neuroticism (e.g., 
extraversion) were added to the model. If one is to accept that depression is an entity 
distinct from personality (even if we assume they are causally related), then it is 
possible that features of personality may impact on the expression of depression in 
different ways without necessarily influencing the risk of experiencing it. For 
example, higher levels of conscientiousness may serve to minimise the presentation 
of fatigue (since highly conscientious individuals might put in additional effort to 
overcome it), despite subjective reports suggesting more severe levels of depression. 
Either way, whether one assumes that personality impacts directly on depression 
(predisposition model) or only on how it is expressed (pathoplasticity model), both 
models could be used to argue that depression is not directly related to memory 
complaints. 
The concomitants and consequences/scar account. The third group of 
models that attempt to explain the relationship between personality and depression 
includes the concomitants and consequences/scar models. As with the predisposition 
and pathoplasticity models, the concomitants and consequences/scar models also 
hypothesize that a causal relationship exists between personality and depression. 
However, rather than personality influencing depression or the manner in which it is 
expressed, this third group of models suggest depression exhibits a causal influence 
on personality. The concomitants model posits that the presence of depression or 
associated symptoms alters the presentation of personality characteristics. During 
periods of poor mental health, personality traits associated with depression (e.g., 
neuroticism) intensify. According to the concomitants model, these changes are 
temporary and personality returns to its stable baseline when mental health improves 
and symptoms of depression subside. Alternatively, the consequences/scar model 
suggests depression also alters personality, but that these changes are long-lasting, 
possibly permanent. 
Whether the changes to personality resulting from depression are temporary 
(as specified in the concomitants model) or permanent (as specified in the 
consequences/scar model) is irrelevant when interpreting the results obtained in the 
current study. For this reason, the models are not differentiated here. Effectively, 
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what both models suggest with regard to the results obtained in the current study is 
that personality mediates the entire relationship between depression and memory 
complaints. That is, depression alters features of personality, which in turn impact on 
memory complaints (see Figure 7). If one is to adopt the interpretation offered by the 
concomitants and consequences/scar models, then a causal relationship between 
depression and memory complaints (albeit mediated by personality) cannot be ruled 
out. However, one can rule out the possibility that personality and memory 
complaints are related only on account of both being influenced by depression, given 
an association between personality and memory complaints exists beyond the role of 
depression. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Relationships between memory complaints, depression and personality in 
the current study, as postulated by the concomitants and consequences/scar models. 
In summary, the results of the current study that reflect the relationships 
between depression, personality and memory complaints can be interpreted in a 
number of different ways depending on how the association between depression and 
personality is viewed. Indeed, almost all of the models attempting to account for the 
relationship between depression and personality offer a different explanation for the 
results obtained in the current study. If one is to adopt the view offered by the 
common-cause and precursor models, then the lack of association between memory 
complaints and depression must result from overlap between causal mechanisms 
between depression and personality that contribute to memory complaints. From the 
perspective of the continuum/spectrum model, one could assume that memory 
complaints are simply associated more strongly with ongoing features of distress 
(i.e., neurotic tendencies) than temporary features (such as those observed in 
depressive episodes). 
Alternatively, if the predisposition model is adopted, then the current set of 
results suggest that memory complaints and depression are only associated with one 
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another on account of their associations with personality (i.e., depression shares no 
causal relationship with memory complaints). Proponents of the pathoplasticity 
model, however, would argue that memory complaints are associated only with the 
expression of depression and not depression itself. Given this reasoning, one must 
again accept that depression and memory complaints are not directly related. The 
third group of models, which includes the concomitants and consequences/scar 
models, does not rule out the possibility of a causal relationship between depression 
and memory complaints, but does suggest that if such a causal relationship exists, 
then it is entirely mediated by personality characteristics. Whilst the results of the 
current study can be conceptualized in a number of different ways, all models can 
offer an explanation for why depression was found not to be a useful predictor of 
memory complaints beyond personality in the current study. 
Anxiety. In this next section, the four models that attempt to account for the 
relationship between anxiety and personality (reviewed in Chapter 3) are used as a 
framework to explain the results relevant to anxiety that are reported in Chapter 7. 
Whilst the arguments made in models that attempt to explain the relationship 
between personality and anxiety are conceptually very similar to those used to 
explain the relationship between personality and depression, they are discussed 
separately here given the features of anxiety relevant to personality and memory 
complaints are qualitatively different from the features of depression relevant to 
personality and memory complaints. Four different hypotheses that attempt to 
explain the relationship between anxiety and personality have been proposed: the 
vulnerability hypothesis, the scar hypothesis, the pathoplasty hypothesis, and the 
common-cause hypothesis. The following section uses each of these hypotheses as a 
framework to explain the results obtained in the current study pertaining to the 
relationships between anxiety, personality and memory complaints. 
The vulnerability account. The explanation for the relationship between 
anxiety and personality provided by the vulnerability hypothesis is effectively the 
same as that used to explain the association between depression and personality in 
the predisposition model. As its name suggests, the vulnerability hypothesis states 
that personality characteristics have the potential to put one at an increased risk of 
affective distress and associated mental health problems (Andersen & Bienvenu, 
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2011). For example, low levels of extraversion may increase the risk of social 
phobia, given it may impede participation in social interaction and lead to a 
preference for seclusion. An explanation of the results obtained in the current study 
provided by the vulnerability hypothesis is presented in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Relationships between memory complaints, anxiety and personality in the 
current study, as postulated by the vulnerability hypothesis. 
As is the case with the predisposition model, the results of the current study 
can only be interpreted as reflecting the absence of a direct relationship between 
affective distress and memory complaints when viewed through the vulnerability 
hypothesis. Given the relationship between anxiety and memory complaints 
diminished almost completely when personality measures were entered into the 
model, it suggests that the relationship only exists on account of their association 
with personality. Of the five measures of personality included in the current study, 
anxiety was predominantly associated with neuroticism (see Appendix G). Thus, a 
plausible explanation for the results obtained in the current study based on the 
vulnerability hypothesis is that higher levels of worry exhibited by participants with 
elevated levels of neuroticism might contribute to both an increased risk of anxiety 
and more frequent or severe complaints about memory. 
However, whilst this explanation may account for why measures of anxiety 
typically failed to predict memory complaints beyond personality in most cases, it 
cannot account for the results obtained with regard to symptoms of situational 
anxiety. In the current study, the presence of symptoms of situational anxiety 
remained a significant predictor of memory complaints assessed via GFF scores even 
with neuroticism scale scores also in the model. Only when the remaining pertinent 
measures of personality (extraversion, openness and conscientiousness) were entered 
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into the model did situational anxiety fail to reach significance as a predictor of GFF 
scores. In this case then, rather than an underlying tendency to worry being the 
reason for why anxiety failed to predict memory complaints beyond personality, self-
confidence (strongly associated with extraversion, see Cheng & Furnham, 2002) 
and/or a tendency to be self-critical (possibly associated with conscientiousness) may 
explain the loss of predictive value of anxiety beyond personality. Whatever the 
case, the results are still consistent with the notion that memory complaints are not 
related to depression beyond the relationship they exhibit with features of 
personality. 
The scar account. The argument regarding anxiety and personality put 
forward in the scar hypothesis is analogous to that proposed in the consequences/scar 
model to account for the relationship between personality and depression. That is, 
personality and anxiety are said to exhibit a relationship because above-normal 
levels of anxiety change (or ‘scar’) personality. Where the vulnerability hypothesis 
would maintain that higher levels of extraversion buffer against social phobia 
through additional opportunities for habituation, the scar hypothesis would attribute 
this association to the effect of social phobia on levels of extraversion. That is, 
continued exposure to the anxiety associated with social phobia would discourage 
involvement in social activities that is typically reflected in individuals exhibiting 
high levels of extraversion. The manner in which anxiety, personality and memory 
complaints are purportedly linked in the scar hypothesis (in combination with the 
results of the current study) is depicted in Figure 9. 
  
 
Figure 9. Relationships between memory complaints, anxiety and personality in the 
current study, as postulated by the scar hypothesis. 
For the scar hypothesis, the results obtained in the current study must be 
interpreted as a reflection of anxiety impacting only on personality (i.e., not directly 
on memory complaints), which in turn impacts on memory complaints. For all 
regression analyses but one, anxiety symptoms (whether overall or specific) were 
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found not to be associated with memory complaints beyond neuroticism. These 
results likely reflect the notion that anxiety simply constitutes a core component of 
neuroticism (Jylha & Isometsa, 2006). Thus, anxiety is simply echoed in relevant 
aspects of personality, leading to more frequent or severe memory complaints. 
An exception to this explanation of the current set of results is that symptoms 
of situational anxiety remained a significant predictor of memory complaints beyond 
neuroticism. Situational anxiety, as defined by the DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995a), refers to anxiety pertaining to one or more specific tasks or events. It may be 
the case then, that the anxiety exhibited in neuroticism that is detected by the NEO-
FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) is more generalized and that anxiety pertaining to 
specific situations may usefully predict memory complaints beyond personality. 
Indeed, there is nothing to discount the possibility that the specific situations in 
which (some) participants felt situational anxiety were tasks associated with memory 
(e.g., difficulty recalling the names of newly-met acquaintances). Evidently, this 
might reflect a specific form of anxiety within memory complaints that is not 
exhibited in neuroticism measured via the NEO-FFI. 
The pathoplasty account. Like the predisposition and pathoplasticity models 
that attempt to account for the association between personality and depression, the 
pathoplasty hypothesis suggests that personality and anxiety are not causally related, 
but indirectly associated with one another via the impact of personality on factors 
associated with anxiety. For example, extraversion is not a cause or the result of 
anxiety prompted by social situations. Instead, the pathoplasty hypothesis suggests 
that extraversion might impact on the likelihood of attending a social situation, but 
not directly on the subjective experience of anxiety itself. The relationships between 
anxiety, personality and memory complaints in the current study, as accounted for by 
the pathoplasty hypothesis, are presented in Figure 10. 
With regard to the results obtained in the current study, advocates of the 
pathoplasty model would argue that anxiety shares no causal relationship with 
memory complaints (direct or indirect). Rather personality could be seen as 
influencing the appearance or expression of anxiety, as well as exhibiting a direct 
influence on memory complaints. The results pertaining to symptoms of situational 
anxiety again suggest that they may be of some predictive value for memory 
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complaints beyond levels of neuroticism, though not beyond personality in its 
entirety. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Relationships between memory complaints, anxiety and personality in the 
current study, as postulated by the pathoplasty hypothesis. 
The common-cause account. The final hypothesis discussed here that 
attempts to account for the relationship between anxiety and personality, and that can 
be applied to the results in the current study, is the common-cause hypothesis. The 
explanation offered by the common-cause hypothesis for why anxiety and 
personality are associated with one another is analogous to that used to explain the 
relationship between personality and depression (see Figure 3). That is, anxiety and 
relevant features of personality are said to have a similar set of etiological factors 
(both genetic and environmental). Consequently, anxiety and some features of 
personality (e.g., neuroticism and extraversion) are associated, yet exhibit no causal 
influence on one another. This notion, as well as how this might play a role in 
memory complaints in older adults, is depicted in Figure 11. 
With regard to memory complaints then, the common-cause hypothesis 
would suggest that anxiety is not a useful predictor of memory complaints beyond 
personality due to overlap in the factors that are associated with memory complaints. 
That is, the aspects of anxiety that are useful for predicting memory complaints are 
also common to personality (predominantly neuroticism). Given the instruments 
utilized to assess anxiety and personality in the current study, factors relevant to 
memory complaints that are common to both anxiety and personality might include 
above normal levels of emotional discomfort as well as feeling tense or nervous. 
Such factors would likely make anxiety a useful predictor of memory complaints on 
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its own, but would tend to provide little value if neuroticism was also included in the 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Relationships between memory complaints, anxiety and personality in the 
current study, as postulated by the common-cause hypothesis. 
A hidden variable account. One other possibility that has not yet been 
considered is the view that one or more variables may underlie all relationships 
between personality, affective distress and memory complaints. That is, personality, 
affective distress and memory complaints may not exhibit causal relationships with 
one another in any direction but rather all share one or more common underlying 
determinants that forge a relationship between them. Little effort has been directed 
towards understanding how personality, affective distress and memory complaints 
interact with one another as a system and so little or no research has investigated 
whether a hidden variable account might adequately explain the complex 
associations between them. Such underlying hidden factors might include, for 
example, features associated with self-esteem, self-confidence or self-concept. 
Literature suggests self-esteem is associated with memory complaints (Crane et al., 
2007; Pearman & Storandt, 2004), affective distress (Sowislo & Orth, 2013) and 
personality (Erdle, Irwing, Rushton, & Park, 2010; Zeigler-Hill, Besser, Myers, 
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Southard, & Malkin, 2013), so a hidden variable account will likely explain at least 
part of the associations between them. 
A more likely explanation though (given all models and hypotheses are 
supported to some degree by the available evidence) is that a rather complex 
arrangement of direct and indirect influences as well as shared genetic, 
environmental and underlying hidden factors contributes to the relationships 
amongst memory complaints, affective distress and personality. One could envisage 
a scenario whereby genetic and environmental factors contribute to personality and 
affective distress, which in turn influence each other. In addition, underlying hidden 
variables such as self-esteem and self-concept (also determined by genetic and 
environmental factors) influence personality, affective distress and the frequency and 
severity of memory complaints. Such a model could not only account for the 
relationships between personality and affective distress (given the extent of shared 
determinants) but also for the relatively weak associations with memory complaints 
(given that the model specifies that complaints are spuriously linked to affective 
distress and personality, and that hidden variables might contribute to personality, 
affective distress and memory complaints in different ways). Figure 12 depicts this 
set of relationships. 
With regard to the results obtained in the current study, this hidden factors 
model would suggest that the relationships memory complaints exhibit with affective 
distress and personality are both spurious and that personality only remains a 
significant predictor of memory complaints with affective distress already in the 
model because hidden underlying variables (e.g., self-esteem) are not accounted for. 
One might also infer that anxiety and depression are not useful predictors of memory 
complaints in older adults beyond personality simply because aspects of the hidden 
variables that influence both memory complaints and affective distress also influence 
both memory complaints and personality. Furthermore, additional features of hidden 
variables may link memory complaints and personality that are not observed with 
memory complaints and affective distress (given features of personality are 
predictive of memory complaints even when affective distress is accounted for). 
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Figure 12. Model linking memory complaints, affective distress and personality via 
genetic, environmental and underlying hidden factors. 
Applied Versus Global Memory Complaints 
The third research question addressed by the current study pertains to 
whether the relationship between affective distress and memory complaints beyond 
personality differs according to the manner in which memory complaints are 
assessed. A clear divide exists in the literature regarding how memory complaints 
are assessed (i.e., globally or applied), though little effort has been invested in 
systematically investigating the impact of this on associations with affective distress. 
Research reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests consistent results regardless of how 
memory complaints are assessed. That is, affective distress typically shares medium-
strength relationships with memory complaints irrespective of whether complaints 
are evaluated globally or in applied settings. However, whether the method for 
assessing memory complaints remains irrelevant when personality is also 
incorporated is yet to be examined. 
The results of the current study primarily suggest that the manner in which 
memory complaints are assessed is not an important factor when examining the 
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relationship between affective distress and memory complaints beyond personality. 
With the exception of overall anxiety status as a predictor of global memory 
complaints, all measures of affective distress were found to be related to memory 
complaints prior to incorporating personality or other relevant variables into the 
relationship (see Appendix G). Zero-order Pearson correlations between applied 
memory complaints assessed via the GFF scale and overall depression status (r = -
.18), anhedonia (r = -.20), overall anxiety status (r = -.15) and situational anxiety (r 
= -.26) suggest weak to medium-strength relationships between general and specific 
features of affective distress and memory complaints applied to specific situations 
(e.g., recalling names or phone numbers). For high versus low memory complaints 
measured via responses to a single global memory complaint question, Phi 
coefficients suggest weak associations with overall depression status (ϕ = .16), 
anhedonia (ϕ = .19) and situational anxiety (ϕ = .17), but no significant relationship 
with overall anxiety status (ϕ = .10), despite being in the expected direction. 
Given Pearson correlations and Phi coefficients can be interpreted in much 
the same way when Phi coefficients are calculated for two binary variables 
(Guildford, 1936), the correlations with the GFF scale and with the dichotomised, 
high versus low global measure can be compared directly with one another. The 
results suggest that regardless of whether memory complaints are assessed via 
applied situations or a single, dichotomised global complaint measure, little 
difference is exhibited in the relationship between memory complaints and 
depression (or symptoms of it). However, a small impact may exist when observing 
relationships with anxiety (and specific symptoms of it). Correlations with memory 
complaints were almost identical for depression status and anhedonia, regardless of 
how complaints were assessed. For anxiety, however, the correlations for overall 
anxiety status and situational anxiety were marginally stronger when complaints 
were assessed via the GFF scale. 
With regard to the relationship between memory complaints and affective 
distress beyond personality, the manner in which memory complaints were assessed 
still had little bearing on observed relationships. No measure of affective distress 
(overall or specific) was found to significantly predict memory complaints (either on 
the GFF scale or for the dichotomized high vs. low group) beyond all pertinent 
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features of personality. Situational anxiety was a significant predictor of GFF scores, 
but not (high vs. low) memory complaint status, beyond neuroticism levels. 
However, it still failed to reach significance when other measures of personality 
were entered into the model. Thus, whether complaints were assessed via the GFF 
scale or a high-low dichotomy had little effect on whether affective distress was 
found to be associated with complaints beyond personality. 
In summary, the findings with regard to research question three suggests that 
whether memory complaints are assessed via applied or global measures does not 
drastically influence relationships with affective distress. A non-significant 
relationship was found between overall anxiety status and the global measure of 
memory complaint, though the effect size values suggest only a very small 
difference from the effect size found between overall anxiety status and GFF scores. 
This result is consistent with the findings reported in Chapter 2, which suggest 
studies assessing memory complaints via global measures (e.g., Clarnette et al., 
2001; Jorm et al., 2004; Jungwirth et al., 2004) have obtained results that are largely 
consistent with studies that assess memory complaints via applied measures (e.g., 
Dux et al., 2008; Potter & Hartman, 2006; Potter et al., 2009). The results for the 
current study further suggest that utilizing different measures of complaint remains 
unimportant even when considering these relationships within the context of 
personality. 
However, these results may differ depending on the content utilized in 
applied measures to gauge memory complaints. The GFF scale assesses complaints 
primarily in the context of normal everyday behaviours such as recalling names, 
directions, phone numbers and recently read material. Such behaviours would likely 
be related to affective distress very differently compared to behaviours with a 
stronger affective component, such as when recall is more pressured (e.g., during 
public speaking or during performance assessment when applying for a job). The 
GFF scale touches on some of these behaviours (e.g., losing thread of thought during 
public speaking), though most questions on the scale have a minimal affective 
component. For this reason, the conclusion offered here that how memory 
complaints are assessed is not pertinent to their associations with affective distress 
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(either alone or in the context of personality) is limited to complaints associated with 
everyday behaviours that contain minimal affective content. 
Features of Personality Pertinent to Memory Complaints 
To fully appreciate why affective distress was found not to be a useful 
predictor of memory complaints (either applied or global) beyond personality in the 
current study, it is important to address what particular features of personality were 
pertinent to memory complaints. That is, understanding precisely how personality is 
associated with memory complaints in older adults may help to clarify its impact on 
the association between complaints and affective distress. Various researchers have 
proposed different explanations for why complaints may be associated with 
personality (e.g., Pearman & Storandt, 2004, 2005; Slavin et al., 2010). 
Consequently, together with the results of the current study, the following section 
highlights previous explanations (and offers possible new alternatives) for why the 
association between affective distress and memory complaints may not exist beyond 
specific features of personality in some older adult populations. 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, some previous studies have promoted the view 
that anxiety impacts either directly or indirectly on memory complaints (e.g., Dux et 
al., 2008; Slavin et al., 2010). Slavin et al., for example, suggested that anxiety may 
not be directly related to memory complaints but rather indirectly associated via 
memory performance. That is, anxiety may impact adversely on memory 
performance, which in turn leads to more frequent or severe complaints about 
memory. Other studies, such as that by Dux et al., have put forward the view that 
anxiety impacts directly on memory complaints, such that more anxiety simply 
contributes to more frequent or severe reports of memory problems without being 
mediated by a another variable. 
In addition, an earlier study by Pearman and Storandt (2004) proposed that 
the relationship between memory complaints and neuroticism may be attributable to 
anxiety, given it forms a core component of neuroticism. In the context of the results 
obtained in the current study, this might suggest that regardless of how personality 
and affective distress are related to one another, anxiety as a form of affective 
distress makes no additional contribution to memory complaints beyond anxiety 
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associated with levels of neuroticism. Certainly there is no reason (logically or 
empirically) to assume that anxiety as a form of affective distress is in any way a 
distinct experience to the anxiety captured by measures of neuroticism, so anxiety 
may offer no additional predictive value for memory complaints beyond neuroticism 
simply because of an overlap between symptoms of affective distress and features of 
personality. 
Despite this possibility, neuroticism typically remained a significant predictor 
of memory complaints beyond anxiety status and anxiety symptoms in the current 
study, suggesting anxiety alone may not sufficiently explain the association between 
neuroticism and complaints. Neuroticism encompasses a number of other features in 
addition to anxiety, including depressive features, self-consciousness and 
vulnerability to stress (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It is possible that features of 
depression contribute to memory complaints beyond anxiety, although results from 
the current study suggest neuroticism typically remains a significant predictor of 
memory complaints beyond depression status and associated features as well. An 
increased vulnerability to stress is certainly associated with both anxiety and 
depression as defined by the American Psychiatric Association in the DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), although self-consciousness need not be. 
Thus, one possibility is that feelings of self-consciousness associated with 
neuroticism, in addition to anxiety, contribute to memory complaints in older 
adulthood and that this is the reason neuroticism remains a significant predictor of 
complaints beyond affective distress. 
The idea that self-consciousness contributes to memory complaints in 
addition to anxiety was supported in a follow-up study by Pearman and Storandt 
(2005). The study reported that self-consciousness (a facet of neuroticism that was 
assessed via the NEO PI, Costa & McCrae, 1992) remained a significant predictor of 
memory complaints (assessed via the Memory Assessment Clinic's Self-Rating 
Scale, Crook & Larrabee, 1992), even when a measure of anxiety (also assessed via 
the NEO PI) was also included. In addition, the measure of anxiety also remained a 
significant predictor of complaints. Thus, the results support the notion that anxiety, 
as well as additional facets of neuroticism (i.e., self-consciousness), both make 
unique contributions to memory complaints. These unique contributions emerged 
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even after accounting for a specific feature of conscientiousness (self-discipline), 
self-esteem and objective memory performance assessed via the Logical Memory 
subtest of the WMS-III (Wechsler, 1997). 
Whilst neuroticism remained an important predictor of memory complaints 
across most of the analyses conducted in this study, it was not a significant unique 
predictor of complaints when predicting global (high vs. low) memory complaint 
status. There are two likely explanations for why this might be the case. Firstly, 
given the relationship is in the expected direction, failure to reach significance may 
simply be attributable to a lack of statistical power on account of weak associations 
that are often observed between variables in this literature. Given the complexity of 
memory complaints and the number of factors that likely influence them, using more 
general measures of complaints (i.e., removing situation or scenario specificity) may 
simply ‘water down’ these associations even further. In the same way that specific 
features of neuroticism can be a better predictor of memory complaints than overall 
measures neuroticism (Pearman & Storandt, 2005), complaints pertaining to specific 
situations may be more strongly tied to personality and affective distress than general 
complaints. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that memory complaints assessed within a 
given situation more readily trigger thoughts and feelings associated with 
neuroticism (or specific features of it, such as anxiety or self-consciousness) than do 
memory complaints assessed more generally. Perhaps memory complaints assessed 
in a particular context (e.g., public speaking) or in relation to specific behaviours 
(e.g., reading) provide a stronger cue for past experiences during which feelings 
associated with neuroticism (e.g., anxiety or self-consciousness) were felt. It is 
certainly possible that global complaints may tap into more general cognitive 
appraisals of one’s own abilities and that applied complaints may more closely 
reflect past experiences that contribute to these general appraisals. Further study 
would certainly help to clarify this. 
As with previous studies (e.g., Pearman & Storandt, 2004, 2005), the results 
obtained in the current study also found conscientiousness to be a useful predictor of 
memory complaints when complaints are assessed via applied settings (both earlier 
studies used sections of the Memory Assessment Clinic’s Self-Rating Scale, Crook 
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& Larrabee, 1992). Conscientiousness reflects a combination of a range of different 
tendencies, including being organized, methodical, disciplined, efficient, neat and 
careful (Pearman & Storandt, 2005; Thompson, 2008). Pearman and Storandt (2005) 
found self-discipline to be an important predictor of memory complaints in applied 
settings but also stated that there is no clear, logical explanation for the association. 
Indeed, their results suggest the relationship is not mediated by memory performance 
(whereby self-discipline might improve memory performance, which in turn might 
lower complaints). One possibility not entertained by Pearman and Storandt is that 
self-discipline may foster positive self-esteem (and vice versa), which may in turn 
improve evaluations of oneself (including memory). 
Whilst the results reported here support earlier research that indicates 
conscientiousness is related to applied memory complaint measures, the current 
study found conscientiousness not to be a useful predictor of memory complaints 
when assessed via a single global complaint question. Regardless of which measure 
of affective distress was included in the model (depression status, anxiety status, 
anhedonia or situational anxiety), conscientiousness was not found to be a significant 
unique predictor of high versus low global memory complaint status. This result was 
consistent across all regression analyses. 
In addition to clear differences in how conscientiousness is related to applied 
versus global complaints (with regard to statistical significance) in the context of 
other variables included in this study, clear differences can also be seen when 
examining zero-order relationships. Without considering the influence of other 
variables, conscientiousness shared a much stronger association with applied 
memory complaints assessed via the GFF scale (r = .34, p < .001) than with memory 
complaints assessed via a global complaint measure (r = -.12, p > .05). Whilst this 
was also the case for the remaining measures of personality used in the current study, 
this was not the case for the associations between memory complaints and memory 
performance, which showed little difference in their associations (see Appendix G). 
Therefore, whilst the weaker association with global memory complaints may in part 
be attributable to global complaints providing a less reliable or valid measure, it is 
certainly also possible that conscientiousness (like neuroticism) asserts more 
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influence on complaints when judgements on one’s own performance are made in a 
specific context or with regard to specific behaviours. 
For the current study, a third feature of personality found to be as important 
as (if not more important than) neuroticism and conscientiousness in the context of 
memory complaints, was extraversion. Evidence regarding the relationship between 
memory complaints and extraversion in previous research is mixed (cf. Jorm et al., 
2004; Perrig-Chiello, Perrig, & Stahelin, 2000; Ramakers et al., 2009; Vestberg, 
Passant, Risberg, & Elfgren, 2007), though there has been little or no evidence for a 
contribution of extraversion to memory complaints beyond other pertinent measures 
of personality, affective distress and cognitive function. 
Extraversion, like conscientiousness, is comprised of features and behaviours 
that on face value would not logically exhibit an influence on memory complaints. 
Extraversion is characterised by talkativeness and a tendency to be outgoing and 
energetic (Thompson, 2008). One possibility, however, is that higher levels of 
extraversion are predictive of a more active lifestyle in older adulthood. Recent 
evidence suggests that a more active lifestyle assists with maintaining cognitive 
function (Paillard-Borg, Fratiglioni, Xu, Winblad, & Wang, 2012; Sofi et al., 2011), 
which in turn may reduce complaints about memory. Another possibility is that a 
third variable or group of variables underlie this relationship. Self-esteem, for 
example, is associated with both measures of extraversion (e.g., Robins, Tracy, 
Trzesniewski, Potter, & Gosling, 2001) and memory complaints (e.g., Crane et al., 
2007). Consistent with the hidden variable account discussed earlier, the relationship 
between extraversion and memory complaints may be partly or entirely explained by 
their relationship with other variables, such as self-esteem and self-confidence. 
A fourth feature of personality that also demonstrated some value in 
predicting memory complaints in the current study was openness. Openness to 
experience captures a wide variety of behavioural patterns but it is perhaps best 
characterized by a tendency to be creative, intellectually minded, intelligent, and to 
approach things with a philosophical disposition (Thompson, 2008). Openness to 
experience is associated with greater intelligence, which may be reflected in greater 
memory performance (and consequently, fewer or less severe memory complaints). 
Apart from these distant connections, however, there is little justification for 
186 
 
examining openness within the context of memory complaints. Possibly for this 
reason, there is little evidence available regarding its relevance to memory 
complaints in older adulthood in previous research. Vestberg et al. (2007) reported 
that openness was of little use for differentiating between those with and without 
objective memory impairment but there is little or no evidence examining the role of 
openness to experience in memory complaints in healthy older adult populations. 
In the current study, openness to experience accounted for a significant 
amount of unique variance in memory complaints assessed via the GFF scale, 
regardless of the measure of affective distress being examined. Its unique 
contribution to the models predicting GFF scores was small but consistent (partial 
correlations were typically around .20). In addition, the zero-order correlation 
between openness to experience and GFF scores (r = .21, p < .01, see Appendix G) 
suggested a small to medium-strength association between them. In contrast, 
openness to experience exhibited almost no predictive value and no zero-order 
association with memory complaints assessed globally. For all four models 
predicting global memory complaint status, openness to experience failed to reach 
significance. In addition, the zero-order correlation between them also suggests little 
or no association (r = -.01, p < .05, see Appendix G). Again, the discrepancy in how 
openness to experience is related to applied and global complaints may be 
attributable to how effectively the different measures capture the notion of memory 
complaints, or it may be reflective of personality features asserting more influence 
on complaints when they are assessed in a specific context. 
Why openness to experience shared an association with applied memory 
complaints in the current study is less clear. It is conceivable that intelligence (which 
was associated with openness to experience, see Appendix G) might contribute to 
greater memory performance and therefore reduce complaints about memory. 
However, it is unlikely that this small contribution would have persisted beyond the 
introduction of (years of) education into the model (given education is also strongly 
associated with intelligence, see Matarazzo & Herman, 1984). Including years of 
education in two of the models made little difference to the unique contribution of 
openness, suggesting openness to experience might be associated with memory 
complaints via a path other than one that involves intelligence. 
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Another possibility is that the association between openness to experience 
and applied memory complaints is also attributable to one or more hidden variables, 
such as self-confidence. Lack of self-confidence might hamper openness (via a need 
to avoid potentially shameful experiences), whilst also leading to less favourable 
evaluations of one’s own memory abilities. This explanation, however, does not 
account for the absence of a relationship between openness to experience and global 
memory complaints (which logically should be subject to self-confidence as well). 
Perhaps memory complaints assessed in the context of specific situations are more 
sensitive to attributes like self-confidence. Further research on the association 
between openness to experience and memory complaints is required, firstly with 
regard to whether the association continues to materialize, and if so, why it exists. 
Such research would benefit from a more detailed evaluation of openness, such as 
that provided by the NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1985) or NEO PI-R (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992). 
The final feature of personality incorporated into the current study, which 
demonstrated little or no value in predicting memory complaints beyond other 
variables included in the study, was agreeableness. Agreeableness was not found to 
be a significant predictor of either applied or global memory complaints in any of the 
multiple regression models. However, it did exhibit small to medium-strength zero-
order relationships with both applied (r = .22, p < .01) and global (r = -.16, p < .05) 
memory complaints. The most likely explanation for why agreeableness failed to 
predict memory complaints in the regression models is that it exhibited small to 
medium-strength correlations with neuroticism (r = -.22, p < .01), extraversion (r = 
.24, p < .01) and conscientiousness (r = .19, p < .05). Thus, any small contribution to 
the prediction of memory complaints that agreeableness may have been able to make 
was likely already accounted for by other measures of personality previously entered 
into the model. 
In summary then, several features of personality contributed to memory 
complaints measured both in an applied context and more globally. Consistent with 
previous literature (Pearman & Storandt, 2004, 2005; Slavin et al., 2010), 
neuroticism was a useful predictor of memory complaints assessed in applied 
settings. Neuroticism did not, however, uniquely contribute to the prediction of a 
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global memory complaint measure, which may be partly attributable to such 
complaints failing to adequately tap into previous experiences that triggered feelings 
associated with neuroticism (e.g., anxiety or self-consciousness). As with 
neuroticism, conscientiousness played a role in applied memory complaints but also 
failed to uniquely contribute to global memory complaints. Again, this may be partly 
attributable to global complaints failing to activate memories of previous experiences 
associated with conscientiousness. 
Contrary to expectation, (higher) extraversion uniquely predicted (lower) 
memory complaints across more of the regression models than both neuroticism and 
conscientiousness. Extraversion was a significant predictor of applied memory 
complaints across all models, regardless of the measures of affective distress, 
personality and contextual variables also included. It was also a significant predictor 
of global memory complaints in models that included overall anxiety status and 
anhedonia. However, only LM factor scores predicted global memory complaints 
beyond overall depression status and situational anxiety. Whilst evidence for the role 
of extraversion in memory complaints is mixed, a hidden variable account that 
includes self-esteem or self-confidence may partly explain the relationship between 
them. 
Another feature of personality found to be a useful predictor of (higher) 
memory complaints in the current study was (lower levels of) openness to 
experience. Unlike extraversion, openness to experience was only predictive of 
applied memory complaints assessed via the GFF scale. Partial correlations indicated 
a relatively small contribution of openness to GFF scores, although significance 
testing indicated a consistent unique contribution. The underlying reason openness to 
experience exhibits an association with applied memory complaints is still not clear. 
However, one possible explanation is that memory complaints assessed in the 
context of specific situations are more sensitive to attributes like self-confidence. As 
a result, lower self-confidence might lead to more frequent or severe complaints of 
memory (in applied settings) as well as reduced openness to experience (in an 
attempt to avoid any potentially distressing or shameful experiences). 
The final measure of personality utilized in the current study, agreeableness, 
was the only feature of personality that failed to uniquely contribute to memory 
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complaints in any of the regression models. This may be largely attributable to 
overlap with other features of personality included in the analyses, given significant 
zero-order correlations were found between agreeableness and both applied and 
global memory complaints. Across all analyses undertaken in the current study, one 
rational explanation for why neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience and 
conscientiousness were found to be associated with memory complaints (mostly in 
an applied context), is that one or more underlying variables contributes to all of 
them. Self-esteem or self-consciousness, for example, may exhibit an influence on 
various aspects of personality as well as memory complaints, which may contribute 
to the associations observed in the current study (and, indeed, in previous studies). 
Contextual Variables Pertinent to Memory Complaints 
 Results regarding the role of the contextual variables in the regression models 
were, for the most part, very consistent. Of the six contextual variables incorporated 
into the current study (i.e., age, gender, education, premorbid intelligence, verbal 
memory performance and non-verbal memory performance), age, gender, premorbid 
intelligence and non-verbal memory performance played little or no role in 
predicting memory complaints, or in suppressing the relationship between memory 
complaints and measures of affective distress and personality. Alternatively, 
education was found to play a minor role in memory complaints, and verbal memory 
performance was found to be the most prominent contributor across all predictors 
included in the study. 
 Whilst there is little consensus regarding whether or not verbal memory 
performance is related to memory complaints (cf. Dux et al., 2008; Mendes et al., 
2008), results from the current study indicated that LM factor scores were the best 
predictor of memory complaints across every analysis, regardless of how memory 
complaints were assessed. In addition, LM factor scores were the only significant 
predictor of global memory complaints when overall depression status or situational 
anxiety was included as the measure of affective distress. Whilst neuroticism, 
extraversion and conscientiousness all exhibited stronger zero-order correlations 
with applied memory complaints than verbal memory performance, the overlap 
between measures of affective distress and personality (see Appendix G) likely 
contributed to LM factors scores being the prominent predictor. Then again, LM 
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factor scores exhibited a stronger association with global memory complaints than 
any measure of affective distress or personality. As mentioned earlier, this may be at 
least partly attributable to specific scenarios or behaviours in applied memory 
complaint measures being more likely to cue past experiences tied to affective 
distress or features of personality. 
 Alternatively, non-verbal memory performance was found not to be a 
significant predictor of either applied or global memory complaints. Zero-order 
correlations between VR factor scores and both applied and global memory 
complaints were in the expected direction, but also failed to reach significance. 
However, the discrepancy between verbal and non-verbal measures of memory in 
how well they predicted memory complaints in the current study likely does not 
solely reflect genuine differences in how different types of memory are related to 
memory complaints. Rather, verbal memory was most likely found to be a better 
predictor of applied memory complaints than non-verbal memory due to the content 
included in the GFF scale. The GFF scale includes two sections that assess 
subjective complaints pertaining to recall of written material in books, newspapers 
and magazines, so it is perhaps not surprising that the GFF scale correlates more 
strongly with recall for verbal information than for recall of line drawings. 
 However, verbal memory performance was significantly related to global 
memory complaints, whilst non-verbal memory performance was not. Given the 
manner in which global memory complaints were measured in the current study was 
content neutral (i.e., “How would you rate your memory in terms of the kinds of 
problems you have?”), this likely reflects the notion that older adults have a greater 
tendency to recall verbal memory problems than non-verbal memory problems. This 
may simply be attributable to such problems being more noticeable or occurring 
more frequently. For example, older adults frequently report problems with recalling 
names or items on a list (e.g., Amariglio et al., 2011) and such difficulties may carry 
considerable weight when making global judgements about one’s own memory. 
 Consistent with earlier research (Bassett & Folstein, 1993; Gagnon et al., 
1994; Jonker et al., 1996; Schofield et al., 1997), education also played a small role 
in predicting memory complaints in some of the regression models. For models 
predicting GFF scores that incorporated overall depression status or overall anxiety 
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status, partial correlations for education were both -.16 (both p < .05), suggesting 
greater frequency or severity of memory complaints for those with less education. 
However, zero-order correlations indicated little or no relationship between them, 
suggesting other variables in the regression models might suppress the relationship 
between education and memory complaints. 
 The remaining contextual variables (i.e., age, gender and premorbid 
intelligence) appeared to play little or no role in predicting memory complaints in the 
regression models. Age and premorbid intelligence exhibited little or no relationship 
with memory complaints, regardless of how complaints were assessed (see Appendix 
G). Whilst both age and premorbid intelligence have the potential to suppress the 
relationship between memory complaints and memory performance (see Merema, 
Speelman, Kaczmarek, & Foster, 2012, shown in Appendix A), this did not occur in 
the current set of regression analyses. This is likely attributable to this suppressor 
effect being relatively small and to the inclusion of a range of other variables, which 
either counteract or themselves account for this suppressor effect. Education, for 
example, was correlated with premorbid intelligence, and age with openness to 
experience (see Appendix G), which may have distorted this suppressor effect. 
 As with age and premorbid intelligence, gender played no role in the 
regression models predicting memory complaints. Gender exhibited a weak 
association with applied memory complaints, whereby males exhibited more 
frequent or severe complaints of memory problems (which may be partly attributable 
to small gender differences in LM factor scores). No significant association was 
observed between gender and global memory complaints, although the relationship 
was in the same direction as that observed with applied memory complaints. Whilst 
some research has found gender to play a role in memory complaints (see Derouesne 
et al., 1999; Jonker, Geerlings, & Schmand, 2000), the current results suggest that 
this role may not exist beyond memory performance, features of affective distress 
and personality. 
Theoretical Implications 
 In both empirical literature and the small number of available models 
detailing memory complaints and their predictors, it is typically assumed that 
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affective distress (usually depression) exhibits a direct influence on memory 
complaints. However, whilst depression is associated with pessimism (Sha, 2006) 
and low self-esteem (Sowislo & Orth, 2013), there are few features of clinically-
diagnosed depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) that should logically 
be directly associated with more frequent or severe complaints of memory problems. 
Depressed mood, irritability, loss of interest or pleasure, weight change, sleep 
disturbance, changes to daily activities, fatigue, guilt, difficulties concentrating or 
suicidality should not exhibit much of a direct influence on memory complaints. 
Feelings of worthlessness may exhibit a direct influence, though there has been little 
or no empirical research performed to assess this. Sleep disturbance, loss of interest, 
fatigue and difficulties concentrating may exhibit an indirect influence via their 
impact on memory performance, but a direct link between depression and memory 
complaints is somewhat questionable, given the criteria it is composed of and the 
lack of evidence linking specific facets of depression to complaints. 
 Whilst further research is required to establish the precise nature of the 
relationship between affective distress and memory complaints in the context of 
personality, the consistency of the results found in the current study suggest that 
affective distress and memory complaints may not be directly related. If continued 
research efforts continue to support the findings reported here (that affective distress 
is not predictive of memory complaints beyond personality), it will require a 
significant shift in how memory complaint theories conceptualize the relationship 
between affective distress and memory complaints. In addition, it will require a shift 
in how this relationship is viewed and interpreted in empirical research, both in past 
and future studies. 
 The MSE framework (Berry, 1999) proposes a direct relationship between 
physiological arousal or mood state and self-evaluations of one’s own memory 
performance. For example, experiences of anxiety (e.g., increased heart rate) are 
interpreted as a vulnerability to poor performance, which consequently negatively 
affect self-evaluations. Likewise, negative mood states associated with depression 
are seen as impacting on memory complaints because they distort one’s perception 
of their own abilities. In the context of the results obtained in the current study, the 
MSE framework overlooks the role of personality and the possibility that 
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physiological arousal, mood states or affective distress might be related to memory 
complaints as a result of underlying factors such as self-confidence or self-esteem. 
Whilst this notion is not central to the purpose of the MSE framework, it presents 
itself as a serious limitation with regard to how accurately and comprehensively the 
framework is able to account for and predict memory self-evaluations. 
 Similarly, the Social Support Model (Chan et al., 2007) also suggests mood 
(specifically depression) is associated with memory complaints. The model was 
developed primarily to predict and promote further study on the chronological 
associations between social support, depression and complaints. The results of the 
current study do not directly contradict the assertions made by the Social Support 
Model. That is, despite the fact that features of personality or more fundamental 
components of self-concept may be largely responsible for the association between 
depression and memory complaints, the results of the current study do not preclude a 
relationship between depression and memory complaints; they simply suggest it may 
be indirect in nature. Thus, if it is indeed found to be the case that affective distress 
is not associated with memory complaints beyond personality, it will render the 
Social Support Model somewhat insufficient for accounting for the depression-
memory complaints relationship. Personality as an alternative explanation for the 
associations between social support, depression and memory complaints needs to be 
examined in order for the Social Support Model to maintain its accuracy and 
completeness. 
 The Mediation Model (Crane et al., 2007) takes a slightly different approach 
to the MSE framework and the Social Support Model in that it was designed 
primarily to clarify the nature of the relationship between depression and memory 
complaints. The Mediation Model, although it offers a slightly different 
interpretation, is somewhat consistent with the results obtained in the current study. 
The Mediation Model suggests that depression and memory complaints are not 
directly related, but rather connected through negative cognitive bias (Crane et al., 
2007), such that the negative cognitive bias often observed in depression, and not the 
depression itself, increases memory complaints. This may be the case, though given 
the results obtained in the current study, further research is required to rule out the 
possibility that an underlying concept like self-esteem might be responsible for the 
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relationships proposed in the Mediation Model. That is, perhaps self-esteem is 
responsible for the associations between depression, negative cognitive bias and 
memory complaints but is more closely tied to negative cognitive bias. 
Consequently, any aspect of self-esteem that plays a role in the association between 
depression and memory complaints might be quashed when negative cognitive bias 
is entered into the model. Thus, the notion that negative cognitive bias appears to 
mediate the relationship between depression and memory complaints could also be 
accounted for by the hidden influence of self-esteem (or a range variables). 
 Niederehe’s (1998) CDM is the only model to incorporate both affective state 
(e.g., depression) and personality traits (e.g., neuroticism) as distinct entities that 
contribute to memory complaints. The CDM proposes that personality traits 
influence memory complaints directly as well as indirectly via its influence on 
affective states. Likewise, affective states are said to exhibit an influence on memory 
complaints directly as well as indirectly via their influence on memory performance. 
In essence, the CDM adopts the same views as the predisposition and 
pathosplasticity models (Klein et al., 2011) or the vulnerability hypothesis (Andersen 
& Bienvenu, 2011), given it endorses the view that personality influences affective 
states but not the reverse. Whilst there is considerable evidence for this and other 
viewpoints (see Chapter 3, Personality and Affective Distress), the model at least 
formally acknowledges the role of personality as distinct from the role of affective 
distress. 
 In the context of the current study, Niederehe’s (1998) CDM would propose 
that personality should be associated with memory complaints beyond affective 
distress (which it was), and that affective distress should be associated with memory 
complaints beyond both personality and memory performance (which it was not). 
Whilst further research is required to confirm the absence of a relationship between 
affective distress and memory complaints beyond personality, the results obtained in 
the current study are inconsistent with the CDM in that they suggest no direct 
relationship between affective distress and complaints. It could be argued that the 
association between affective distress and memory complaints is direct, but that this 
entire association stems from the influence of personality features (given their 
inclusion in the model reduced the predictive value of all measures of affective 
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distress almost to zero). However, even if this is found to be the case, it suggests 
little need for including affective distress as a predictor, given it provides no 
additional explanation. 
Whilst the results from the current study were unanimous with regard to 
affective distress and personality, and clear recommendations with regard to relevant 
theory are possible, it is also worth commenting on the limitations of theory 
pertaining to memory complaints more generally and the extent to which theory can 
play a role in the literature. There is evidence in the literature that depression, 
anxiety, specific features of personality, and memory performance are all predictive 
of memory complaints (see Chapters 2 and 3). However, many of the relationships 
that are reported are typically not very strong and are likely highly dependent on 
what measures are utilized in the research and the characteristics of the sample 
(including how participants are recruited). 
For example, different results were obtained in the current study with regard 
to whether or not personality predicted memory complaints depending on whether 
complaints were conceptualized on a continuum in applied settings or as a more 
global, high-low dichotomy. Despite being one of the more reliable predictors of 
memory complaints, neuroticism was found to significantly predict applied memory 
complaints, but not global memory complaints, across all of the regression models. 
As mentioned earlier, this may be attributable to applied measures of complaints 
more readily cueing previous experiences associated with neuroticism. Regardless of 
why this occurred, it demonstrates very well the fragility of relationships in this 
research area, which presents as a severe limitation to theory development. That is, if 
seemingly pertinent relationships are dependent on how concepts are measured, it is 
difficult to imagine how a reliable theoretical framework might develop. 
In addition, sample characteristics also have the potential to play a role in 
memory complaint studies. Indeed, an earlier study by Kliegel, Zimprich and Eschen 
(2005) reported different results regarding the role of depression in overall cognitive 
complaints beyond neuroticism depending on the type of sample. The study reported 
that depression remained a useful predictor of cognitive complaints beyond 
neuroticism (in fact, it was a better predictor than neuroticism) for a sample of 
healthy older adults. Alternatively, for participants with age-associated cognitive 
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decline (AACD), depression was not found to be a useful predictor of cognitive 
complaints beyond neuroticism. This may be attributable to AACD participants 
exhibiting more worry (a key component of neuroticism) because of observed 
cognitive decline, both of which may increase complaints. Likewise, participants in 
the current study were recruited via advertisements pertaining specifically to 
memory, which may also have attracted more worried or neurotic individuals. In 
Kliegel et al.’s study, however, healthy older adults were recruited for research into 
more general aspects of aging, which may explain why neuroticism was not found to 
be the strongest predictor. 
Thus, it seems likely that relationships that surface within memory complaint 
research may be sensitive to differences in how relevant variables are conceptualized 
or on what type of sample the research is based. An unfortunate consequence of this 
instability is that any theory pertaining to memory complaints is likely to be 
applicable only under a specific set of circumstances or in a specific context. As a 
result, theoretical frameworks relating to memory complaints can likely offer little 
with regard to guiding future research or understanding memory complaints on a 
more general level (i.e., outside of specific populations or across research that 
conceptualizes variables differently). This may partly explain the slow rate at which 
theory in this area has developed as well as why existing theories have failed to 
garner much support. 
Clinical Implications 
If it is the case that the results reported in the current study can be replicated 
and that they generalize beyond the measures utilized here, then there are two 
important clinical implications for older adult populations. Firstly, in addition to 
earlier suggestions that memory complaints in older adults should prompt health 
professionals to screen for mental health problems (see Harwood et al., 2004), the 
current results may explain why older adults complaining of memory problems may 
exhibit an ongoing risk of depression, even if it is not present at the time the 
complaint is made. Secondly, the results may also help to further explain why 
otherwise-healthy older adults complaining of memory problems exhibit an 
increased risk of subsequent dementia (see Geerlings et al., 1999; St John & 
Montgomery, 2002; Tobiansky, Blizard, Livingston, & Mann, 1995; Wang et al., 
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2004), despite the absence of cognitive dysfunction at the time the complaint was 
made. 
 Whilst memory complaints in older adults are clearly associated with the 
presence of depression or symptoms of it (see Chapter 2), research also suggests 
memory complaints are associated with an increased risk of subsequent depression, 
even in healthy older adults (Tobiansky et al., 1995). Whilst it is difficult to conceive 
of why memory complaints might precede a later diagnosis of depression in healthy 
older adults, the results of the current study provide some indication of why this 
might be the case. Indeed, given memory complaints may be tied to more long-term 
aspects of personality rather than more transient periods of affective distress, it may 
be the case that older adults who complain more about memory problems might 
exhibit personality characteristics that maintain a higher risk of a diagnosis of 
depression or anxiety across older adulthood. Thus, features of personality might 
increase complaints (and the risk of mental health issues) at one time point, but also 
increase the risk of mental health issues at later time points as well. Consequently, 
memory complaints in older adults may warrant screening for mental health 
problems both at the time of the complaint, but also at later time points as well. 
Given prevention of mental health problems is preferable to treating them, memory 
complaints may be a particularly valuable screening method for older adult 
populations. However, the extent to which they are useful for identifying subsequent 
mental health problems requires further study. 
In addition, the current results also provide further explanation as to why 
memory complaints appear to be predictive of a subsequent dementia diagnosis, even 
if cognitive functioning presents as normal at the time the complaint is made. There 
is now ample evidence that the presence of depressive symptoms increases the risk 
of a diagnosis of dementia in later-life (e.g., Barnes et al., 2012; Byers, Covinsky, 
Barnes, & Yaffe, 2012; Byers & Yaffe, 2011). Paradoxically then, the fact that 
memory complaints predict subsequent dementia may be totally unrelated to an 
ability to detect some level of preclinical cognitive decline. Instead, this relationship 
between complaints and a subsequent diagnosis of dementia may, in some cases at 
least, be a function of depressive symptoms (which coincide with memory 
complaints) increasing risk of dementia. Then again, the pathophysiological changes 
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associated with dementia are thought to begin many years prior to the symptoms of a 
formal diagnosis of dementia becoming apparent (Sperling et al., 2011). It may be 
the case that such pathophysiological changes impact on memory performance 
(which then influence memory complaints), even if the impact of such changes 
cannot be detected by clinical testing. Thus, additional research is necessary to 
support a connection between memory complaints, depression and dementia, 
independent of actual memory dysfunction. 
A recent meta-analytic review by Low, Harrison and Lackersteen (2013) 
examining whether features of personality are predictive of subsequent dementia 
offers support for this explanation. The meta-analysis examined the associations 
between the Big Five personality traits and risk of a subsequent diagnosis of 
dementia in 12 longitudinal studies and three case-control studies. The results of the 
meta-analysis suggest that whilst extraversion and agreeableness were not linked to 
subsequent dementia status, neuroticism increased the risk of dementia and both 
conscientiousness and openness protected against it. Whilst it is possible that one or 
more factors may underlie the association between personality and a subsequent 
dementia diagnosis, it can also be understood within the context of the predisposition 
or pathosplasticity models for depression. That is, specific personality features may 
increase or decrease the risk of subsequent mental health problems (including 
depression), which in turn may increase or decrease the risk of a dementia diagnosis. 
Furthermore, personality features may also increase the likelihood of a memory 
complaint being made, thus creating an indirect relationship between complaints and 
a later diagnosis of both depression and dementia. This set of relationships is 
depicted in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Model linking personality, memory complaints, depression and dementia 
(derived from the current results and the predisposition and pathoplasticity models). 
Solid lines represent direct relationships, whilst broken lines represent indirect 
associations. 
Limitations 
 Whilst the results of the current study have some important implications for 
healthy ageing in older adulthood, these need to be considered within the context of 
a few limitations. Firstly, whilst personality and affective distress were treated as 
separate concepts in the current study (and are treated separately by most models in 
the literature), it is possible that affective distress influenced reporting on measures 
of personality. For example, participants experiencing a greater number or more 
severe symptoms of depression may have reported higher levels of neuroticism, not 
because it characterizes their personality but because symptoms of depression may 
simply influence reporting. Thus, the finding that affective distress did not contribute 
to memory complaints beyond measures of personality in older adults should be 
viewed with this in mind. Perhaps affective distress failed to contribute to memory 
complaints beyond personality because its value as a predictor was already expressed 
through its impact on reporting for personality measures. It is difficult to 
conceptualize how one might go about dealing with this issue in future, although 
Dementia 
Depression 
Memory 
Complaints 
Personality 
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observing the expression of personality at different time points (and hopefully under 
different levels of affective distress) may offer some insight. 
 Another limitation of the current study pertains to the sample and the manner 
in which the participants were recruited. For the current study, participants 
responded to an advertisement for a study on memory placed in a local newspaper. 
Therefore, given participants were required to seek out the researchers, rather than 
being selected from a general pool of participants, it is unlikely that many 
participants in the current study exhibited symptoms of affective distress severe 
enough to warrant a formal diagnosis of a mood disorder or an anxiety disorder 
(DASS scores in the current study also supported this). Consequently, the notion that 
memory complaints might offer a clinically-useful screening tool for subsequent 
mental health problems in older adult populations needs to be examined in clinical 
populations. Certainly this sampling method may account for why some previous 
studies have found aspects of mental health to be useful predictors of cognitive 
complaints beyond personality (Kliegel & Zimprich, 2005; Kliegel et al., 2005; 
Pearman & Storandt, 2004), given such previous studies have generally contacted 
potential participants, rather than the other way around. However, participants who 
are required to seek out researchers in order to participate in a study are probably 
more representative of community-dwelling adults likely to present to memory 
clinics or mental health professionals in primary health-care settings with complaints 
of memory problems. Indeed, it may be the case that affective distress increases 
memory complaints in older adults but reduces the likelihood of them being 
reported. 
 It should also be noted that the current study deviated from normal testing 
procedures for the WMS-IV when gathering data from participants. When a full 
WMS-IV battery is administered, standard testing procedures involve administering 
the Verbal Paired Associates subtest between the immediate and delayed 
components of the VR and LM subtests. However, this subtest was substituted with 
the MFQ, NEO-FFI and DASS questionnaires in the current study. Whilst care was 
taken to maintain the same time delay as that used in standard testing procedures 
(i.e., 20-30 minutes), differences in task difficulty and content between completing 
the questionnaires and completing the Verbal Paired Associates subtest may have 
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impacted performance on the delayed components of the VR and LM subtests. 
Consequently, the scale scores presented in Table 14 for the delayed components of 
the VR and LM subtests may not be an accurate reflection of the overall mean 
performance of the sample. However, this change in testing procedures likely 
impacted little on the main conclusions drawn from the results of the current study, 
given how this data was treated in the analysis. 
 One final issue to be considered in the context of memory complaint research 
more generally is the matter of skewed data on measures of affective distress. For all 
measures of affective distress in the current study, raw scores exhibited a strong 
positive skew (such that a large proportion of participants showed little or no sign of 
distress). This was dealt with in the current study by grouping participants into high 
or low levels of distress on the basis of clinical cut-offs in the DASS (for overall 
measures of affective distress) or simply as the presence or absence of symptoms 
(for subscale measures). Whilst treating the data in this manner makes it more 
amenable to a multiple regression analysis, it likely does not correct for the loss of 
strength in relationships between variables that results from using skewed data 
(Dunlap et al., 1995). In contrast, most measures of personality (including the NEO-
FFI) are typically designed for use in non-clinical populations, and so do not 
encounter the same problems with skew that measures of affective distress often do. 
Consequently, this should be taken into account when comparing affective distress 
and personality as predictors of memory complaints. The issue of skewed data in 
measures of affective distress could be managed more effectively in future by 
utilizing measures of affect that range from extreme positive to extreme negative, 
rather than simply assessing negative affect. 
Future Research 
 The results of the current study suggest a substantial shift is required with 
regard to how memory complaints are considered to be related to affective distress in 
older adults. For nearly 25 years, the relationship between affective distress 
(including depression and anxiety) and memory complaints in older adults has been 
conceptualized as being direct in nature. However, in the first study specifically 
designed to examine whether two measures of affective distress (i.e., depression and 
anxiety) contribute to memory complaints beyond measures of personality, the 
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results presented here suggest that neither depression nor anxiety directly contribute 
to memory complaints in older adults beyond features of personality. Given the 
substantial shift in thinking with regard to how the relationship between affective 
distress and memory complaints in older adults would need to be conceptualized 
(based on the current results), future studies must attempt to replicate the results 
presented here. 
Furthermore, additional research should attempt to replicate these results 
using other measures of affective distress and personality. Whilst the NEO-FFI and 
DASS are both reliable and valid measures of personality and affective distress, 
respectively, it may be the case that the DASS scales are particularly sensitive to 
aspects of personality or that the NEO-FFI scales are particularly sensitive to levels 
of affective distress. Thus, to accept that affective distress does not directly 
contribute to memory complaints beyond personality, it is necessary to observe 
whether the results of the current study can be reproduced with different measures. 
Other measures of affective distress that could be utilized include Beck’s (1987; 
1988) scales, Hamilton’s (1960; Maier, Buller, Philipp, & Heuser, 1988a) scales, or 
the CES-D (Radloff, 1977). For personality, one could utilize the EPQ-R (Eysenck 
& Eysenck, 1991), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Butcher et al., 
1989), or the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
A second issue that needs to be addressed in the literature is whether the 
results of the current study generalize to a clinical context. That is, do clinical levels 
of depression and anxiety contribute directly to memory complaints, or can this 
relationship also be explained by features of personality, as it was with the measures 
of affective distress utilized here? Also, if there is a direct relationship between 
clinical levels of affective distress and memory complaints, does it persist across all 
anxiety and mood disorder diagnoses? Theoretically, this is an important question 
given it may further complicate the already-complex and frail theoretical frameworks 
to an extent that renders them meaningless. 
Likewise, it is also important from a clinical perspective given memory 
complaints may offer a viable screening method for groups at risk of experiencing 
subsequent and clinically-significant levels of depression or anxiety in older 
adulthood. This is an important topic given the ageing population and link identified 
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between late-life depression and dementia. This could be investigated via 
longitudinal studies that assess the association between the presence or severity of 
memory complaints at one time point and mental health problems at later time 
points. This could be achieved by assessing memory complaints in healthy older 
adults and then intermittently screening for mental health problems (e.g., mood 
disorders or anxiety disorders) as time passes. 
Another question to be answered by additional studies is whether or not the 
results obtained in the current study generalize beyond the age group assessed here. 
That is, if follow-up studies do in fact support the notion that affective distress is not 
directly related to memory complaints beyond features of personality, does this 
finding extend to younger age groups as well? Clinically, this may be of considerable 
importance, given memory complaints may offer a screening tool for subsequent 
mental health problems across the age spectrum. However, this is a distant prospect 
given additional research first needs to examine how well memory complaints 
predict subsequent mental health problems. 
One final issue within the memory complaint literature that has received little 
attention is the question of whether positive aspects of mood alleviate complaints, in 
addition to negative aspects of mood exacerbating them. When focussing on the role 
of affect in memory complaints, the literature typically examines the presence of 
affective distress (e.g., the presence of depression or symptoms of it). Whilst the 
level of distress experienced as a result of mental health problems has been found to 
be a consistent predictor of memory complaints (see Chapter 2), little is known about 
whether positive aspects of mood alleviate complaints, in addition to negative 
aspects of mood exacerbating them. Examining both the positive and negative 
aspects of mood as a predictor of memory complaints in older adults would also 
alleviate problems with non-normal data that is typically observed when assessing 
levels of affective distress in community-dwelling older adults. 
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SECTION TWO SUMMARY 
 Section one of this thesis outlined relevant empirical and theoretical literature 
that was used as a framework for the current study detailed in section two. Section 
two began with Chapter 5 outlining the rationale, objectives and research questions 
for the current study. In Chapter 6, the methodology for the research was discussed, 
followed by the analyses and results in Chapter 7, and the discussion pertaining to 
these results in Chapter 8. 
 The key objective examined by the study detailed in this thesis was whether 
affective distress plays a role in memory complaints in older adulthood beyond what 
can already be explained by features of personality. This was achieved by assessing 
the predictive value of overall and specific measures of both depressive symptoms 
and anxiety symptoms towards memory complaints beyond what could already be 
accounted for by the Big Five personality characteristics. Furthermore, the current 
study also examined this topic across both applied and global measures of memory 
complaints. In addition, this study examined the role of affective distress in memory 
complaints beyond personality within the context of memory performance, age, 
education, gender and premorbid intelligence. At the conclusion of Chapter 5, the 
research questions for the current study were outlined. Possible benefits of the 
current study were also outlined in Chapter 5, and included improved interpretation 
of prior empirical studies and theoretical frameworks as well as a possible 
contribution to mental health screening in older adulthood. 
 To achieve the objectives set out in this thesis, the current study collected 
data from community-dwelling older adults between the ages of 65 and 90 years. 
The sample included participants with little or no problems with vision, hearing, 
memory and language who had not previously undergone any formal assessment for 
memory functioning. A total of 177 older adults participated in the study and a 
correlational approach was used to examine concurrent associations between 
memory complaints, affective distress, personality, memory performance, age, 
gender, education and premorbid intellectual function. Participants were assessed 
individually within their own homes, which typically took around 90-100 minutes to 
complete. 
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 To examine affective distress as a predictor of memory complaints assessed 
via the GFF scale and a global complaint status (generated via responses to the first 
question on the GFF scale) within the context of memory performance, age, gender, 
education and premorbid intelligence, multiple linear and binary logistic regressions 
were conducted. For these regression analyses, all measures of affective distress 
(overall and specific) significantly predicted both measures of memory complaints 
(situation-specific and global), with the exception of overall anxiety status when 
predicting global memory complaint status. Despite the measures of affective 
distress almost unanimously predicting memory complaints, no measure of affective 
distress (overall or specific) significantly predicted memory complaints (assessed via 
the GFF scale or via a global complaint) beyond relevant features of personality. 
 Thus, the results of the current study strongly suggest that affective distress is 
not related to memory complaints beyond relevant features of personality. One 
possible interpretation of the results obtained in the current study is that memory 
complaints and affective distress exhibit an association with one another simply 
because both are associated with personality. That is, relevant features of personality 
have the potential to increase both complaints about memory and risk of affective 
distress. Consequently, memory complaints and affective distress exhibit a spurious 
relationship whereby they are correlated with one another but not causally related. 
However, the precise manner in which affective distress and memory complaints are 
related depends on the position one takes with regard to how affective distress is 
associated with personality (a range of models detailing this relationship were 
discussed in Chapter 3). 
 Regardless of the exact nature of the relationship between affective distress 
and memory complaints, the lack of association beyond personality characteristics 
indicates that a significant shift may be required in how this relationship is viewed, 
should additional studies continue to support the results obtained here. Furthermore, 
the results obtained in the current study may help to explain why otherwise-healthy 
older adults exhibit a subsequent risk of depression. Indeed, the relatively stable 
personality characteristics that increase the likelihood of a memory complaint being 
made may also put older adults at risk of depression (both at the time of the 
complaint and subsequently). For this same reason, the results of the current study 
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may also shed light on why healthy older adults complaining of memory problems 
also exhibit an increased risk of dementia. Given research continues to support the 
notion that late-life depression contributes to dementia onset, memory complaints 
may signal the presence of certain personality characteristics that put older adults at 
an increased risk of depression, and thus, dementia. However, further empirical 
studies will need to support the results obtained here using a range of measures for 
affective distress and personality. Furthermore, it is not yet known whether the 
results of the current study generalize to a clinical context. 
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Appendix B 
Advertisement Used to Recruit Sample 
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Appendix C 
Table 23 
Summary of Measures Used in the Current Study 
Variable Measure Outcome 
Applied Complaints 
Global Complaints 
GFF scale 
GFF scale – Q1 
33 – 231 
See Chapter 7 
Depression 
Dysphoria 
Hopelessness 
Devaluation of Life 
Self-Deprecation 
Lack of Interest 
Anhedonia 
Inertia 
Anxiety 
Autonomic Arousal 
Skeletal Effects 
Situational Anxiety 
Subjective Experience 
 
 
 
 
DASS – Depression 
Scale / Subscales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DASS – Anxiety   
Scale / Subscales 
 
 
 
 
See Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
See Chapter 7 
Neuroticism 
Extraversion 
Openness to Experience 
Agreeableness 
Conscientiousness 
 
 
NEO-FFI Scales 
0 – 48 
0 – 48 
0 – 48 
0 – 48 
0 – 48 
Non-Verbal Memory 
Verbal Memory 
VR subtest 
LM subtest 
See Chapter 7 
See Chapter 7 
Age 
Gender 
Education 
Premorbid Intelligence 
Years 
Male or Female 
Years 
NART 
 
 
 
0 – 50 
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Appendix D 
Information Letter 
Exploring Self-Reports of Memory 
The Study 
 
The current study is investigating how well people are able to predict their own 
memory capabilities and how this is influenced by personality characteristics and 
emotional wellbeing. The research is being conducted by Edith Cowan University 
(ECU) student, Matthew Merema, and conforms to the guidelines produced by the 
Edith Cowan University Committee for the Conduct of Ethical Research. 
The research is being carried out as part of the Doctor of Philosophy (Clinical 
Psychology) award at ECU. 
Participating in the research will take approximately two hours. During this time, 
you will be asked to participate in some memory tasks, some speech tasks and to 
complete some questionnaires that evaluate personality characteristics, emotional 
wellbeing and beliefs about your memory. As part of the research, you will also be 
asked questions about the presence of any language impairments, medications you 
may currently be taking and any previous head injuries or medical conditions (e.g., a 
stroke). 
 
Risks or Discomfort 
Some people may experience distress or discomfort when disclosing personal 
information about emotional wellbeing or their memory functioning. The process 
may also be distressing for some people should the testing procedures identify a 
potential impairment in memory or high levels of depressive symptoms, anxiety or 
distress. Please consider this carefully when deciding whether or not you wish to get 
involved in the study. 
Please feel rest assured that any information you provide will be held in strict 
confidence. Your personal information will be stored in a locked filing cabinet at 
Edith Cowan University. At no time will your name or identifiable information be 
revealed when reporting the results of the study. Please also understand that your 
participation in this research is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any 
time during the study without penalty or justification. You are also able to remove 
any data that you have contributed. 
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Benefits of the Study 
Participation in the project is free and provides you with a brief, non-clinical 
assessment of your memory. In addition, you can also feel satisfied that you have 
contributed to research investigating memory functioning and methods for 
identifying memory problems in their very early stages. 
If you wish to participate, please read and sign the attached informed consent 
document and return it to myself or my primary supervisor, Craig Speelman. 
If you have any questions relating to the study that you would like answered before 
deciding whether or not to participate they can be directed to: 
 
Matt Merema      Prof. Craig Speelman 
PhD Candidate     Head of Psychology Department 
Edith Cowan University    Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive     100 Joondalup Drive 
JOONDALUP WA 6027    JOONDALUP WA 6027 
Ph: 9304 4031      Ph: 6304 5724 
Email: mmerema@our.ecu.edu.au   Email: c.speelman@ecu.edu.au 
 
        
        
 
If you would like to talk to an independent person regarding this study, please direct 
enquiries to: 
 
Research Ethics Officer  
Edith Cowan University  
100 Joondalup Drive  
JOONDALUP WA 6027  
Phone: (08) 6304 2170  
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au 
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Appendix E 
Informed Consent Document 
 
I ___________________________ have read and understand the information 
document provided and any questions I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I also understand that if I have further questions I can contact the 
researchers listed on the information letter. I freely agree to participate in the study, 
realizing that I may withdraw at any time without penalty. I agree that research data 
gathered for the study will only be used for the purposes of the research and that it 
may be published, provided I am not identifiable. 
 
I understand that my participation in this project will involve: 
- Undertaking memory tasks 
- Undertaking speech tasks 
- Completing questionnaires relating to personality, emotional wellbeing and 
my beliefs about my own memory 
 
* I understand that my speech will need to be recorded during various tasks within 
the testing session and that this speech sample will be destroyed at the completion of 
the project. 
 
 
 
____________________________________            ___________ 
      Participant Signature                     Date 
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Appendix F 
Information Sheet Used During Testing Session 
 
ID#:         Date:         /       /       
 
Name:         
 
Ph:      
 
Address:            
 
How participant heard about the study: ________________________________________ 
 
Additional Comments:          
 
DOB:        /        /   Male / Female 
 
Vision  Hearing  
 
Education:          
 
First Language: English , other      
 
Medication(s):           
 
Previous Head Injury           
 
Stroke             
 
Language Impairment           
 
Memory Impairment           
 
Assessment Completed 
 
Info Cover Sheet  ........................................................................................................   
VR-I  ............................................................................................................................   
LM-I  ...........................................................................................................................   
NEO-FFI  .....................................................................................................................   
DASS  ..........................................................................................................................   
VR-II  ...........................................................................................................................   
LM-II  ..........................................................................................................................   
VR-II Copy ...................................................................................................................   
MFQ  ...........................................................................................................................   
NART  ..........................................................................................................................   
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Appendix G 
Table 24 
Correlations Between All Variables Used in the Analyses 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1. GFF -                          
2. Complainer -.45c - .16a .02 .09 .11 .08 .09 .19a .10 .10 .13 .14 .17a .08        .09 -.08   
3. Dep -.18a  - .54c .58c .70c .59c .57c .54c .42c .58c .29c .59c .44c .52c        -.02 .11   
4. Dysphoria -.02   - .49c .51c .48c .61c .52c .41c .39c .24b .40c .43c .37c        -.06 .10   
5. Hopelessness -.16a    - .54c .49c .60c .42c .32c .39c .17a .38c .46c .34c        -.07 .06   
6. Devaluation -.13     - .61c .52c .45c .31c .41c .16a .49c .35c .42c        .03 .12   
7. Self-Dep -.16a      - .47c .42c .27c .44c .18c .41c .38c .34c        -.08 .19a   
8. Interest -.13       - .47c .43c .40c .14 .43c .43c .38c        -.04 .05   
9. Anhedonia -.20b        - .33c .43c .26b .40c .51c .36c        -.01 .00   
10. Inertia -.14         - .35c .27c .28c .37c .32c        -.19a .04   
11. Anx -.15a          - .42c .58c .41c .44c        -.03 .17a   
12. Autonomic -.21b           - .30c .33c .23b        .07 .13   
13. Skeletal .00            - .30c .38c        .05 .08   
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Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
14. Situational -.26c             - .29c        -.03 -.06   
15. Anx Affect -.14              -        -.06 .02   
16. Neuroticism -.38c .20b .49c .44c .44c .44c .48c .38c .43c .20b .41c .33c .28c .30c .42c -           
17. Extraversion .42c -.24b -.26b -.21b -.27c -.15a -.19a -.26b -.28c -.23b -.19a -.35c -.08 -.30c -.19a -.44c -          
18. Openness .21b -.01 .02 .10 -.08 -.04 -.03 .03 -.03 .09 -.02 -.07 -.02 -.07 -.13 -.14 .07 -         
19. Agreeableness .22b -.16a -.29c -.20b -.22b -.25b -.26b -.23b -.23b -.16a -.10 -.14 -.17a -.15a -.13 -.22b .24b .07 -        
20. Conscientious .34c -.12 -.08 -.15a -.09 -.07 -.15a -.11 -.17a -.20b -.05 -.07 .01 -.07 -.16a -.32c .41c -.03 .19a -       
21. LM .28c -.25c -.20b .11 -.11 -.15 -.11 -.01 -.10 .03 -.16a -.16a -.07 -.15a -.04 -.12 .17a .17a .14 .05 -      
22. VR .12 -.14 -.23b .03 -.15a -.16a -.15a -.08 -.19a .09 -.18a -.13 -.22b -.16a -.04 -.09 .13 .17a .17a .12 .59c -     
23. Age -.02               -.06 -.02 -.21b -.02 -.02 -.33c -.46c - -.14   
24. Gender .16a               .15 .06 .01 .14 .19a .16a .07  -   
25. Education -.02 -.05 -.03 .00 -.07 -.07 -.11 -.05 -.09 -.10 -.06 -.07 -.01 .08 -.07 -.16a .03 .33c .00 -.08 .16a .07 -.12 -.05 -  
26. NART Errors -.09 .05 .07 -.06 .08 .04 .00 .00 .00 -.13 .06 .11 .01 .09 .08 .04 .08 -.38c -.07 .05 -.38c -.26b .17a .00 -.27c - 
Note: Values below the diagonal are Pearson correlations (df = 175). Values above the diagonal are Phi coefficients (N = 177). Age = Age Status (younger vs. 
older), Anx = Anxiety status (anxious vs. not anxious) Anx Affect = Subjective Experiences of Anxious Affect, Autonomic = Autonomic Arousal, Complainer = 
Complaint Status (high vs. low), Conscientious = Conscientiousness Scale scores, Dep = Depression status (depressed vs. not depressed), Scale scores, 
Devaluation = Devaluation of Life, GFF = General Frequency of Forgetting Scale scores, Interest = Lack of Interest, LM = LM factor scores, Self-Dep = Self 
Deprecation, Situational = Situational Anxiety, Skeletal = Skeletal Musculature Effects, VR = VR factor scores. 
a
p < .05, 
b
p < .01, 
c
p < .001. 
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Appendix H 
Results for Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Complaint Status from Anxiety 
Status 
In stage one, anxiety status was not a significant predictor of global memory 
complaint status (OR = 1.76, 95% CI [0.75, 4.12], p = .196). In stage two, 
neuroticism scale scores (OR = 1.06, 95% CI [1.01, 1.10], p = .023) but not anxiety 
status (OR = 1.13, 95% CI [0.44, 2.88], p = .806) significantly predicted global 
memory complaint status. In stage three, only extraversion scale scores significantly 
predicted global memory complaint status (OR = 0.93, 95% CI [0.88, 0.99], p = 
.024). Anxiety status (OR = 1.11, 95% CI [0.43, 2.91], p = .825) and neuroticism 
scale scores (OR = 1.03, 95% CI [0.98, 1.09], p = .207) still failed to contribute 
significantly to the model. In stage four, LM factor scores were retained in the model 
(OR = 0.61, 95% CI [0.43, 0.86], p = .005). In this fourth model, anxiety status (OR 
= 0.92, 95% CI [0.35, 2.46], p = .872) and neuroticism scale scores (OR = 1.04, 95% 
CI [0.98, 1.09], p = .194) both failed to contribute significantly to the model. 
However, extraversion scale scores (OR = 0.94, 95% CI [0.89, 1.00], p = .049) and 
LM factor scores (OR = 0.61, 95% CI [0.43, 0.86], p = .005) were both significant 
predictors of complaint status. Summary statistics shown in Table 25. 
Table 25 
Predicting Memory Complaint Status from Anxiety, Personality and Contextual 
Variables 
Model Predictors Included Nagelkerke R
2
 
Correctly 
Classified 
χ2 p 
1 Anx .01 53.67% 1.72 .190 
2 Anx, Neu .05 61.58% 7.08 .029 
3 Anx, Neu, Ext .09 61.02% 12.40 .006 
4 Anx, Neu, Ext, LM .15 63.28% 20.92 <.001 
Note: Anx = Anxiety status, Extra = Extraversion scale scores, LM = Logical Memory factor scores, 
Neurot = Neuroticism scale scores. 
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A final binary logistic regression analysis was run with only LM factor 
scores and extraversion scale scores in the model, given they were the only 
significant predictors of global memory complaint status. As the only predictors 
included in the model, LM factor scores (OR = 0.61, 95% CI [0.43, 0.85], p = .004) 
and extraversion scale scores (OR = 0.93, 95% CI [0.88, 0.98], p = .008) both 
significantly predicted global memory complaint status. The model correctly 
predicted complaint status (high vs. low) membership 64.41% of the time, 
Nagelkerke R
2
 = .14, χ2(1) = 19.09, p < .001. 
